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ABSTRACT
THE SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF AMERICAN 
SOCIOLOGY, 1960-1978: ITS SHORTCOMINGS AND ITS PROMISE
by
GERALD GINOCCHIO 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1981
This dissertation represents an attempt to explicate 
and critically analyze an important movement in contemporary 
American sociology. This movement, which I am calling the 
sociological critique of American sociology, aimed to change 
predominant trends in American sociology. Basic tenets of 
sociological practice were called into question, such as the 
principle of value neutrality, an empirical methodology, and 
a functionalist theoretical framework. The goal of this critical 
movement was to bring about a more significant sociology, a 
sociology which would lead the way to the realization of a more 
humane social order. In general, however, the criticisms offered 
by these critical sociologists represent no significant advance 
over "mainstream" sociology. The lack of depth in their criti­
cism, it is argued, relates to an unwillingness to address 
underlying philosophical questions, such as the validity of a 
subjective view of value. In this context, the suggestion of a 
more significant direction for this criticism and for a more 
significant sociology is seen to lie in philosophical argu­
ments put forth by principal members of the Frankfurt School 




The history of sociology, as is the case in the history 
of other intellectual disciplines, is one marked by contro­
versy and debate. Although considerable effort went toward 
establishing sociology as a legitimate discipline with its 
own particular object of investigation, sociologists have 
continually called into question all aspects of their disci­
pline and of its relation to the larger society. Such inter­
nal criticism is, of course, basic to the further advance of 
any intellectual discipline.
In the history of sociology in America, the past two 
decades has been a period characterized by a tremendous amount 
of such internal criticism. It is with an account of this 
internal critical movement, the sociological critique of Amer­
ican sociology, that this dissertation will be concerned. In 
the chapters to follow, the basic arguments, criticisms and 
proposals made in the context of the sociological critique 
of American sociology will be presented and discussed. Al­
though the bulk of this dissertation will Involve an expli­
cation of this critical movement, an attempt will be made to 
assess its shortcomings and its promise. That is to say, a 
determination will be made as to what in this movement points 
in the direction of a more significant, relevant sociology 
and what in this movement represents no significant advance 
over so-called "mainstream" sociology.
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To address such questions, of course, presupposes 
some notion of what constitutes a significant sociology. This 
is a question which, I will argue, can only be answered by 
determining the adequacy of the fundamental tenets of the 
sociological approach to understanding our world. And to make 
such a determination, I believe we must turn to philosophy, 
which suggests that a sociological critique of American soci­
ology must ultimately fall short of the kind of analysis that 
is necessary to erect a new sociology on a sound methodological 
and theoretical foundation.
Nonetheless, I believe the sociologists involved in 
this critical movement are to be credited with highlighting 
some serious problems in sociological thought and practice. 
Moreover, they did have some notion of a more significant 
direction for sociology —  that, for example, it would be one 
which would emphasize a close working relationship between 
sociologists and various social movements aimed at improving 
society. Yet, I would maintain, that insofar as they have 
failed to articulate a sound theoretical and methodological 
base for sociology, they have failed in one of their principal 
aims —  to make sociology relevant to our eternal efforts to 
improve society.
Let us, then, turn our attention to the task of delin­
eating the broad outlines of this sociological critique of 
American sociology. This will encompass a brief discussion 
of all of the most significant issues raised by critical 
sociologists. In addition, I will present an in depth analysis 
of the work of three Important forerunners of this critical
- 2 -
movement; namely, Robert Lynd, Pitirim Sorokin, and most im­
portantly, C. Wright Mills. This will provide a good back­
ground for the more detailed, specific discussion of the 
major points of contention raised by critical sociologists 
in the 1960's and 1970's.
(l) Origin and Major Manifestations of the
Sociological Critique of American Sociology
The selection of the year i960 as the starting-point 
for this examination of the sociological critique of American 
sociology was, in part, an arbitrary decision. More importantly, 
however, that particular date was selected both because it 
marks the beginning of one of the most turbulent decades in 
American history and because it is around this time that this 
critical movement began to blossom and take on far greater 
dimensions than anything of its kind in the past.
By i960, sociology had come of age as an academic 
discipline. It had become an accepted part of the college 
curriculum and its research activities had become widely re­
cognized and suppoted by both private and public organizations. 
Given this newly-won status, sociologists were increasingly 
called upon to contribute their knowledge and insight to the 
solution of pressing social problems. As such, sociologists 
could not help but be deeply affected by the social move­
ments of the 60's, especially the civil rights' and anti­
war movements, which brought these pressing social problems 
to the attention of the world. Sociologists could no 
longer Ignore the question of where they and their disci­
pline stood with respect to the Important social issues of
- 3 -
the time.*
Among the first discoveries made by sociologists who 
began to reflect critically on themselves and their profes­
sion was the conservative bias that was built into the prin­
ciple of value-neutrality, a principle generally accepted 
as an essential aspect of a truly scientific approach to the 
study of society. This principle came to be viewed as a kind 
of mask which concealed an underlying commitment to the es­
tablished social order and a disavowal of all forms of rad­
ical social change. Such characterizations of sociology as 
the following became commonplace during the 6o's: "Mainstream, 
contemporary sociology is largely the creation of cold war 
liberals who, for the most part, have been content to ob­
serve and rationalize the operations of the American co­
lossus from a position of privilege in the name of science 
[that is, as value-neutral observers] .1,2
For many of these critics, synonymous with "mainstream" 
sociology was the theoretical framework known as structural- 
functionalism which had been developed by Talcott Parsons 
during the previous decade. During the late 50's and early 
60's structural-functionalism came under increasing attack 
not only for its inadequacy as a general theory of social 
action but also, and more significantly, because it contained 
a built-in conservative bias which sanctified the established 
social order.
As most critical sociologists saw it, the problem here 
was fundamentally one of a lack of awareness on the part of 
sociologists of where they stood, of what their implicit biases
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were and of how these biases affected their work as sociolo­
gists. That is to say, these critics very soon discarded the 
possibility of a value-free sociology; all aspects of soci­
ological work were seen as involving value j u d g m e n t s . ^
Such considerations as those discussed above gave rise 
to one of the first major manifestations of the sociological 
critique of American sociology, the "sociology of sociology". 
Since the problem was conceived as basically one of either a 
lack of awareness of one's biases or a lack of honesty in not 
forthrightly declaring what these biases were, the solution 
was seen to lie in a self-reflective study of sociologists 
and their profession using sociological research techniques 
and theories which had been developed to investigate other 
occupations and professions. In the words of Alvin Gouldner, 
a leading figure in the sociology of sociology:
What is needed is a new and heightened self- 
awareness among sociologists, which would lead 
them to ask the same kinds of questions about 
themselves as they do about taxicab drivers or 
doctors, and to answer them in the same ways.
Above all, this means that we must acquire the 
ingrained habit of viewing our own beliefs as 
we would those held by others. It means, for 
example, that when we are asked why it is that 
some sociologists believe sociology must be a 
"value-free discipline", we do not simply reply 
with logical arguments on its behalf. Sociologists 
must surrender the human but elitist assump­
tion that others believe out of need whereas 
they believe because of the dictates of logic 
and reason.
This call for a "heightened self-awareness" among 
sociologists echoes throughout the work of those who have con­
tributed to the sociology of sociology. Along with greater 
awareness, it was argued, goes not only improvement of the 
individual sociologist's understanding of himself and his
work as a sociologist, but also eventual improvement of the 
discipline as a whole. The practice of sociology would be­
come more profound, more self-conscious, resulting, ulti­
mately, in more complete and valid knowledge of society. All 
this was to accrue from sociologists using sociological per­
spectives to study themselves and their discipline.
One does not have to reflect very deeply, however, to 
see that the mere attainment of self-consciousness by soci­
ologists could not possibly lead to all the improvements envi 
sioned by these sociologists of sociology. Recognition of 
one's implicit biases or of the inherent conservatism of main 
stream sociology, although important, is not sufficient in it 
self to provide substance and direction for the creation of a 
new and more significant sociology. An element of critical 
evaluation is necessary, in the context of which suggestions 
for the revision of the predominant modes of sociological 
method and theory can be made.
Judging from the kinds of studies that have been car­
ried out under the rubric of the sociology of sociology, crit 
ical evaluation is hardly in evidence. The kinds of studies 
which predominate are descriptive in nature. They are de­
scriptive in the direct sense that they seek to describe the 
current situation of sociologists and their discipline —  
what personal and social factors influence the work of soci­
ologists. But as far as evaluating the current situation and 
proposing more viable alternatives to current sociological 
practice, sociologists of sociology are noticeably silent.
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This point is further illustrated by what have been 
two prominent topics for empirical studies in the sociology 
of sociology contained in The American Sociologist; namely, 
the allocation of prestige to sociology departments (i.e., 
the ranking of sociology departments) and the measurement of 
sociologists’ productivity. These topics certainly involve 
reflection on certain aspects of the sociological profession, 
but in addition to being arguably trivial,^ none of these 
studies includes a significant element of evaluation. Outside 
of some suggestions for the improvement of measuring product­
ivity or prestige, there is no indication of how the knowledge 
gained from these studies is to lead to the development of a 
more significant sociology. Indeed, in reviewing the first 
ten years of publication of The American Sociologist, incoming 
editor Allen Grimshaw decried the growing interest in issues
having to do with the measurement of productivity and pres-
7
tige in sociology.
Another such study in the sociology of sociology con­
cerned the relationship between an author's theoretical orien-
Q
tation and the method of data collection employed. The final 
result of this investigation was a table which cross-classi­
fied the author's theoretical orientation and the kind of 
research technique used. Again, although this knowledge may 
help us better understand an aspect of current sociological 
practice, there is absolutely no suggestion as to how such 
information can be used to bring about a more significant 
sociology.
The descriptive aim of the sociology of sociology bears 
a close resemblance to the sociology of knowledge. In both, 
the principal concern is with seeking to uncover those social 
factors that help to shape a sociologist's work, the aim being 
to make sociologists aware of how such social factors Influence 
their work. This aim is clearly in evidence in Alvin Gouldner's 
first major excursion in the sociology of sociology, Enter 
Plato, in which Gouldner is principally interested in discus­
sing the relation between Plato's social theory and Greek 
civilization. At one point Gouldner characterizes his effort 
this way:
Some social scientists are interested in studying 
industrial workers; some study physicians, and 
still others, drug addicts and prostitutes. I 
happen to be curious about social theorists. They, 
as the anthropologists would say, are "my people".
The ultimate objective is to contribute to an 
empirically testable social theory about social 
theorists, as part of a sociology of science.°
Using sociology to study social theorists is quite 
clearly within the confines of a descriptive, sociology of 
knowledge approach. Indeed, Gouldner appears to be engaged 
in what could more accurately be called a "sociology of 
sociologists", as he himself indicates in the above passage.
His treatment of Plato and later, of Talcott Parsons in The 
Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, certainly bears this out.
An element of critical evaluation is necessary if one 
is to address the crucial issue of whether these influences on 
the work of sociologists are of beneficial or detrimental 
Import. Knowing, for example, that the conduct of social 
research has been heavily Influenced by preconceptions of
- 8 -
members of granting agencies as to what constitutes an accept­
able methodology is of no real help in addressing the more 
important question of the validity of various methods.
Perhaps in recognition of such questions, Gouldner himself 
diverges from a purely descriptive, neutral discussion of the 
social factors influencing Plato's social theory.
Although the bulk of Enter Plato is devoted to a 
descriptive analysis of the relation of Plato's social theory 
to Greek civilization, Gouldner leaves no doubt that he con­
siders Plato's ideas unsatisfactory; hence the Introduction 
of an element of critical evaluation. To be accurate, then, 
we must add to the above-quoted passage from Enter Plato the 
following statement: "Put otherwise, it is the task of the 
historian of social theory not simply to describe but critic­
ally to evaluate a theory in its historical setting."10 This 
recognition of the need for a critical sociological approach 
to the study of sociology, one which goes beyond the descriptive 
emphasis in the sociology of sociology,I would argue, repre­
sents a second major manifestation of the sociological critique 
of American sociology.
It is really only with the addition of this element of 
critical evaluation that we come to the heart of this critical 
movement as a whole. In distinguishing a "critical sociology" 
from a "sociology of sociology", I do not mean to imply that 
they can in reality be separated. These two manifestations of 
the sociological critique of American sociology are so closely 
intertwined that to speak of them as separate and distinct
- 9 -
would be to distort them.11 Indeed, those engaged in the soci­
ology of sociology have frequently expressed the hope (and 
belief) that their research, although basically descriptive
in nature, would lead ultimately to significant revisions of
12mainstream sociology.
Behind this entire critical movement there lies this 
hope: that a more valid, and hence more relevant, sociology 
could be brought about, a sociology which would be of more 
genuine practical benefit in seeking solutions to the complex 
social problems which became all too evident during the 6o's. 
Some sociologists saw that this hope could only be realized 
if a thoroughgoing critique and revision of current sociologic­
al method and theory were carried out. Mere descriptive 
analysis of the present status of sociology was seen as 
insufficient.
In terms of sociological theory, structural-function- 
alism has clearly been the major target of this critical 
movement. I have already briefly discussed the built-in 
conservative bias in this theory which runs contrary to the 
principle of value-neutrality. Beyond this, functionalism 
is argued to be an Inadequate theory of society, principally 
because it leaves out of account the important elements of 
social conflict and social change. Simply put, such critic­
ism represents an attempt to revise a major theoretical, 
framework In sociology with the intent of developing a more 
valid one. That more valid theoretical framework has been, 
logically enough, some form of conflict theory which recog­
nizes the central place of social conflict in the analysis
- 10 -
of modern society. Moreover, conflict theory, it is argued, 
avoids the conservative bias of functionalism, in particular 
the charge that it is a rationalization for the established 
social order.
In addition to conflict theory, critical sociologists 
turned to other alternatives such as a phenomenological- 
existential perspective. It was maintained that functionalism, 
with its emphasis on the functional interrelation of society —  
viewing society as a system, a whole —  tended to lose sight 
of the individual. Indeed, as we will see in much more detail 
later, many of these critical sociologists appear to have 
felt obligated to come to the defense of the individual in 
the face of what they believed to be both actual social domi­
nation and domination of the system idea in sociology. Alfred 
McClung Lee's "existential humanism" represents perhaps the 
clearest, and certainly the most forthright, expression of 
this view, as is plainly evident, for example, in the heading 
of Chapter 2 of his Toward a Humanist Sociology, "How Soci­
ology Can Magnify the Individual." In the eyes of the major­
ity of these critics, humanism is synonymous with the defense 
of the individual.
The development of a phenomenological sociology during 
the 1960's was not only part of the attempt to reaffirm the 
important place of the individual in society and in sociology, 
but it also encompassed a distinctive methodology which rep- 
sented a significant departure from the predominant survey 
and quantitative research techniques. Although the debate 
between advocates of quantitative and qualitative research
had been going on for many years prior to this time, the 
Increasing acceptance of the phenomenological perspective gave 
rise to greater use and discussion of qualitative research 
techniques. Conventional research methods, especially any form 
of survey research, were argued to be artificial instruments 
capable, at most, of obtaining people's reports of their be­
havior and beliefs, which may or may not reflect their actual 
behavior and beliefs. In contrast, phenomenological sociolo­
gists maintained that only by studying the actual behavior of 
individuals and groups in various social settings can one ob­
tain a valid picture of social life. This usually involves 
some form of participant observation in which the researcher 
actually participates in the everyday lives of the people 
being studied; it Is only In this way that a researcher can 
approach a "true" perspective, that is, the perspective of 
individuals and groups themselves which is defining of social 
reality according to phenomenological sociologists.
A specific manifestation of this distinctive approach 
to sociological research is that of ethnomethodology, which, 
in the words of Don H. Zimmerman, "...studies on-going social 
activity In order to discover the properties of the social 
organization of natural language which provide for the ac­
complishments of definite meanings, convergent definitions,
warranted accounts, all In the lively context of their 
til4occurrence. A
Some critical sociologists argued that conventional 
research utilizes a "consensus" methodology whereas ethno­
methodology and similar approaches utilize a "conflict"
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methodology. The use of the term "consensus" to characterize 
conventional research indicates that such research requires 
the cooperation of the people or groups being studied, a 
limitation which confines one to investigating the surface 
phenomena of society and which precludes investigation of the 
hidden, repressed aspects of social phenomena. Conflict 
methodology challenges those being studied rather than seeking 
their cooperation; it utilizes such devices as the law suit 
to uncover otherwise hidden aspects of social life.1-* In sum, 
the keynote in this entire line of criticism of predominant 
methodological approaches is that the only really valid ap­
proach to studying social life is to get deeply involved in 
it first.1^
In this brief discussion of the second manifestation 
of the sociological critique of American sociology, so-called 
"critical sociology", we have seen that the focus is basically 
on inadequacies in the discipline of sociology and not on 
inadequacies in the character of sociologists. This focus,
I believe, gives rise to the most significant contributions 
to the sociological critique of American sociology. Nonethe­
less, there remains a further manifestation of this critical 
movement.
Beyond the implications of this sociological self- 
criticism for the discipline itself, there lies the question 
of the impact of sociology upon the larger society. For the 
most part, these critical sociologists see their criticism of 
conventional sociological practice issuing in a more signifi­
cant sociology, which they believe will ultimately contribute
to the realization of a more humane, Just social order. That 
is to say, a significant sociology, in this view, is a rad­
ical sociology —  radical in the sense that the work of soci­
ologists contributes to a thoroughgoing transformation of the 
established social order.
That this sociological self-criticism has implications 
beyond the discipline itself and includes a commitment to 
radical social change is another feature of the work of Alvin 
Gouldner, in whose work we have already seen the other two 
major manifestations of this critical movement. In response 
to the criticism that his "reflexive" sociology is mere 
navel-gazing (i.e., sociologists contemplating themselves), 
Gouldner counters: "My call for a Reflexive Sociology was... 
scarcely intended to confine sociology to a study of soci­
ology [i.e., navel-gazing]. The goal was surely not to prevent 
studies of other parts of society but, rather, to enable them 
to be done more profoundly by sociologists with a deeper self- 
awareness, who had committed themselves and their work to 
human self-emancipation.
A radical sociology also entails actual participation 
in social movements seeking to transform the status quo, as 
did members of the so-called "Sociology Liberation Movement"
l8
during national sociological conventions in the late I960's. 
Having seen through the facade of value-neutrality so to speak, 
these critical sociologists perceived the need to make expli­
cit their position on social issues. The principal position 
adopted by these critics, in contrast to the cooperative 
nature of the relationship of conventional sociology with
the established social order, was one of direct opposition 
to the status quo. This opposition tended to take either of 
two closely-related forms: either (l) a commitment to a 
Marxist analysis of capitalist society and a Marxist vision 
of a just society, or (2) a commitment to what Gouldner calls 
"human self-emancipation", that is, to the radically demo­
cratic vision of a society consisting entirely of self-deter­
mined individuals.
Those adhering closely to a Marxist analysis of mod­
ern society frequently denounced conventional sociology as an 
instrument of the capitalist ruling class who are solely 
concerned with maintaining their privileged position in the 
status quo. Sociologists are exhorted to join ranks with the 
working class, Indeed with all oppressed classes, and take 
part in the struggle to overthrow the capitalist system.
Such radicalism Is forthrightly proclaimed in the preface to 
Radical Sociology: An Introduction edited by David Horowitz:
The present text, by contrast to most sociology 
texts, adopts a perspective more in harmony with 
the Interests of those further down the social 
hierarchy: it sees social conflict as a reflection 
of the imbalances of property and power at the 
heart of the present social order, and their 
intensification as possible preludes to the over­
throw of its inequitable, racist and imperial 
framework. It is in this sense a "radical" text­
book, unorthodox in Its methodology and approach, 
and untypical in its concern with the consequences 
of accumulated power and wealth, and its dis­
interest in the academically fashionable (pro­
fitable) problems of social administration.
In another anthology entitled Radical Sociology, the 
editors go as far as to include a number of articles on how 
sociologists can organize to help bring about major political
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20and economic change. Along with the advocacy of radical 
activity there also goes an adherence to a dialectical view 
of social change. One consequence of an adherence to a dia­
lectical view of social change is that it encompasses no 
clear conception of a just society —  the logic of this view 
suggests that there is no culmination to the dialectical 
process, no final resting place in history in which all 
contradictions will be resolved. Hence, the view of a better 
society which is adopted by many of these critical sociolo­
gists is characterized by what I will later call an "endless 
dialectic''. In this view, then, a radical sociology is one 
which assists in the creation of a social order characterized 
principally by continual debate, conflict, and change.
Even more widespread than this commitment to some of 
the basic tenets of Marxism was the closely related commit­
ment to the realization of a society in which individuals 
would be free from all forms of domination, whether that 
domination be manifested in the inequality of a capitalist 
economic system, a massive state bureaucracy, or the concep­
tual structure of sociology itself. The vision of a society 
of educated, free individuals engaged in a constant dialogue 
concerning the future direction of their society is a radical 
democratic vision that has deep roots not only in American 
history but also in the history of American sociology. In 
the history of American sociology one of the most influential 
expressions of this radical democratic vision is contained in 
the work of C. Wright Mills, whose overall influence on the 
sociological critique of American sociology has been great,
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as we will see shortly.
Among the most fervent defenders of individual autonomy 
among critical sociologists is Alfred McClung Lee. No better 
expression of this faith in democracy can be found than is con­
tained in the following passage from Lee's Sociology For Whom?:
Whatever optimism or pessimism we might have 
about the future of the human lot depends upon 
the relative speed with which broader popular 
participation may be achieved in the control and 
employment of social power. Will people learn 
how to participate in time to save themselves 
from the short-sightedness and greed of entre­
preneurs? Will people discover in time how to 
control themselves and their resources for human 
ends? Or will they continue to serve mostly as 
pawns in the vast and hazardous game-plans of the 
self-serving manipulators while the earth's re­
sources are being exhausted and human population 
continues to Increase.21
Alvin Gouldner's commitment to "human self-emancipation" 
is no less clear than that expressed by Lee in the above pas­
sage. It is significant to note, however, that Gouldner draws 
heavily upon the work of members of the Frankfurt School, an 
influential group of twentieth-century Marxist thinkers. The 
need to overcome the domination of individuals in our modern 
technocratic world is a pervasive theme in the work of these 
critical theorists of the Frankfurt School.
The preceding discussion of the broad outlines of the
soci'logical critique of American sociology should give us 
some notion of the various forms this criticism has taken.
Our primary concern In the rest of this dissertation will be to
add detail and critical analysis to the basic Issues that have
been merely touched upon thus far. As I indicated previously, 
the discussion of these basic issues (such as the debate
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over the merits of quantitative versus qualitative methods) 
had gone on in American sociology for many years prior to 
i960. Indeed, one could very well argue that the most signi­
ficant and influential critiques of American sociology were 
written prior to i960. In particular, I have three major 
works in mind: Robert S. Lynd's Knowledge For What? (1939), 
Pitirim Sorokin's Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology (1956), 
and most significant of all, C. Wright Mills' The Sociological 
Imagination (1959). Each of these works deals, at least to 
some extent, with all of the issues raised in the sociolo­
gical critique of American sociology. The Sociological 
Imagination alone encompasses all the basic arguments put 
forth, and greatly elaborated upon, by contemporary critical 
sociologists. Despite the significance of these earlier 
works, however, I would still maintain that it was not until 
the early 60's that the sociological critique of American 
sociology took on the dimensions of a full-fledged movement, 
a movement which has already had and will continue to have 
a significant impact on the future course of American 
sociology.
Nevertheless, I believe a brief synopsis of these 
earlier critiques will provide a good deal of insight into 
the nature of this critical movement, of its shortcomings 
and its promise.
(2) Precursors of the Sociological Critique 
of American Sociology
First published in 1939, Robert S. Lynd's Knowledge
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For What? is temporally the farthest removed from this cri­
tical movement, yet the similarities between Lynd's book and 
the work of these later critical sociologists is striking.
To begin with, the respective periods in American history in
which they were writing were among two of the greatest periods
22
of social unrest and social change in this country. In the 
late 30's, America was still struggling to recover from the 
depths of the Great Depression. The Roosevelt administration 
had proposed and implemented many new social programs to put 
people back to work and to get the country back on its feet 
economically. Radical groups such as the communist party 
achieved their highest membership during these troubled times. 
In short, the seriousness of the problems which beset America 
at this time suggested the need for profound socio-economic 
change. It is within this general context that one must view 
Lynd's criticisms of the social sciences; and, as I have 
indicated previously, It is within a similar general context 
of social unrest and social change that one must view the 
work of critical sociologists during the 60's and 70's. In 
the forefront of both critiques Is the common concern with 
developing a more significant sociology, one which would 
contribute to the amelioration of the pressing social prob­
lems of the time.
Lynd's analysis of the status of the social sciences 
is based upon a tenet which will later serve as a funda­
mental point of departure for the sociology of sociology, 
namely, that social scientists are human beings as well as
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scientists and that, as such, they and their work are subject
to all of the general social influences which affect the life
23
of any individual. Social scientists do not and cannot sit 
aloof from society and study it in a totally detached and 
neutral way. The personal and social backgrounds of social 
scientists invariably find their way into social scientific 
research and theory.
The recognition of the existence of such extra-
scientific influences leads directly to the call for greater
self-awareness among social scientists —  that they become
honest and forthright in acknowledging their biases and that
they do not try to hide behind the illusion that their work
is of a purely neutral, scientific nature. So, Lynd comes
out in favor of a position which is very close to one of the
major themes in the work of critical sociologists, a theme
that will be discussed in more detail later in Chapter III
as the "let's be honest" theme:
A social scientist has no place qua scientist 
as a party to power politics...But also, when 
the social scientist hides behind the aloof 
"spirit of science and scholarship" for fear 
of possible contamination, he is likewise 
something less than a scientist. We social 
scientists need to be more candid about our­
selves and our motivations. We should be more 
sensitive and realistic about what our evasions 
do to ourselves and to our science.
The point here being that the principle of value-neutrality
is illusory in the actual practice of social science.
But rather than leave the value question with the 
simple assertion of the need for acknowledging one's biases, 
Lynd takes this discussion a significant step further in
actually proposing an objective base or ground for value 
j u d g m e n t . Lynd proposes a standard by which one can judge 
of the soundness both of social scientists' understanding of 
society and of their contribution to the realization of a 
better society. He proposes that: "The values of human beings 
living together in the pursuit of their deeper and more per­
sistent purposes constitute the frame of reference that
p ^
identifies significance for the social sciences." These 
values, he goes on to argue, are not Just the stereotyped 
values of people in a particular culture, but they connect 
with what Lynd calls "persistent cravings" of human beings in 
general. To identify these persistent cravings and to use 
them as a basis for social reform is the fundamental task of 
the social scientist. This is what a significant social 
science involves.
Although one may certainly take Lynd to task for the 
vagueness of his conception of a sound social order and of how 
social scientists can help realize it, one must acknowledge 
the boldness of his proposal of an objective base for value 
judgment in the social sciences. It is a proposal, moreover, 
which does not dodge difficult philosophical issues. It is a 
proposal which the vast majority of critical sociologists are 
unwilling to hazard.
Lynd is particularly concerned with what he believes 
to be significant deficiencies in the predominant modes of 
research and theory in social science. Most prominent among 
these deficiencies is the lack of a psychological perspective.
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The social sciences, according to Lynd, had in a sense lost 
sight of the individual —  an assertion not all that different 
from the later criticism of functionalism as a theory which 
diminishes individuals by considering them as subordinate 
(ultimately, manipulated) elements of a social system.
Part and parcel of this emphasis on the individual for 
both Lynd and later critical sociologists is the notion that 
the basis of social reality is to be found by focusing on the 
behavior of individuals and not on the type of analysis which 
utilizes large, abstract concepts such as institutions, social 
systems, and the like. As Lynd clearly states, "...this view­
ing of culture in terras of the behavior of individuals provides 
the basis for a more realistic and coherent theoretical struc­
ture for the social s c i e n c e s . L i k e w i s e ,  the individual is 
seen as the key to efforts directed at improving society. Psy­
chology, "With its field...fortunately concentrated on the cen­
tral powerhouse of culture, individuals, it is in the strategic 
position of having the other social sciences turn increasingly 
to it for the solution of realistic problems —  mental health, 
education and child development, labor problems, advertising 
and market research, public opinion and propaganda. It is a 
safe prescription to almost any young social scientist-in-
pQ
training to 'get more psychological underpinning'." °
Putting aside for the moment the question of the 
validity of this line of reasoning, in bringing to the at­
tention of social scientists their blindness with respect to 
the crucial place of the individual in society, Lynd is
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indicating that a major problem with social science is the 
inadequacy of its general theoretical framework.
In a similar vein, Lynd also highlights deficiencies 
in the predominant research techniques utilized in the social 
sciences. Most notably, he criticizes the inherent conserva­
tism of descriptive, empirical research techniques, having in 
mind the gathering of data by means of questionnaires, inter­
views, and variants of these basic survey techniques. Lynd 
argues that the strict adherence to an empirical approach 
involves an implicit acceptance of the values and goals of
2Q
the established social order. ^
The job of the social scientist is not merely to re­
flect the prevailing opinions and beliefs of individuals but 
to penetrate "current folk assumptions" and get at the under­
lying reality. Put otherwise, the job of the social scientist 
is basically a critical one, one which the predominant descrip­
tive, empirical approach in sociology does not encompass. None­
theless, Lynd does not advocate the abandonment of any specific 
research techniques, just as later critical sociologists ul­
timately argue that all research techniques have a place in 
a more significant sociology.
What is perhaps more important, as we will see Mills 
also maintain, is that these research techniques have as their 
focus American society as a whole, that significant problems 
in our society guide the selection of topics for research rather 
than let the requirements of a particular research technique 
dictate the topics to be studied.^0 Ultimately, for Lynd,
- 23 -
the task of social scientists involves the careful investi­
gation of what he calls "outrageous hypotheses" —  hypotheses 
such as the following: "It is possible to build a culture
that in all its institutions will play down the need for and
31the possibility of war." This is, again, to emphasize the 
practical nature of social science research, since as Lynd 
notes, "There is no other agency in our culture whose role 
it is to ask long-range and, if need be, abruptly irreverent 
questions of our democratic institutions; and to follow these 
questions with research and the systematic charting of the
■30
way a h e a d . T h a t  social science has largely failed to live up 
to these expectations can be attributed, in large measure, 
to deficiencies in its theoretical and methodological under­
pinnings .
Writing some seventeen years later, in the midst of 
the emergence of structural-functionalism as the major 
theoretical framework in sociology, Pitirim Sorokin chose a 
similar focus for his critical analysis of sociology in Fads 
and Foibles in Modern Sociology. Although Sorokin has little 
to say about the practical implications of a more significant 
sociology for society (certainly the central feature of 
Knowledge For What?), he does discuss in detail major theo­
retical and methodological issues in contemporary sociology.
In his own words:
The creative renaissance of our disciplines 
requires a basic reconstruction of the prevalent 
conceptions of sociology and psychology. The 
central task of this reconstruction consists of 
replacing the prevalent defective views on what 
constitutes psychosocial reality, what is valid
knowledge of It, and what are the methods of 
its cognition, by more adequate conceptions 
of these fundamentals.33
In a general way, the above statement indicates Sorokin's 
willingness to attempt to resolve some very difficult and basic 
issues in sociology, issues which ultimately cannot be resolved 
without addressing underlying philosophical questions. For 
example, the question of what constitutes valid knowledge of 
society (or,"psychosocial reality" in Sorokin's terms) neces­
sarily takes Sorokin into two major areas of philosophical
'S/i
endeavor, namely, metaphysics and epistemology. Indeed, if 
one had to point to the major topic of discussion in Fads and 
Foibles in Modern Sociology it would be Sorokin's persistent 
criticism of sociology's "sham-scientific" methodology,^ 
during the course of which he not only exposes significant 
problems in predominant research techniques but also proposes 
what he believes to be a more adequate approach to studying 
society. And it is principally within the context of this 
crticism that we also get some notion of what Sorokin believes 
constitutes sound sociological theory.
In attempting to expose the methodology employed by 
sociologists In their research as being in fact unscientific 
and, In some cases, plainly invalid, Sorokin strikes a central 
nerve in American sociology. Characteristic of American 
sociology as a whole has been the constant effort to improve 
the validity, reliability, and overall accuracy of various 
research techniques by drawing increasingly upon developments 
in other sciences and in mathematics. It is precisely this
- 25 -
borrowing from other sciences and the field of mathematics 
that Sorokin casts considerable doubt upon. For example, he 
spends a good deal of time discussing the dangers of what he 
calls "quantophrenia" in modern sociology. He sees the use 
of elaborate statistical procedures and the results of these 
procedures as conveying a false sense of precision about 
what is essentially unquantifiable social phenomena.
When confronted by tables, graphs, or numbers of 
various kinds one tends to assume that studies employing such 
devices are accurate, objective scientific reports. Perhaps 
it is because of this that research utilizing some statistical 
procedure often receives favorable treatment by public and 
private organizations which support sociological research.
But this is precisely the false impression which Sorokin seeks 
to dispel: the introduction of statistics does not by itself 
make a study any more objective or scientific, much less 
valid.
Throughout his treatment of predominant modes of 
research, Sorokin brings to our attention the existence of 
strong subjective elements in so-called "objective" research 
—  a theme which we will see is later greatly elaborated upon 
by phenomenological sociologists and ethnomethodologists. The 
fact that most of the data collected by sociologists, particu­
larly by means of questionnaires or interviews, is of a 
subjective and therefore, highly uncertain, nature is not 
fully appreciated by most sociologists. Such weaknesses in 
sociological research are aptly summarized in the following
- 26 -
passage:
In brief, the bulk of recent psychosocial 
research deals with speech-reactions, gathered 
by speech-reactional operations, centered around 
wishful, hypothetical, "syndromatic" and sub­
jective utterances, rarely checked for their 
accuracy, sincerity and correspondence to the 
facts. This sort of "hearsay" is the material 
out of which most recent psychosocial theories 
and "research conclusions" have been manu­
factured by mechanically processing the "stuff" 
through the calculating gadgets of the 
statistical routine.3°
Although Sorokin contends that there is this sub­
stantial element of subjectivity in current sociological re­
search, he himself advocates a highly subjective approach to 
the investigation of social phenomena, which he refers to as 
"supralogical, suprasensory intuition." Such intuition, he 
goes on to argue, only comes through actual involvement In 
the particular aspect of social behavior one may be studying; 
that is, it takes a "direct cofeeling and coexperiencing" with 
those being studied for one to gain this kind of insight. It 
is through such intuition that the most truly creative thought 
has come, and certainly not through the"statistical routine."
In line with Lynd's call for social scientists to 
draw more heavily upon psychology, I believe Sorokin's argu­
ment here represents another attempt to make room for the in­
dividual In sociology —  specifically, to acknowledge the 
contribution of individual Intuition and insight to social 
research.
In contrast to Lynd, however, Sorokin does affirm 
his belief in the viability of the system concept, of viewing 
society as a whole. Indeed, his depiction of the stages of
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civilization development as the ideational, idealistic. and 
sensate represents a much more all-embracing conception of 
society than most American sociologists are willing to hazard.
In this context Sorokin also notes the futility of the search 
for "social atoms", whether these atoms be individuals, small 
groups, roles, or the like. Society cannot be understood by 
breaking it down into these so-called social atoms. Insofar 
as empirical research does Just that (i.e., break society 
down into smaller units) the knowledge gained from such re­
search is vastly Inferior to the knowledge which can be gain­
ed by an intuitional grasp of the whole.
This brief discussion of some of the principal themes 
in Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology has revealed Sorokin's 
fundamental concern with exposing and seeking to correct serious 
defects in the predominant theoretical and methodological ap­
proaches in contemporary sociology. Congruent with the major 
thrust of Lynd's criticism of the social sciences in general,
Sorokin is, In essence, arguing that the problem with sociolo-
37gy lies in the discipline itself and not In sociologists.
The meaning of this important distinction will become clearer 
when we discuss the work of later critical sociologists whose 
attention :is, more often than not, focused on sociologists 
themselves —  on their biases, on their complicity with the 
established social order, on their lack of courage to speak 
out forthrightly on controversial social issues.
Sorokin, in fact, provides a much more detailed criti­
cism of sociology than does Lynd, particularly as regards its
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methodological foundations. Sorokin goes as far as to chal­
lenge the validity of empiricism as the dominant theory of 
cognition underlying sociological research. But for all the 
fury of his criticism, Sorokin concludes his book on an equi­
vocal note, which tends to undermine the strength of that 
criticism. Imagine that after nearly 300 pages of detailed, 
vehement criticism of "empirical psychosocial science"
Sorokin can say:
The prevalent empirical psychosocial science 
has delivered especially during the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centu­
ries, important knowledge of man and his 
sociocultural universe. Helped in part by the 
logico-mathematical method, this empirical 
science has labored strenuously for several 
centuries. At the present time it is tired 
and has become somewhat neurotic and less 
creative.3°
This is to argue that empiricism was at one time a valid, 
creative basis of psychosocial science and that it is only 
because of its overuse that its validity and creativity have 
diminished, as if this theory of cognition, like a biological 
organism, was once young and vital but now is old and tired. 
The weakness of such a line of argument should be obvious 
enough.
What is significant about this equivocal stance which 
Sorokin takes here is that this represents no isolated phe­
nomenon, for there are numerous examples of such equivocation 
to be found in the work of critical sociologists. Much of 
the severe criticism of current sociological practice is 
burdened by such numerous qualifications that one gets the 
distinct impression that, as critical as these sociologists
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may believe they are, none of them seems to want to rock the 
boat too hard.
As insightful and significant as one may consider the 
criticism of sociology found in the work of Lynd and Sorokin, 
there can be no doubt that the most influential precursor of 
the sociological critique of American sociology was C. Wright 
Mills. Perhaps the most obvious evidence of his tremendous 
influence lies in the fact that some of the important antholo­
gies of critical sociology are dedicated to the memory of 
C. Wright Mills who died unexpectedly in 1962.39 Mills has, 
on occasion, been referred to as the "father" of this critical 
movement, as, for example, Robert W. Friedrichs notes in 
A Sociology of Sociology: "...only as the discipline discovered 
its consolidating paradigm —  system —  in grave difficulty 
was it tempted to open the pandora's box that was the soci­
ology of sociology. Indeed, it took the explosive impact of 
C. Wright Mills' The Sociological Imagination in 1959 for a 
sociology of sociology to intrude upon the sociologists' 
collective conscience.
In addition to the great praise for his insight Into 
the shortcomings and promise of sociology and his courage In 
challenging the sociological establishment, many of these 
critics discuss at length many of his major arguments, 
particularly those contained In The Sociological Imagination.
As I hope to point out throughout my presentation of the 
major themes of the sociological critique of American sociolo­
gy, all of these themes derive in whole or in part from The
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Sociological Imagination. So, a brief discussion of this 
seminal work here will set the stage for the later, more de­
tailed analysis of the major themes of this critical move­
ment .
Mills' interest in sociology and sociologists as objects 
of study and critical analysis actually goes back much further 
than The Sociological Imagination, published in 1959. As 
early as 19^3, Mills wrote an article entitled "The Profession­
al Ideology of Social Pathologists" in which he sought to 
expose the implicit biases in the work of social pathologists. 
Particularly significant in this early essay is Mills' attempt 
to demonstrate that the similar social backgrounds of these 
social pathologists were largely responsible for the similar­
ity in their approach to and definition of social pathology. 
Mills argued that their perception of what was wrong with 
American society reflected their small town, rural, middle-class 
backgrounds. They saw urban and industrial expansion as the 
principal culprits in most social problems, and to counter such 
"pathological" conditions, it was argued, we must strive for 
community welfare, stability, and the like, these being among 
the principal characteristics of a "healthy" society.**1
Mills' discovery of an implicit conservative bias in 
this early literature on social pathology parallels the later 
discovery of an implicit conservative bias in functionalism.
The existence of bias, of course, indicates the influence of 
extra-scientific factors in the work of sociologists —  that 
value judgments enter into the work of all sociologists in spite
of all the protestations of value-neutrality.
In this early essay, Mills also criticized the atom­
istic, fragmented view of society contained in the work of 
these social pathologists, a view of society which provides an 
inadequate basis for any program of political action to correct 
these ills. Social reform, in this context, becomes primarily 
concerned with correcting (i.e., adjusting) individuals rather
than addressing the larger, more crucial problems of social 
ii2
structure. What Is important to note about Mills' critic­
ism here is that It is based upon the recognition that a funda­
mental shortcoming In American sociology is the inadequate 
conception of society which sociologists, for the most part, 
presuppose.
In The Power Elite, another of Mills' major works, he 
takes up a highly controversial subject and treats it in a way 
which also reveals some fundamental shortcomings in modern soci­
ology. Among the most significant of these shortcomings is the 
failure to appreciate the existence and power of modern insti­
tutions. Mills focuses on three such centers of power: "These 
hierarchies of state and corporation and army constitute the 
means of power; as such they are now of a consequence not be­
fore equalled in human history —  and at their summits, there 
are now those command posts of modern society which offer us 
the sociological key to an understanding of the role of the high-
Jio
er circles in America. Sociologists' failure to perceive this 
fundamental fact of modern society, Mills goes on to argue, 
derives in large part from the inadequacy of an empirical
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methodology. An empirical approach to the study of society
may yield a lot of data but very little in the way of under-
44
standing of modern society as a whole. Hence, it is because 
of an inadequate methodology that sociologists have failed, by 
and large, to appreciate the true nature of modern society. 
Needless to say, such criticism goes to the heart of sociology.
That the most significant shortcomings of modern soci­
ology derive from its inadequate methodological and theoretical 
foundation is a theme which receives its most detailed and 
insightful attention in The Sociological Imagination. In ad­
dition, Mills' critical analysis of sociology is clearly tied 
to the potential practical benefit sociologists can bring to 
the society which they study. Prom the opening pages in which 
Mills depicts the malaise of contemporary American society,of 
people being unknowingly swept along by the blind drift of 
social forces they do not understand, the practical implica­
tions of sociology are highlighted (that is, how sociology 
can help alleviate this unhealthy condition of modern society). 
But sociology cannot contribute to social reform in a meaning­
ful way —  fulfill its promise -- in the absence of sound 
method and theory.
The basic defects of the predominant modes of theory 
and research in sociology are brought out in the context of 
Mills' discussion of "grand theory" and "abstracted empiri­
cism". Grand theory, for Mills, is synonymous with structural- 
functionalism and, even more specifically, with one of Talcott 
Parsons' major works, The Social System. Mills argues that
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Parsons' work represents an attempt to develop a universally 
valid theoretical framework to account for every important 
aspect of social life. He contends that this grandiose task 
is carried out with little regard for the historical record 
and with no thought of any significant social or sociological 
problem as a point of reference, which amounts to saying that 
Parsons was writing in a vacuum with no firm connection to the 
reality which he was attempting to capture in his theoretical 
framework.
In spite of the alleged thoroughness of Parsons’ theo­
retical framework, Mills perceptively notes that his analysis 
of the social order is in fact limited to "the institution­
alization of values", a focus which leaves out of account many 
important structural features of modern society (such as proper­
ty, for example).^ Moreover, in focusing on common values as 
that which holds society together, grand theory tends to 
enshrine the current normative order as necessary to social
stability, as functional; hence, Parsons is led to assume that
46virtually all power is legitimated. So, grand theory could 
not possibly be a part of a significant sociology which seeks 
to change the status quo. Indeed, to carry Mills' analysis a 
bit further, it can be argued that grand theory actually helps 
perpetuate the ills of modern society by regarding them not 
as evidence of something wrong In society as a whole but as 
sources of dissension and disorder in an otherwise stable, order­
ed society. The problem for grand theory, then, becomes one of 
adjusting to the status quo rather than seeking to change the
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present state of American society by trying to increase the 
scope of reason and freedom, as we will see Mills advocating 
later.
Whereas grand theory suffers from its implicit justi­
fication of the established social order, the most serious 
defects of abstracted empiricism derive from its having been
significantly shaped by the increasing bureaucratization of 
47modern society. ' That is to say, empirical research in soci­
ology has largely become bureaucratized:
In each and every feature of its existence and 
its influence, abstracted empiricism, as it is 
currently practiced, represents a 'bureaucratic' 
development. (l)In an attempt to standardize 
and rationalize each phase of social inquiry, 
the intellectual operations themselves of the 
abstracted empirical style are becoming 
'bureaucratic'. (2) These operations are such 
as to make studies of man usually collective 
and systematized: in the kind of research 
institutions, agencies, and bureaus in which 
abstracted empiricism is properly installed, 
there is a development, for efficiency's sake 
if for no other, of routines as rationalized 
as those of any corporation's accounting 
department. (3) These two developments, in 
turn, have much to do with the selection and 
shaping of new qualities of mind among the 
personnel of the school, qualities both 
intellectual and political. (4) As it is 
practiced in business — ...in the armed 
forces and increasingly in universities as 
well, 'the new social science' has come to 
serve whatever ends its bureaucratic clients 
may have in view... (5) Insofar as its 
research efforts are effective in their 
declared practical aims, they serve to in­
crease the efficiency and the reputation —  
and to that extent, the prevalence of bureau­
cratic forms of domination in modern society.
All of the above-mentioned bureaucratic characteristics 
of the predominant modes of empirical research run directly 
contrary to the kind of creative insight (gained by means of
- 35 -
the "sociological imagination") necessary to come to the best 
possible understanding of modern society. Rather than employ 
the talents of creative, independent thinkers, research organ­
izations tend to rely on technicians, those who utilize set 
procedures defined by "The Scientific Method". Mills notes 
that scientific method, statistics, and the like have become 
so important in sociological research that they have become 
the determining factors in sociologists' selection of topics 
to study. Topics of investigation which cannot be easily 
quantified and are not amenable to scientific method tend not 
to be pursued, which leads Mills to note: "...surely it is 
evident that an empiricism as cautious and rigid as abstracted 
empiricism eliminates the great social problems and human 
issues of our time from inquiry."^9 jt is this "methodological 
inhibition" which precludes the investigation of such important 
issues as the one Mills himself outlines in his opening remarks 
in The Sociological Imagination.
An even more fundamental defect of contemporary soci­
ological research lies in its dubious philosophical base, in 
particular, the theory of knowledge which it presupposes. In 
a passage reminiscent of criticism put forth by members of the 
Frankfurt School, Mills argues that empirical research can never 
penetrate the realm of appearance, the realm of opinion; it 
only reflects people's perception of reality which may or may 
not be accurate and which, in our mass culture, is quite often 
manipulated: "Many problems with which its practitioners do 
try to deal -- effects of mass media, for example —  cannot be
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adequately stated without some structural setting. Can one 
hope to understand the effects of these media —  much less 
their combined meaning for the development of a mass society - 
if one studies, with whatever precision, only a population 
that has been 'saturated' by these media for almost a 
generation?
Closely related to the above observation is Mills' 
criticism of the "building block" theory of knowledge which 
holds that the results of these narrow empirical studies can 
somehow be added up to yield more significant general con­
clusions. But no matter how many studies of the psychological 
reactions of individuals sociologists add up, Mills argues, 
they will never gain any insight into the nature of social 
structure and its significance for the lives of individuals.^^
Although Mills does not pursue this line of criticism 
much further, he leaves no doubt as to what he believes is a 
more adequate approach to the study of social life. This 
approach, broadly defined, involves historical and comparative 
research in the tradition of classical sociological theorists, 
the most important representative of which for Mills is Max 
Weber. Weber's work in the areas of religion and economics 
is particularly noted for the depth of its historical and 
comparative analysis.52 Just what such an approach involves 
is indicated in the following observation: "Comparative study 
and historical study are very deeply involved with each other. 
You cannot understand the underdeveloped, the Communist, the 
capitalist political economies as they exist in the world
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today by flat, timeless comparisons. You must expand the 
temporal reach of your analysis."53
What is especially significant about Mills' approach 
is its holistic nature; that is, rather than study isolated 
segments of social life or individuals in isolation from the 
larger social structure, these classical theorists clearly 
perceived the necessity of studying social life in its full 
historical, structural setting if one is to get a valid pic­
ture of social life. This alternative approach is, of course, 
captured in what Mills calls the "sociological imagination" 
which he defines at one point as that which "...enables its 
possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms 
of its meaning for the inner life and external career of a 
variety of individuals."^ Put somewhat differently: "The 
sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and 
biography and the relations between the two within society.
That is its task and its promise. To recognize this task and 
this promise is the mark of a classic social analyst."55
Not only does the sociological imagination have impli­
cations with respect to methodology but it also clearly entails 
an alternative conception of society, a conception of society 
which emphasizes social structure. Social structure, for Mills, 
basically involves the institutions of modern society (govern­
ment, economy, religion, etc.) and their interrelationship.
The most inclusive unit of social structure is the nation­
state, for it is "The nation-state which is now the dominating 
form in world history and, as such, a major fact in the life
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of every man."56 Such a view of society contrasts significant­
ly with both Parsons' focus on institutionalized values and 
abstracted empiricism's "psychologism".
Perhaps the most significant element of Mills' critique 
of the predominant modes of method and theory in contemporary 
sociology is his discussion of the value question. Mills' 
basic argument with respect to the question of the proper 
relation between the work of sociologists and value consider­
ations is repeated on numerous occasions, sometimes almost 
verbatim, by later critical sociologists. Although Mills' ar­
gument certainly appears to be the immediate reference-point 
for these critical sociologists, there is nothing in his argu­
ment which could not be derived from Max Weber's discussion of 
the principle of value-neutrality, as Alvin Gouldner clearly 
demonstrates in his widely-cited essay, "Anti-Minotaur: The 
Myth of a Value-Free Sociology."
Among the many clear expressions of what I will later 
characterize as the "let's be honest" position is the follow­
ing passage from The Sociological Imagination:
Whether he wants it or not, or whether he is
aware of it or not, anyone who spends his life
studying society and publishing the results is 
acting morally and usually politically as well.
The question is whether he faces this condition 
and makes up his own mind, or whether he con­
ceals it from himself and from others and drifts 
morally.->7
There are two aspects of this statement that need to be empha­
sized here: first, that Mills is arguing that value-neutral
sociological work is a myth —  that all sociological work not 
only presupposes an explicit or implicit value perspective but
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also the results of sociological research have definite 
moral and political implications for society. A major task 
for the critical sociologist (indeed, the obligation of all 
sociologists), then, is to uncover the moral background and 
moral implications of all sociological work. Secondly, once 
the full extent of this relationship between one's work and 
questions of value is explored, sociologists are enjoined to 
declare what these values are rather than take the cowardly 
route of continuing one's work under the pretense of value- 
neutrality.
Consistent with his injunction to sociologists to 
declare their own value orientation, Mills offers his own view 
of what constitutes the proper work of s o c i o l o g i s t s A s  was 
noted earlier, Mills opens The Sociological Imagination by 
depicting the situation of individuals in modern society as 
one of feeling trapped, of being carried along by the blind 
drift of events. With the encroachment of bureaucratic modes 
of organization and thought in all aspects of social life, with 
the rise of a "power elite" which exercises effective control 
over the course of American society by way of their control 
of politics, economics, and the military, Mills sees American 
society increasingly becoming a society of masses, that is, a 
society of manipulable individuals. Such a development, Mills 
goes on to note, runs directly contrary to the ideals of 
American society contained in its democratic heritage. ^  And 
for Mills, if there is any ideal worth fighting for —  that 
sociologists and, indeed, all intellectuals should defend —
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it is the democratic ideal of a nation of free individuals 
making free and rational decisions about the future course of 
their nation. In Mills' own words: "What he [the sociologist] 
ought to do for the society is to combat all those forces 
that are destroying genuine publics and creating a mass 
society —  or put as a positive goal, his aim is to help 
build and strengthen self-cultivating publics. Only then 
might society be reasonable and free." (my emphasis)^®
One specific way that sociologists can help enlighten 
people (i.e., develop genuine publics) is to translate, by 
means of the sociological imagination, personal troubles into 
public Issues; that Is, to show people that problems in their 
own lives have their source in larger problems in society as 
a whole. This would involve, for example, showing that the 
impersonal, faceless character of life for many people in 
modern society Is basically not the fault of individuals 
(the "cheerful robots", as Mills describes such people), but 
that this is the result, in large part, of the encroachment 
of bureaucratic modes of organization and thought in modern 
society. The scope of reason and freedom has diminished con­
siderably, and it Is the principal task of sociologists to 
try to enlarge their scope.
In essence, then, Mills can be seen as an advocate for 
the democratic ideal of social order and, ultimately, for the 
individual. Interestingly enough, this very position will 
emerge as the predominant one among critical sociologists —  
a position which will be called Into question in my critical
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analysis of this aspect of the sociological critique of 
American sociology.
(3) Summary and Outline of 
Chapters to Follow
Throughout the discussion of the work of Lynd, Sorokin, 
and Mills, it has been noted time and again that a principal 
focus of their criticism has been the methodological and theo­
retical foundations of American sociology. On the whole, I 
believe their critical analysis is more insightful, more 
thoroughgoing, and more significant than the bulk of the work 
done by later critics. These qualities of this earlier work 
derive in large part from the willingness of these sociolo­
gists to address some of the basic philosophical issues which 
underlie the major controversies in sociology. This is not 
to say that later critical sociologists do not discuss im­
portant theoretical and methodological issues; however, 
those critical sociologists who do look into such issues 
almost invariably avoid discussing related philosophical 
questions. As I hope to demonstrate more fully in the chapters 
to follow, the most significant shortcomings of the principal 
arguments put forth by these critical sociologists derive 
from their reluctance to discuss the more basic philosophical 
questions involved.
I believe it is questionable that any insight of any
real significance can be derived from a sociological critique
62of American sociology. Put otherwise, I am suggesting 
that no significant criticism of contemporary sociology is
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possible unless sociologists are willing to come to grips 
with and attempt to resolve the epistemological, metaphysical, 
and ethical Issues which clearly underlie the defects in con­
temporary sociology which they point to.
In my own reflections on the nature of this critical 
movement I will be drawing on essentially two philosophic 
sources. First, there is the work of some of the principal 
members of the Frankfurt School who directed much of their 
critical attention at positivistic thought in general and, 
on occasion, specifically at sociology. I will argue that the 
insight of these "critical theorists" into the shortcomings 
of current sociological practice and into the larger question 
of what is wrong in modern society is generally more profound 
than anything offered by critical sociologists. What is par­
ticularly interesting about the work of these critical 
theorists is that It has had an impact upon some of the major 
figures of this critical sociological movement, most notably, 
Alvin Gouldner. Nonetheless, I believe some interesting and 
informative differences will emerge In looking at their res­
pective critiques of sociology and society.
Secondly, and more importantly, is the criticism of 
sociology and the kind of thinking sociology represents offer­
ed by a much-neglected twentieth-century American philosopher, 
Elijah Jordan. The impact of Jordan's work for the sociolo­
gical critique of American sociology goes far beyond the 
specific criticisms he levels at sociology in Chapter Two of 
his Forms of Individuality. More fundamental are his general
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contributions to an understanding of the nature of modern 
society and of its basic constituent elements. Finally, as 
Jordan emphasizes throughout his work, a sound understanding 
of society is a necessary prerequisite to any meaningful 
effort at social reform. It is with this in mind that we 
must require of sociologists that in their investigation of 
society they bring forth knowledge which will contribute, 
rather than detract, from the effort to improve society.
And this requirement can be fulfilled only insofar as sociolo­
gists critically evaluate the methodological and theoretical 
foundations of their discipline.
Although the bulk of the discussion in the chapters 
to follow will be taken up with the presentation of the basic 
arguments put forth in the context of the sociological critique 
of American sociology, I will present some critical reflections 
based upon the work of members of the Frankfurt School and 
Elijah Jordan at the end of each chapter. In some instances, 
the reader may get the impression that I have left him 
hanging at the end of a chapter without having resolved the 
issue discussed. This may very well be the case, for my final 
judgment of the shortcomings and the promise of the sociolo­
gical critique of American sociology will be brought to light 
in the concluding chapter, after having considered this criti­
cal movement as a whole. It is perhaps a commonplace ob­
servation, but true, that all of the issues discussed by 
critical sociologists are closely interrelated, and therefore 
require that they be treated as interrelated in making a
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critical assessment of them.
Each of the chapters to follow will focus on a basic 
issue discussed in the sociological critique of American 
sociology. In Chapter II, the relation between sociological 
research and social policy will be discussed. Critical soci­
ologists will consider the question of how sociologists have 
and should relate to the private and public agencies which 
fund sociological research. The charge that mainstream soci­
ologists are working hand-in-glove with the established social 
order emerges in Chapter II but is given much fuller consid­
eration in Chapter III which is on the value question in
sociology. In this chapter, we will consider what place, if
any, values have in the work of sociologists. Critical soci­
ologists argue that values affect all aspects of the work of 
sociologists, which, being the case, critical sociologists 
are obliged to express their value preferences. In Chapter IV, 
then, their preference for the democratic ideal being applied 
to both sociology and society will be considered. Chapter V 
will build on this analysis by presenting what have been some 
other prominent attempts to develop alternative conceptions of 
society as a basis for a new and more significant sociology.
These alternatives will be found wanting for many of the same
reasons the discussion of issues presented in previous chapters 
was found wanting. In a concluding chapter, I will bring to­
gether the important shortcomings of this critical movement 
and suggest a new direction for developing a new and more 
significant sociology.
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pletely arbitrary.
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Louis Horowitz.
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J Later, we will see that the work of classical sociological 
theorists often provides the model for a more adequate 
approach to the study of society for these critical sociolo­
gists .






5 8This commitment to a particular moral and political position, 
for Mills, is of a relativistic nature: "Not every social 
scientist accepts all the views I happen to hold on these 
issues, and it is not my wish that he should. My point is 
that one of his tasks is to determine his own views of the 
nature of historical change and the place, if any, of free
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and reasonable men within It." Ibid., p. 192.
59This Is a point which Howard Press, In his intellectual 
portrait, C. Wright Mills, continually emphasizes in attempt­
ing to characterize Mills' politics.
C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p.187.
^This point has direct bearing on arguments put forth by 
members of the Frankfurt School, in particular Max Horkheimer's 
Eclipse of Reason and Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man. 
Although on the surface their arguments are quite similar,
I will later try to demonstrate the superiority of Horkheimer 
and Marcuse's treatment of this problem of the constriction 
of reason and freedom in modern society.
Part of the point being made here is captured in T.B. 
Bottomore's characterization of Gouldner's "reflexive soci­
ology" as "...the sociologist contemplating his own navel."
T.B. Bottomore, Sociology as Social Criticism, p.44.
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CHAPTER II
SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND SOCIAL POLICY
Among the first issues to be addressed by critical 
sociologists was the close relationship which they argued had 
grown up between sociological researchers and the public and 
private agencies which provided funds for their research.
This relationship was taken as evidence of the complicity of 
mainstream sociologists with representatives of the established 
social order -- that researchers were allowing their work to 
be dictated by powerful interests in our society whose primary 
concern is the maintenance of the status quo. That is to say, 
other than scientific considerations have been involved in 
the selection of topics for research and in the process of 
carrying out the research. This very serious charge goes to 
the heart of the canons of empirical research, and it will be 
the focal point of what critical sociologists see as wrong 
with sociological research.
(1) Project Camelot: The Initiation of the Debate
Over the Proper Relationship Between Sociological 
Research and Social Policy.
An important facet of the development of sociology in 
America has been the increasingly close relations that have 
been built up between the sociological profession and the 
federal government. With the growing involvement of the 
federal government in the formulation and implementation of 
social policy, there has been a subsequent growth in the need
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for comprehensive, accurate knowledge about our society and 
its problems —  knowledge which ultimately could serve as a 
guide for those who make social policy. Hence, since the 
passage of the National Health Act in 1946 (from which came 
the National Institute of Mental Health), the federal govern­
ment has allocated larger and larger amounts of money to basic 
and applied research in the social sciences.1
Official recognition of the importance of social 
science research, however, has generally been overshadowed by 
the high regard in which the natural and physical sciences 
have been held. The natural and physical sciences have always 
received the bulk of government research funds. Nonetheless, 
by the mid-1960's the social sciences, and sociology in par­
ticular, had come a long way toward gaining an equal footing 
with the so-called "hard" sciences.
This newly-won status was exemplified by hearings in 
Congress concerning a proposal to set up a National Social 
Science Foundation (NSSF) apart from the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) which has been a principal source of funding 
for social science research although, again, the bulk of the 
grants went to research projects in the natural and physical 
sciences. Moreover, there was discussion in Congress of a 
proposal, which grew out of testimony of sociologists con­
cerning the establishment of NSSF, that a Presidential 
Council of Social Advisors be set up, modeled after the exist­
ing Council of Economic Advisors.
In general, one can notice a direct correlation between
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the increase in the number of social programs in the 60's and 
the increase in federal money for social science research. A 
sociologist who has looked into this phenomenon notes, "The 
Kennedy-Johnson years were boom times for social science 
researchers. Federal expenditures for such research more 
than quadrupled in the years between i960 and 1966, rising 
from $73.1 million to $325.1 million."2 But just as the 
policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations were to 
come under attack from social critics, so too were sociolo­
gists criticized who, having carried out research under gov­
ernment sponsorship, were indirectly tied to these policies.
Critical sociologists charged that sociological re­
searchers, in accepting government funds for their research, 
had by and large surrendered their autonomy and become instru' 
ments of government policy. This charge was given credence 
by a scandal which grew out of a U.S. Army-sponsored research 
project entitled "Project Camelot". The years of debate and 
discussion which ensued upon the cancellation of this ill- 
fated project would serve to bring tb the fore many important 
Issues concerning the question of the proper relationship be­
tween the sociological profession and its sources of research 
funding. Perhaps it was because Project Camelot appeared to 
represent such a direct and blatant attempt to influence the 
conduct of sociological research that it became the cause 
celebre among critical sociologists, particularly Irving 
Louis Horowitz, a former student of C. Wright Mills who was 
to become a principal figure in this whole debate.
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Initiated in 1964, Project Camelot was to have invol­
ved several noted sociologists from the United States and 
abroad in a study of the causes of revolution and insurgency 
in underdeveloped and developing countries throughout the
3
world, with the specific focus of this study being Chile. The 
source of the funds for this research, a generous $4-6 million 
spread over three or four years, was the United States Army.
The study was to have been done under the aegis of the Special 
Operations Research Organization (SORO), an organization nom­
inally connected with American University in Washington D.C. 
and funded principally by the Defense Department.
The fact that the United States Army was funding this 
project was not made clear to social scientists and adminis­
trators at the University of Chile in Santiago, whose cooper­
ation was needed to carry out this research. During the ini­
tial phases of the project, however, a sociologist from the 
University of Oslo who had been asked to Join the project,
Johan Gatlung, revealed to University of Chile administrators 
that the funding for this project was coming from the United 
States Army. In light of the United States' image as an im­
perialist power in the world, highlighted just a few months 
later by United States' military intervention in Santo Domingo 
in May, 1965, Gatlung's revelation led to charges of imperial­
ism in the Chilean press, culminating finally in Congessional 
hearings in Washington and the cancellation of Project Camelot.
Whether true or not, Chileans regarded Project Camelot 
as an unwarranted intervention in their internal affairs; they
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feared that the knowledge gained from this research would 
only serve to enhance the effectiveness of the C.I.A. In Its 
efforts to insure the existence of a Chile amenable to Amer­
ican interests. In this country, the effects of the cancella­
tion of Project Camelot went far beyond those sociologists 
who had agreed to participate in it. What was at stake here, 
ultimately, was the credibility and integrity of the sociolo­
gical profession itself. What had begun as one of the most 
auspicious and well-financed research projects ever under­
taken by sociologists, thus, turned into one of the most con­
troversial chapters in the history of the sociological pro­
fession in America.
Critical comment on the nature and implications of 
Project Camelot appeared almost immediately after its demise 
and continued unabated for several years to come. In the con­
text of this critical commentary most of the central issues 
surrounding the question of the proper relationship between 
sociological research and social policy were raised. Indeed, 
for critical sociologists such as Irving Louis Horowitz, 
Project Camelot represented all that was wrong with the exist­
ing relationship. The basic position argued by critical soci­
ologists is nicely summarized by Herbert Blumer in an article 
contained in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, edited by 
Irving Louis Horowitz. Blumer comments:
The major issue is not that of entrenching 
and extending the role of sociology in the 
federal government but of protecting the 
integrity of sociology as a scientific 
discipline....
The threats that appear to me to be of 
crucial significance are (l) the restraints
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imposed on the scientific pursuit of truth,
(2) a disrespect of the rights of human 
beings being studied, and (3) an unwitting 
corruption of scholars engaging in agency- 
determined research.
The criticism that those sociologists involved in Pro­
ject Camelot were, in a sense, instruments of the Defense De­
partment is later reasserted in an article by Horowitz in which 
he compares the corruption of sociologists involved in this 
project with the corruption of social scientists brought to 
light in The Pentagon Papers which revealed American military 
planning to intervene in Vietnam. Clearly hearkening back to 
Mills' discussion of the "bureaucratic ethos" in sociological 
research in The Sociological Imagination, Horowitz describes 
Project Camelot as being prepared "...with the same bloodless, 
bureaucratic approach that characterizes so much of federally 
inspired social science and history."^
In addition, another group of sociologists focused on 
the methodological deficiencies in the research design itself. 
For example, Marshall Sahlins argues that a conservative bias 
was built into the design of the project from the start, a 
conservative bias which in many ways reflects that of the 
functionalist view of social order. Sahlins notes, "...revo­
lutionary movements are described as 'antisystem activities', 
indications of 'severe disintegration', varieties of 'destabi­
lizing processes', threats to 'legitimate control of the means 
of coercion within society', facilitated by 'administrative 
errors'. Movements for radical change are in Camelot's view
/ T
a disease and a society so infected is sick." Considered
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along with the criticisms of Project Camelot mentioned above, 
this criticism is indicative of these critical sociologists' 
fundamental belief that sociological research is a scientific 
endeavor —  that the validity of the sociological enterprise, 
as with any scientific enterprise, rests upon the degree to 
which sociologists are autonomous, the degree to which their 
research is an unbiased pursuit of the truth.
In direct response to the potential threat to the 
integrity of the sociological profession which Project Camelot 
represented, the American Sociological Association initiated 
the process of drafting a code of ethics for the profession.
The drafting of a code of ethics was seen as essential to 
insure continued public support for sociological research.
That such an action was viewed as an appropriate response to 
this situation is an indication of the degree to which the 
blame for Project Camelot was placed upon the individual 
sociologists who had agreed to participate in it. As one 
sociologist noted in this context: "Where the issue of pro­
fessional ethics entered most significantly in Project Camelot, 
it seems to me, was in the initial acceptance of the mission 
of the project by social scientists acting in their role as 
social scientists.
In general, I believe it is accurate to say that the 
principal focus of the criticism of Project Camelot was 
directed at the actions of the individual sociologists in­
volved. These sociologists, it was argued, had: (l) sur­
rendered their autonomy in agreeing to participate in the
project; (2) had failed to disclose all of the background 
information on the nature of the project and its source of 
funding to officials at the University of Chile; and (3) had 
allowed their conservative bias to enter into the design of 
the study. In all of this there is nothing which suggests 
any problems with the nature of sociological research itself 
or with its philosophical basis. Indeed, In the view of the 
critics of Project Camelot, the ultimate problem was that 
sociologists involved in it did not adhere closely enough to 
the tenets of scientific research.
The serious charges raised by critics of Project 
Camelot did not go without rebuttal from some of the sociolo-
Q
gists who had agreed to participate in the study. Interest­
ingly enough, In defending their participation, these sociolo­
gists appealed to some of the very same arguments that critics 
used to attack Project Camelot. They denied the contention 
that the Army was using them to gather intelligence inform­
ation; rather, they expressed the belief that they had a sub­
stantial amount of freedom, that their autonomy as scientific 
researchers was not as severely curtailed as the critics had 
maintained. Moreover, these sociologists believed that this 
research project, with such generous financial support, 
represented an unparalleled opportunity to investigate the 
phenomenon of social change in a truly comparative sense.
This was the kind of "Big-Range Sociology" that one of the 
principal critics of Project Camelot, Irving Louis Horowitz, 
had argued so strongly for in the introduction to The New
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Sociology just a few years prior to this. Hence, although the 
two sides of this debate disagreed as to the nature and im­
plications of Project Camelot, there was agreement on one 
basic point; namely, that sociological researchers must seek 
to preserve their autonomy which is vital to all truly 
scientific work.
Prom reading the numerous charges and countercharges 
put forth by critics and defenders of Project Camelot, I am 
at a loss to make any determination of which side is painting 
the most accurate picture of the whole situation. The fact 
that Project Camelot never got past the design stage further 
complicates matters. Many of the criticisms and their rebut­
tals are premised on what someone believed would have been 
the case if Project Camelot had been carried out.
Nonetheless, one thing can be said for certain: Project 
Camelot was the source of considerable debate and controversy 
in American sociology during the 1960's and 1970's. Indeed, 
the debate which it engendered raised issues that would be 
discussed time and again in later critical analyses of the 
relationship between sociological research and social policy.
Let us, then, turn our attention to some of these 
other critical analyses of the relationship between sociolo­
gical research and social policy.
(2) The Power of Sociological Research
Perhaps the most serious charge brought against 
Project Camelot was that it represented an attempt by the
- 59 -
Defense Department to use legitimate social scientific re­
search as a means of gathering intelligence information about 
a foreign country —  the ultimate purpose of that information 
being to enhance the United States 1 ability to control the 
political situation in that country. Put bluntly, those soci­
ologists Involved in the project were being accused of being 
tools of United States' imperialism. As fantastic as such 
criticism may appear at first glance, it, in fact, is repre­
sentative of one of the principal arguments put forth by 
sociological critics concerning the growing ties between 
sociological research and social policy.
Sociologists' increasing willingness to assist in the 
formulation, implementation, and assessment of social policy 
was seen as more than Just a reflection of their desire to 
assist in the task of social reform. Critical sociologists 
charged that such willingness was more a reflection of 
(1) sociologists' interest in gaining access to more funds 
for research and (2) their interest in having the status quo 
preserved in whibh their own positions were relatively secure.^ 
That is to say, mainstream sociologists were being accused of 
working hand-in-glove with the established social order to 
help insure that things remain as they are. As Mills had 
pointed out in The Sociological Imagination, a "bureaucratic 
ethos" predominated in sociological research, which meant 
that sociological research came "to serve whatever ends its 
bureaucratic clients may have in view..."10 Those bureau­
cratic clients, according to these critical sociologists,
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were for the most part representatives of the most powerful 
interests in our society whose principal concern is with the 
preservation of their own privileged position.
Although some of these critics push the beginnings of 
sociologists' collusion with the established order back as 
far as Elton Mayo's Hawthorne Studies in the late 1920's and 
early 1930's,11 it is not until the 1960's that such criticism 
reached full bloom in an atmosphere in which "the establish­
ment" was being attacked from a variety of perspectives by 
people involved in the numerous social movements which had 
sprung up around this time. Just as Mills had singled out 
government, the military, and business as the master insti­
tutions of modern society, the leaders of which constituted 
the "power elite", these critical sociologists focus on the 
alleged collusive relationship between sociological researchers 
and those who paid for such research in government, in the 
military, and in corporate America. In all cases, these critics 
charge that sociological researchers are wittingly or unwit­
tingly working in the interest of their clients which is to 
maintain the status quo. This charge is epitomized in the
following statement by Martin Nicolaus, who paints a very
dark picture of the nature of this relationship:
In addition to the general dissemination of
propaganda, professional sociology has the 
major specific functions of aiding industrial, 
civil, and military authorities in the solution 
of manpower control problems of a limited order, 
and preparing university candidates for careers 
in the official bureaucracies. As a source of 
legitimation for the existing sovereignty, and 
as a laboratory of refinements in the processes 
by which a tribute of blood, labor, and taxation
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is extracted from the subject population, 
the professional organization of sociology 
today represents the concrete fulfillment 
of the charter vision of its founding 
fathers.12
As extreme as Nicolaus' charges a r e , ^  they are indicative of 
the basic position put forth by critical sociologists.
Sociological research and the sociological profession 
in general are variously characterized as: part of the "tech­
nology of repression",^ disguising "the practical and poli­
tically oppressive realities of the scientific and social
worlds", "serving...as the avant-garde of the corporate
1 f\ 17
reality,...", "a tool of the Welfare State,...", and
l8
finally, and most directly, the "servant of the power elite".
By and large, however, these charges are made in very general 
terms, with little in the way of evidence to back them up.
Nevertheless, in a general sense, I believe there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that such characterizations 
of contemporary mainstream sociology are not entirely astray. 
One may be hard pressed to prove that an actual conspiracy 
existed involving members of the power elite and their intel­
lectual "servants", but one does not have to look very hard 
to uncover evidence of the conservatism of much of contempo­
rary American sociology. For example, Dusky Lee Smith, in 
analyzing the work of Nathan Glazer, Amitai Etzioni, and 
Seymour Martin Lipset, cites numerous passages in which these 
prominent sociologists clearly defend the status quo —  
suggesting by this that nothing is basically wrong with 
modern American society. I believe the title of her essay
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aptly describes these sociologists and their work: "The Sun-
19shine Boys: Toward a Sociology of Happiness".
An important and highly questionable assumption, I
would argue, underlying this charge that sociologists have
become the intellectual servants of the most powerful interests
in corporate America is the belief that the knowledge gained
from sociological research is of such strategic value that
whichever groups gain control of this knowledge will have a
tremendous advantage over other groups which may be vying for
power. The nature of sociologists' strategic function in our
society is well-outlined by J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach
in their introduction to Radical Sociology:
...the point should not be lost that the 
sociology of the postwar period was not as 
irrelevant as some of its humanistically- 
oriented critics have charged....Sociologists 
as consultants, managers, and administrators, 
directly or indirectly contributed to govern­
mental policy formation and implementation.
Liberal sociologists could not design weapons 
systems or develop methods for the transport­
ation of raw materials to American industries, 
but they could advise the military on ways of 
mobilizing support for its programme and 
develop, in the name of economic growth and 
democracy, rationalizations for the exploi­
tation and pacification of the domestic poor 
of the Third World. 0
More than anything else, the above passage brings to 
light the fact that sociologists quite often serve as apolo­
gists for the established social order.21 Functionalists, 
who associate that which is functional with that which is es­
tablished, would be an example of such apologists. On this view, 
a social problem becomes that which deviates from accepted 
social standards, when, in reality, it may be those very
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22standards which need to be questioned.
In addition to sociological research providing ration 
alizations for the status quo, a number of critical sociolo­
gists have charged that sociological researchers have tended 
to pry into the lives of powerless groups of people: the poor 
Blacks, the working class, etc.. At the same time there has 
been relatively little sociological scrutiny of the lives of 
the powerful in our society. The knowledge gained from 
studying the powerless is said to be of great value to the 
powerful who can use this knowledge to enhance their control 
over these powerless groups. In Martin Nicolaus' characteris­
tic style: "Sociology has risen on the blood and bones of 
the poor and oppressed; it owes its prestige in this society 
to its putative ability to give information and advice to the
ruling class of this society about the ways and means to keep 
23people down." Hence, as David Horowitz notes, "The task of 
a radical sociology is to reverse this process, to study the 
structure of social oppression and to bring this knowledge, 
and the power it conveys, to the powerless and exploited
Oh
majority.
The truth of such claims aside, what is particularly 
significant about them is that they indicate an underlying 
belief in the viability of current modes of sociological 
research. Rather than question the validity of these modes 
of research, these critical sociologists are more concerned 
with the question of who controls this research and of whose 
interests it serves. It was to be expected , then, that
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during the 1968 American Sociological Association Convention 
in Boston the "Sociology Liberation Movement", with which 
some of these critical sociologists were connected, organized 
a number of workshops which focused on the question: "know- 
ledge for whom?"
That sociological research has a substantial impact
on the direction of social policy and of society in general
is an assertion made with even greater force by some critics
who argue that the influence of sociological research goes
beyond mere service to the powerful. Sociological knowledge,
which represents an attempt to conceptualize and order social
phenomena, is argued to possess such power that the mere
recognition of it has the power to influence significantly
26
the course of major events. This line of argument, which 
is particularly emphasized in the work of Robert V. Friedrichs, 
amounts to nothing less than assigning the discipline of soci­
ology itself a crucial place, if not the most crucial, in 
effecting social change.
Friedrichs is not arguing that sociological knowledge 
alters society in any direct sense; rather, what is argued is 
that this knowledge acts as a kind of self-defeating prophecy. 
That is to say, sociological predictions (which constitute the 
bulk of this knowledge) tend to have a negative influence on 
social behavior —  people respond to such knowledge by acting 
in ways opposite to that which is predicted. For example, 
in commenting favorably on a study done on the social impact 
of the projections made by Karl Marx and Arnold Toynbee,
Friedrichs makes the following questionable and undocumented 
assertion concerning the power of Marx's projections in parti­
cular: "The very truth of much of Marx's analysis of the 
nineteenth-century European and American bourgeoisie appears 
to have acted in part as a self-defeating prophecy as that
bourgeoisie acceded to modifications in its power vis-a-vis
2 7the proletariat." This whole argument is based On the 
incredible supposition that the bourgeoisie, through a care­
ful study of Das Kapltal, came to the conclusion that they 
would be overthrown unless they gave in to some of the de­
mands of the proletariat.
Anticipating Friedrichs' argument, John R. Seeley 
comments in an earlier article that: "The very 'recognition' 
of something as a scientific problem, instead of some other 
kind of problem, marks a shift, an implicit act of legislation 
so profound as to deserve the title revolutionary...a change 
that by itself threatens to shake the foundations of the 
present society and to erect a new one of unforeseeable
po
characteristics— ..." This, again, highlights the potential­
ly powerful influences of sociological work on society in 
general.
Significantly, however, none of these and similar 
claims are ever factually substantiated, outside of some 
general observations on contemporary American society. I 
know of no revolutionary change in the structure of American 
society which has been the result of the recognition of some 
social problem as a scientific problem. Moreover, one is
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left to wonder just who it is who recognized the scientific 
nature of these problems since the vast majority of people 
rarely have occasion to peruse the reports of sociological 
findings tucked away in various professional Journals and 
monographs.2^
In the context of this discussion of the power of 
sociological research, we find also the straightforward as­
sertion that this research has made and can potentially make 
valuable contributions to the solution of our society’s prob­
lems. In one of Talcott Parsons' several attempts to spell 
out what he believes to be the proper job of the sociologist, 
he attributes sociological research with having made substan­
tial progress toward the solution of poverty and juvenile de­
linquency,"^0 in spite of the fact that these problems are as 
serious today as they were at the time that Parsons made this 
comment.
The argument is also made that the reason we have 
failed to solve some of these major social problems is because 
leaders in government and people in general have failed to 
appreciate the advances toward solving such problems that 
have been made in recent and past sociological research. This 
argument is typified by the following extremely positive as­
sessment of the potential impact of sociology: "Having achiev­
ed a quantum advance toward solving major social problems, 
sociologists, with characteristic reticence, have allowed 
their accomplishments to remain unnoticed. What that 
"quantum advance" is is not specified In this article and In 
many articles of Its kind, with the possible exception of
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Melvin Turnin's discussion of our government's failure to in­
stitute racial policies based on the many significant studies
of race relations dating all the way back to Myrdal's The
32
American Dilemma, published in 19^2.
In contrast to the above sanguine assessments of the 
accomplishments of sociological research, there have been 
some critics who have argued that sociological research has
failed to come up with any findings relevant to the solution
33of major social problems. For these critics, the problem is 
not that sociological research has gone unnoticed but that it 
is largely irrelevant, which means that its findings could 
confer on no group any substantial power because these find­
ings are themselves flawed by having been arrived at on the 
basis of an inadequate, invalid methodology. Certainly, one 
would have to look hard in Mills' The Sociological Imagination 
to find any positive comment on the predominant modes of soci­
ological research; indeed, in terms of the knowledge needed 
to correct the major ills of our society, these predominant 
modes of research represent precisely the wrong way to go 
about acquiring such knowledge for they preclude the use of 
the "sociological imagination".
As was noted in the Introduction, the thrust of Mills' 
critique of contemporary sociology is directed at its method­
ological and theoretical foundations and not at sociologists 
themselves, as is largely the case with those critical soci­
ologists who pose the question: "sociology for whom?". For 
these critics, the moral culpability of sociologists is what
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is at issue —  it is a question of whose side are we on, the
powerful or the powerless, or in Gouldner's terms, the "over-
34
dogs" or the "underdogs".
For those critics to adhere more closely to Mills 1 
argument, however, this is to miss the point that sociolo­
gical research may be incapable of rendering an accurate pic­
ture of modern society and social behavior. I believe the fail­
ure to address the question of the adequacy of the predominant 
methodological approaches in contemporary sociology is a fund­
amental shortcoming of the sociological critique of American 
sociology —  it reflects, in the final analysis, either the 
inability or the unwillingness of most of these critical
sociologists to address the crucial philosophical Issues of
35the validity of empirical sociological research. The ques­
tion of who controls this research, with which we opened this 
section, is minor in comparison to the question of whetheror 
not predominant modes of sociological research are capable 
of uncovering significant knowledge about society.
(3) The Question of the Adequacy 
of Sociological Research
Within the context of the sociological critique of 
American sociology there was at least one prominent attempt 
to confront the issue of the adequacy of predominant modes 
of sociological research. Some critics directed their attention 
to what they believed to be the artificial nature of large- 
scale survey research which utilizes a questionnaire or inter­
view format, the results of which are usually presented in
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quantitative terms. Such an approach, it was argued, tends 
to distort the object of investigation by introducing some 
foreign element into the natural flow of social life. Soci­
ologists administering questionnaires or conducting inter­
views inevitably have some kind of effect on those individuals 
or groups they are studying, an effect which is frequently 
glossed over in analyzing the results of such research. 
Moreover, as Sorokin had earlier pointed out, such research 
may yield answers to the question of people's attitudes and 
beliefs toward their's and others' social behavior, but it 
cannot give us any insight into the actual behavior of people. 
What people say about their behavior and what they actually 
do are all too often entirely different. In short, these tech­
niques, the hallmarks of so-called ’’objective" social re­
search, were seen as inadequate approaches to the study of 
social life.
With the rejection of the scientific, "objective" 
approach, these critical sociologists maintain that the only 
true approach is a subjective one in which sociologists at­
tempt to study social behavior from the perspective of the 
individuals and groups being studied. Drawing on Max Weber's 
empathetic approach, as encompassed by his notion of verstehen. 
and on the more recent development of a phenomenological soci­
ology, emphasis comes to be placed on the personal involvement 
of sociologists in whatever aspect of society they happen to 
be studying. It is argued that only on the basis of actual 
involvement in the ongoing process of social life can sociolo­
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gists come to understand it most adequately. With this in 
mind, Jack Douglas claims, "...the finest sociological studies 
of groups have been done by people which at some point had 
been totally involved insiders or had committed the sin of 
going native (becoming 'too-involved') but then returned. 
Douglas, then, discusses William Foote Whyte's classic study, 
Street Corner Society, as one prominent example of this.
To some critical sociologists, personal involvement 
meant more than merely having sociologists immerse themselves 
in whatever aspect of society they happen to be investigating. 
Personal involvement, for them, also means actively assisting 
the individuals, groups, or communities that they intend to 
study. For example, in response to increasing difficulties 
sociological researchers were having in gaining the cooper­
ation of ethnic and minority groups in the inner-city, two 
researchers suggest the establishment of what they call 
"research communes". These research communes would give 
community residents a voice in all aspects of the research 
process: in the design phase, in carrying out the research, 
and in the publication of its results. ^ Despite the potential 
hazards such an approach poses to the reliability and valid­
ity of such research, in gaining the fuller cooperation of 
the people they are studying, these researchers argue that 
such an approach will in fact enhance reliability and val­
idity, as they apparently found in their study of Boston's 
Chinatown.
Even more directly, another sociologist suggests that
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those interested in doing research in poor and oppressed com­
munities should take a hand in attempting to alleviate the 
plight of people trapped in these communities. Rather than 
follow the usual procedure of a sociologist going into a 
community, collecting his data, and then leaving the community 
in the same state in which he found it, "Institution Formation 
Sociology proposes that sociologists initiate the organization 
of new institutions and simultaneously study the institutions 
that are created. These new institutions should be organized 
to help meet the social needs in areas of society where no 
institutions exist to solve the problems that people face and 
cannot resolve by themselves."^0 In studying the formation 
of these institutions the usual questionnaire or interview 
format would be dispensed with in lieu of the use of tape 
recorders, movie cameras, and other such devices which can 
capture "the natural interaction of the institution as it
..4loccurs.
Throughout the rest of our exposition and critical 
analysis of the sociological critique of American sociology 
we will see this emphasis on the personal involvement of soci­
ologists in the society which they study surface in a number 
of different contexts. In general, the virtues of personal 
involvement, of focusing on the everyday lives of individuals, 
of being a forthright and courageous individual oneself, are 
held in high esteem by these critical sociologists. More than 
one critical sociologist has equated such virtues with human­
ism. For example, Alfred McClung Lee speaks of "humanist"
research methods in terms of the virtues of personal involve­
ment: "...a humanist social scientist has to have a sufficient 
sense of empathy and of participation to gain understanding 
through joining in the emotions and the activities of those
42
observed to the extent that might be possible or practical.''
On this view, then, the closer sociologists get to the in­
dividual, the closer they get to a valid research methodology 
and to a humanist perspective.
This discussion of the need for personal involvement,
for studying social behavior in its natural setting, really
does nothing to improve sociological research, much less 
constitute the only true humanist perspective. Advocating 
increased personal Involvement of sociologists in those as­
pects of social life they are investigating, in itself, offers 
no guarantee that such research will be any more valid or 
ultimately more significant than conventional modes of re­
search. This is not to take anything away from their often 
insightful criticisms of conventional research techniques 
such as the questionnaire and the interview, but the question 
they fail to confront adequately is whether or not the de­
ficiencies in these conventional techniques can be overcome 
by adopting their alternative approach.
I maintain that just as the affect of a sociologist
on a group of people to which he is administering a question­
naire or conducting interviews is largely unknown, so too, 
the affect of the participant observer (the major form of 
personal involvement of sociologists) on the groups he is
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studying is largely unknown. That there is a great deal of 
uncertainty concerning the question of the appropriate degree 
of participation and detachment necessary to a successful 
participant observation study is evident from reading these
43
studies themselves.
Although we may believe, along with these critical 
sociologists, that such an approach will yield more insight 
into the nature of social life, particularly into the actual 
behavior of individuals and groups, there still exists no 
guarantee that this will be the case.
Even more difficult to sustain, I believe, is the
claim that through personal involvement in the everyday lives
of people sociologists can acquire knowledge of the motives
44
which prompt people to behave in certain ways. The desire 
to see social reality from the point of view of those being 
studied is not a realizable goal, unless, that is, we are to 
believe that sociologists can somehow enter the minds of these 
people. And even if sociologists claimed to have acquired 
such knowledge, there is no way that one could be sure they 
had in fact uncovered the mental processes that lie behind 
social behavior.
Finally, this emphasis on personal involvement clearly 
implies an individualistic view of the nature of society —  
that, as Robert Lynd commented, individuals are seen as 
"the central powerhouse of culture". In the context of our 
modern, corporate social order such a view of society must be 
seen as narrow and, ultimately, mistaken. Such an individual­
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istic view of society precludes the kind of "Big-Range Soci­
ology" that C. Wright Mills had in mind in writing The Soci­
ological Imagination. For Elijah Jordan, as well as for Mills, 
the study of the major institutions of modern society is the 
starting-point for a significant sociology.
The above-mentioned shortcomings of this alternative 
to the predominant modes of sociological research are indica­
tive of the shallowness of the sociological critique of Ameri­
can sociology as a whole. Although these critics were willing 
to address the important question of what constitutes a valid 
approach to the study of society, in the context of which they 
did offer some insightful criticisms of some of the convention­
al techniques in contemporary sociology, they presented an 
alternative which is clearly as flawed as the approaches it 
was designed to replace. This alternative, in fact, repre­
sents no fundamental departure from mainstream sociology; in­
deed, it can be derived almost entirely from the work of Max 
Weber who, interestingly enough, is revered alike by both 
critical and mainstream sociologists. This "new" approach, 
moreover, does not challenge the underlying philosophical 
tradition on which sociological research has always been 
based, namely, the empiricist tradition. Finally, the indivi­
dualistic, subjective view of society which this alternative 
approach presupposes is extremely narrow; it leaves out of 
account the tremendous institutional, objective growth of 
modern society which, I will argue later, is the most crucial 
fact of modern society.
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(4) The Essential Weakness of the 
Argument for Increased Autonomy
If the Project Camelot controversy revealed anything 
to critical sociologists it was the need to guarantee that 
sociologists conduct their research in an atmosphere of com­
plete autonomy. In the eyes of most of these critics, the 
basic defect of contemporary sociological research was that 
it was increasingly becoming an instrument of the private 
and public interests which supported it. Being a mere in­
strument of external interests, it thus violated the cardi­
nal principle of all scientific endeavor: that scientific re­
search must be an unfettered search for the truth. So, more 
than anything else, these critics argued that sociologists 
need to be freed and need to free themselves from the corrupt­
ing effects of having any external interest dictate the nature 
and aim of sociological research. As Irving Louis Horowitz, 
perhaps the leading advocate of increased autonomy among 
these critics, simply put it: "Social science needs autonomy, 
freedom of inquiry being its most vital outcome. Any incur­
sion upon autonomy in the name of Big Sociology, or Impor­
tant Sociology, or even to serve governmental operations, 
would constitute a direct assault on the very basis of social 
science itself.
The stress placed upon autonomy in sociological re­
search is not only designed to address the problem of that 
research being used to enhance the position of powerful groups 
in our society, but also, it is designed to insure that this
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research complies with the canons of all truly scientific 
work. In other words, basic to this whole line of argument 
is an abiding faith in the validity of a scientific method­
ology. Contrary to the criticism directed at some of the 
predominant modes of sociological research which are discus­
sed above, the advocacy of complete autonomy for sociological 
research guarantees a place to all modes of research, however 
flawed they may be.
What is at issue, then, is not the validity of these 
various methodological approaches but the extent to which 
the domain of sociological research as a whole is organized 
along democratic, pluralistic lines. In commenting on the 
proposal to establish a National Social Science Foundation 
which would serve as the principal source of government fund­
ing for research in the social sciences, Irving Louis Horowitz 
stresses the imporatnce of operating this foundation in a 
strictly democratic fashion: "It is ...extremely important 
that the pluralistic basis of social science research fa­
cilities be strictly maintained. Care should be taken to pre­
vent the multiple forms of social science research from be­
ing smothered or obscured by the development of a monolithic
ii 6
agency committed to a single, limited orientation." To 
make room for all kinds of research techniques may open the 
way for some more significant approaches to the study of 
society, but it will also insure the continued use of con­
ventional research techniques, the adequacy of which has been 
seriously questioned by both early and contemporary critical
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sociologists.
The advocates of increased autonomy for sociological 
researchers further maintain that along with increased auto­
nomy will go the adoption of a more critical stance on the 
major social issues of the day. No longer having to bow to 
the wishes of any particular public or private interest group, 
sociological researchers would be free to design more contro­
versial research projects. Although there can be no doubt 
that increased autonomy would give sociologists the freedom 
necessary to investigate more controversial topics, this is 
by no means an inevitable consequence of increased autonomy.
Quite the contrary, I believe a good case can be made 
that increased autonomy would have just the opposite effect, 
for there does not appear to be any aspect of current empiric­
al research which incorporates anything of a critical per­
spective. Being basically descriptive in nature, empirical 
research can, at most, help us explain existing social be­
havior, but to suggest that this can serve as a basis for
a critical approach to society is to stretch empirical re-
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search beyond the limits of its applicability. What is more, 
by accepting all modes of sociological research as legitimate, 
these critical sociologists sidestep the more important ques­
tion of the validity of these various modes of research and 
whether, in fact, they should have a place at all in the 
study of society.
Significantly, two sociologists, in commenting on the 
code of ethics that was being drafted by the American Sociolo-
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gical Association in direct response to the Project Camelot 
incident, do not agree that increased autonomy will have such 
a salutory effect on the sociological profession. To the 
contrary, they believe the principal function of this code, 
which emphasizes maintenance of a "value-free" image of soci­
ology and protection of the members of the sociological pro­
fession from any external threats to their professional auto­
nomy, would be to serve as a symbolic gesture to the public 
in order to allay any fears that sociology is not a legitimate 
scientific discipline. So, instead of opening up the prospect 
of a more critical, controversial sociology, "...the Code
appears to be based on the role of the sociologist as 'bureau-
4 9
cratlc social scientist'." That is to say, the adoption of 
this code of ethics would only serve to protect the image of 
sociology as a scientific endeavor and obscure the fact that
the work of sociologists is largely governed by outside in-
5 0
terests.
That these sociological critics would be staunch ad­
vocates of increased autonomy for sociological researchers 
is understandable in the context of their overall approach to 
this question of the relationship between sociological research 
and social policy. Throughout, the focus of their criticism 
has not been on the inadequacies in the predominant methodolo­
gical approaches in sociological research; rather, they have 
directed their criticism at individual sociologists who have 
chosen to sell their talents to the highest bidder, so to 
speak. If sociology has gone astray, according to this view,
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it is not because of problems with respect to its methodolo­
gical and theoretical foundations but because sociologists 
themselves have not adhered to the canons of truly scientific 
work. Although greater autonomy would not necessarily 
alleviate this problem, it would help insure that this re­
search is carried out with far less outside interference.
That, in itself, would undoubtedly be a positive step, but 
as I have continuously pointed out, it does not guarantee 
that future sociological research will be any more significant, 
more valid, or, much less, critical. Only a detailed critical 
analysis of the methodological foundations of contemporary 
sociological research will tell us how significant, how valid, 
and how critical this research is and can be. Ultimately, 
such critical analysis would take us into the more funda­
mental question of the adequacy of empiricism as a theory 
of knowledge.
(5) The Inflation of the Power 
of Sociological Research
Even more wrong-headed, I believe, is the argument 
that mainstream sociologists, through their research, provide 
important information to the centers of power in our society 
who then use this information to enhance their control over 
our society. This argument rests on the unsubstantiated 
assumption that current sociological research provides ac­
curate, useful information about social behavior in general 
and, in particular, about the poor and oppressed classes of 
our society.
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If anything, however, I believe sociological research 
has been largely irrelevant. It has been irrelevant because 
its focus has been on peripheral aspects of society. This is 
the essence of Mills' charge that "abstracted empiricism" re­
duces society to a matter of beliefs, attitudes, opinions, and 
the like, leaving out of account the larger social structure.
Moreover, the questions so frequently posed by critic­
al sociologists, such as, "whose side are we on?" or "sociolo­
gy for whom?" must also be seen as largely irrelevant, for 
unless sociologists first straighten out some fundamental 
problems with respect to the way they go about obtaining their
knowledge of society, it will not matter whose side they are 
51on. The argument that sociologists have wittingly or un­
wittingly served as tools of the power elite I also find very 
weak for similar reasons.
These critical sociologists imply that if sociologists
of the "stature and courage" of an Alfred McClung Lee or an
Alvin Gouldner were to have their way that sociology would 
come to stand for something significant rather than kow-tow 
to the powers that be. This theme emerges with even more 
force in these critics' treatment of the value question, 
which we will take up in the next chapter. In the following 
chapters I intend to present further evidence to support my 
contention that the fundamental problem with contemporary 
American sociology is not that it is controlled by corrupt 
sociologists, but that it is the very discipline of soci­
ology that requires alteration. Ultimately, sociologists'
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contribution to social policy stands or falls on their 
ability to render an accurate picture of the nature of our 
modern corporate social order.
NOTES
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the essential role of the sociologist-as-liberal-technologue 
to foster the optimistic image of American society as a
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This, of course, is not all that different from radical 
sociologists arguing for the necessity of all sociologists 
getting involved in various social movements aimed at over-
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salvation of sociology lies in its becoming more profession­
al in the sense of directing its attention more toward clients 
and less toward colleagues. Although behind this proposal is 
the well-intentioned desire to make sociology more accessible 
to non-sociologists, there is nothing in it to guarantee that 
the beneficiaries will be the people rather than certain 
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CHAPTER III
"LET'S BE HONEST": THE VALUE QUESTION 
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY
(l) Max Weber's "Science as a Vocation" as 
the Key to the Debate Concerning the 
Value Question in Contemporary Sociology
At the center of critical sociologists' analysis of 
contemporary American sociology is the claim that sociology 
is a science. In the previous chapter, critical sociologists 
discussed the need for greater autonomy in sociological 
research -- autonomy, or that freedom to pursue the truth 
wherever it may lead, being an essential condition for scien­
tific work. A related and even more widely discussed facet 
of sociology's claim to scientific status is the principle of 
value neutrality. A scientific study of society is said to 
be distinguished from other approaches, such as a philosophic­
al one, in that its methodology is based on empirical obser­
vation ’which does not and cannot Include any element of eval­
uation .
The Job of the scientist is to describe, explain, 
classify phenomena dispassionately; to allow any preconceptions 
or prejudices to influence any aspect of one's work is to 
diverge from this scientific ideal. Indeed, the eradication 
of all preconceptions and prejudices was seen by Emile 
Durkheim, a major figure in the early development of soci- 
ology, as basic to this new discipline, which he argued was 
distinctive precisely because It was a scientific study of
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society.1
Another major figure in the early development of soci­
ology, Max Weber, was no less insistent that, as scientists, 
sociologists must be value neutral. As he noted in his famous 
essay "Science as a Vocation", the historical and cultural 
sciences may help us "...to understand and interpret political, 
artistic, literary, and social phenomena in terms of their 
origin [i.e., explain them^ ...But they give us no answer to 
the question, whether the existence of these cultural pheno-
p
mena have been and are worth while. Nor, in Weber's view, 
should social scientists take it upon themselves to attempt 
to provide the answer to that question during the course of 
their work.
If Durkheira and Weber can be cited favorably by de­
fenders of value-neutral, scientific sociology, these two 
important figures in the history of sociology can also be, 
and have been on numerous occasions, cited favorably by cri­
tics of value-neutral sociology. In contrast to sociologists 
today who blindly follow the injunction against making value 
judgments, D.J. Gray, in his hard-hitting article, "Value-Free 
Sociology: A Doctrine of Hypocrisy and Irresponsibility", notes 
that although Durkheim and Weber conducted their research as 
objectively as possible, neither of them refrained "...from 
offering their most reasoned judgments."3 Among the two,
Weber is clearly the more central figure in this debate for 
both mainstream and critical sociologists. Indeed, one can 
trace the arguments of both sides in this debate back to that
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single essay of Weber's, "Science as a Vocation".
In "Science as a Vocation" Weber stipulates what he 
believes are the basic preconditions that must be met for 
any study to qualify as scientific. Among these precondi­
tions is the principle that the realm of fact and the realm 
of value constitute two entirely separate and distinct realms. 
The scientist's proper work is in the realm of fact —  Inves­
tigating the causes of natural or social phenomena, develop­
ing classificatory schemes to organize this knowledge, and
the like. This work, to be scientific, must be carried on
without any admixture of values such as racial prejudices, 
political biases, or religious beliefs.
Although the work of scientists may be used by poli­
ticians to achieve certain ends, it is not the Job of the 
scientist to say what those ends should be. This pertains 
with special force to the scientist who Is also a teacher.
The classroom Is not the place for a teacher to express his
4
political views, however well-reasoned they may be. In
Weber's words:
One can only demand of the teacher that he 
have the intellectual integrity to see that 
it is one thing to state facts, to determine 
mathematical or logical relations or the 
Internal structure of cultural values, while 
it is another thing to answer questions of 
the value of culture and its individual 
contents and the question of how one should 
act in the cultural community and in poli­
tical associations. These are quite hetero­
geneous problems. If he asks further why 
he should not deal with both types of 
problems in the lecture-room, the answer is: 
because the prophet and the demagogue do not 
belong on the academic platform.5
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Value judgments have no place in either scientific work or 
in classroom lectures precisely because value judgments, in 
the eyes of Weber and those who adhere to his position, are 
essentially nothing more than a reflection of personal op­
inion. The validity of personal opinion, being entirely rela­
tive, is thus not scientifically demonstrable. "Scientific 
pleading is meaningless in principle because the various value 
spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with
g
each other."
Defenders of the ideal of a value-neutral sociology 
have appealed to the above interpretation of Weber's stance 
on this issue. Talcott Parsons, in one of his many commen­
taries on the sociological profession which appeared in The 
American Sociologist during his editorship (1965-1967), cites 
Weber in the following context:
The basic valuatlonal position of the soci­
ological profession is that classically 
formulated by Max Weber as 'value-neutrality', 
which is not to be interpreted as neutrality 
toward all values, but lending clear primacy 
to the values of the intellectual enterprise 
as such and refusal to let it be dominated 
by other values, notably those, on the one 
hand, of immediate practical interests, on 
the other hand, those of a particular 'world 
view' at religious or political levels.7
Philip Hauser, a former President of the American 
Sociological Association, adopts a similar argument in criti­
cizing members of the "Sociology Liberation Movement" who, 
during the late 1960's and early 1970's insisted that the 
A.S.A. take a stand against the Vietnam War. In criticizing 
this "actionist" orientation, Hauser set down six premises
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which, taken together, constitute what he calls the "Weberian
Q
model". These premises clearly emphasize that sociology, as 
a scientific endeavor, should have nothing to do with value 
judgments. Value judgments, being expressions of personal be­
liefs and convictions, are perfectly appropriate insofar as 
one is a religious person, a citizen, a politician, and indeed, 
just a human being, but in scientific endeavors of any kind 
they have no place. For the sociological profession to take 
a stand on the Vietnam War would only serve to undermine its 
hard-won scientific status.
There is, however, another side to Weber's argument, 
brought out most influentially in Alvin Gouldner's essay 
"Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology", which is 
the basic reference-point for critical sociologists ' attack 
on value-neutral sociology. Gouldner argues that what most 
contemporary sociologists refer to as the "Weberian model", 
in fact, represents a one-sided interpretation of Weber's 
stand on this issue. Contemporary sociologists tend to gloss 
over those aspects of Weber's argument in which he does ac­
knowledge the importance of taking a definite value position 
in the sociologist's capacity as citizen or member of a poli­
tical party, although maintaining that his professional work 
must be considered separately from this. Thus, the same Weber 
who denounces the practiceof making political speeches in 
the classroom, asserts: "When speaking in a political meeting 
about democracy, one does not hide one's personal standpoint; 
Indeed, to come out clearly and take a stand is one's damned
d u t y . As Gouldner goes on to argue In this regard, then, to 
adopt Weber's argument for value neutrality by no means en­
tails the disavowal of any and all value judgments, for soci­
ologists are also citizens, also human beings, and as citizens 
and as human beings they will form opinions and adopt certain 
value orientations. So, as Gouldner asserts, it is a mistake 
to interpret Weber's doctrine of value neutrality as simple 
indifference to all values, as many contemporary sociologists 
appear to have done.^
Where Gouldner and other critics of the doctrine of 
value neutrality disagree with Weber is in his belief that 
social scientists can successfully isolate their scientific 
work from the other activities of life which inevitably in­
volve values. For Gouldner, it is not possible for a soci­
ologist to cut himself off from his connections with family, 
country, and indeed, his very humanity. That is to say, every­
one carries with himself a certain value orientation which, 
in the sociologist's case, will inevitably have some effect 
on his work as a sociologist, whether this effect manifests 
Itself in the selection of research topics, the way the re­
search is carried out, or the statement of the results.
A value-free sociology is thus seen as a myth, a myth 
which only serves to hide the fact that all aspects of the 
work of sociologists are tinged with implicit and explicit 
value commitments.
Given the broad definition of values (i.e., any 
personal opinion, belief, conviction, etc.) which underlies
mmm-,. - - ~_
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the critics' view here, one would be hard-pressed to dispute 
their claim that values enter into all of our life activities. 
If this be the case, then there appears to be only one viable 
alternative to continuing the charade that the work of soci­
ologists is value-free. This alternative, stated by Gouldner 
in specific reference to Weber's argument, clearly sets forth 
the predominant position among critical sociologists general­
ly:
If sociologists ought not to express their 
personal values in the academic setting, 
how then are students to be safeguarded 
against the unwitting influence of these 
values which shape the sociologist's selection 
of problems, his preferences for certain 
hypotheses or conceptual schemes and his 
neglect of others. For these are unavoidable 
and, in this sense, there is and can be no 
value-free sociology. The only choice is 
between an expression of one's values, as 
open and honest as it can be,...and a vain 
ritual of moral neutrality.il
By declaring his values openly, the sociologist can retain
some degree of objectivity, whereas, those sociologists who
hold on to the myth that their work is value-neutral must
surrender any claim to objectivity.
Overriding this apparent disagreement between Gouldner 
and Weber is, I believe, a basic agreement on the value of 
objective, scientific research In sociology. Both the de­
fenders of the doctrine of value-neutrality, such as Weber 
and Parsons, and those who espouse what I will call the "let's 
be honest" position, formulated by Gouldner and other contem­
porary critical sociologists, concur in the belief in the 
efficacy of an objective, scientific approach to the study of
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social phenomena. However, whereas mainstream sociologists 
merely enjoin their fellow sociologists to be dispassionate 
in their research and teaching, critical sociologists see 
such an injunction as futile, maintaining that the only al­
ternative is for sociologists to declare openly their values 
and by doing so significantly neutralize the potential bias­
ing effects of these values on their research and in their 
teaching.
This concurrence of views goes beyond the overriding 
belief in the efficacy of an objective, scientific approach 
to the study of society. Underlying both sides of this de­
bate is the notion that values are synonymous with personal, 
subjective beliefs, opinions, convictions, etc.. As such, 
values are relative —  they are the exclusive property of 
each individual and their applicability cannot extend beyond 
the individual. Put otherwise, critical and mainstream soci­
ologists alike subscribe to the notion that the realm of fact 
and the realm of value are entirely separate and distinct.
The validity of any value Judgment, thus, cannot be demon­
strated scientifically. The most sociologists can do, as 
critical sociologists argue so forcefully, is to acknowledge 
those values that influence their research and teaching with 
the hope that that part of their work which represents factu­
al contributions to our understanding of modern society can
be salvaged from that part which merely reflects the personal
12
views of any particular sociologist.
The above discussion of Weber's "Science as a Vocation"
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and the interpretation of that work by mainstream and critical 
sociologists provides the essential frame of reference for 
the entire debate concerning the value question in contempo­
rary sociology. Most significantly, there appears to be an 
underlying area of agreement on some crucial points in this 
debate. For the most part, those who criticize value-neutral 
sociology do not call into question the validity of an ob­
jective, scientific approach to the study of society. More­
over, value judgments are viewed as representing no more than 
the expression of personal biases; hence, value judgments are 
relative —  their validity cannot be demonstrated scientific­
ally.
I believe the existence of such a wide area of agree­
ment among critical and mainstream sociologists on this fun­
damental issue is indicative of the shallowness of this critic­
al movement as a whole. As I hope to point out further in 
the rest of this chapter, the criticism of value-neutral 
sociology goes no further than the injunction to "be honest" 
and declare one's values. There is no questioning of soci­
ology's status as a scientific discipline, nor is there any 
significant attempt to discuss the basic philosophical issues 
that are obviously involved here -- most directly, the concept 
of value and the validity of a relativistic theory of value.
On both these points I hope to shed some light by presenting 
an alternative, objective conception of value that could point 
the way toward a more significant sociology, which is, after 
all, the basic goal of the sociological critique of American 
sociology.
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(2) Origin and Nature of the Criticism 
of the Doctrine of Value Neutrality
The place of values in sociology has been a question 
that has given rise to considerable debate and discussion 
throughout the history of sociology. One can find a clear 
statement of the doctrine of value neutrality in one of the
1 *3
early essays of Auguste Comte, J not to mention the later 
discussions of this issue contained in the work of Durkheim 
and Weber which have already been touched upon. In early 
American sociology this doctrine of value neutrality was 
largely dropped in favor of an emphasis on social reform as 
an important practical aim of sociology. Although one con­
temporary critic has argued that "the founding fathers of 
American sociology were ideological protagnoists for corpor-
14
ate capitalism", one cannot deny their clear commitment to 
social reform. But American sociologists' desire to gain 
respect and recognition as a scientific discipline and pro­
fession required that they drop this social reform emphasis 
and develop more along value-neutral lines.^
In spite of the steady drift toward a strictly scien­
tific, value-neutral approach to the study of social phenome­
na, some prominent American sociologists have challenged this 
trend. They argued forcefully for the adoption of certain 
value orientations in the work of sociologists. Among these 
are included the two most influential forerunners of the 
sociological critique of American sociology, Robert S. Lynd 
and C. Wright Mills, whose work we have already discussed. 
However, as important as their discussion of this issue is,
it cannot begin to compare in volume and intensity with the 
criticism of the doctrine of value neutrality produced in 
the I960's and 1970's by critical sociologists.
What sparked this outpouring of criticism at this 
time is not easy to delineate in specific terms, but I believe 
it is possible to link the resurgence of this issue with two 
general conditions.
First, one could reasonably argue that during the 
1950's a strictly scientific, value-neutral approach to the 
study of society reached its fullest development. Pitirim 
Sorokin's Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology (1956) amply 
documents (albeit in a critical vein) social scientists' emu­
lation of the work of scientists in other fields. Given this 
increasing scientific emphasis in sociology, I believe it was 
to be expected that a reaction would set in against this 
trend —  a reaction which was helped along considerably both 
by Mills' and Sorokin's criticism of this trend and by the 
tradition of social reform which had been a strong element in 
the early development of sociology in America.
Second, and more importantly I believe, the doctrine 
of value neutrality became a central target for critical soci­
ologists because the events and mood of the country at this 
time demanded it. The civil rights and anti-war movements, 
in particular, called into question some basic social policies 
of our country, policies which sociologists, among other 
academics, had become associated with. Since the scientific, 
value-neutral approach precluded any kind of critical analysis
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of these social policies, several sociologists perceived the 
need to break with such an approach. The time had come for 
sociologists to take a stand on these pressing social issues 
and this required a reassessment of the doctrine of value 
neutrality.
Among the first and most important discoveries made
by sociologists who began reassessing the doctrine of value
neutrality was that it was, in fact, a myth. So-called "value
neutral" sociological research and theory were discovered to
contain numerous implicit value presuppositions. All facets
of the work of sociologists, from the initial choice of topic
to be investigated to the theories which these investigations
provided evidence for, were found to have been influenced by
the value orientations of the sociologists involved. Hence,
as Howard Becker clearly notes in the following passage, it
is no longer a question of having values or not having values
This dilemma, which seems so painful to so 
many, actually does not exist, for one of
its horns is imaginary. For it to exist,
one would have to assume, as some apparently 
do, that it is indeed possible to do research 
that is uneontaminated by personal and 
political sympathies. I propose to argue 
that it is not possible and, therefore, that 
the question is not whether we should take 
sides, since we inevitably will, but rather 
whose side are we on. 17
For example, choosing to focus one's research on members of
an oppressed minority group rather than investigate the insti
tutional policies which may have helped create and perpetuate
the oppression of this minority group reflects a value
preference on the part of the researcher: that the plight
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of this minority group is better understood by focusing on 
members of it rather than on the larger circumstances with­
in which it exists.
So, those who claim that their work is value-free do 
not, in fact, escape "taking sides", as Becker puts it. This 
point is further emphasized in D.J. Gray's provocative ar­
ticle, "Value-Free Sociology: A Doctrine of Hypocrisy and 
Irresponsibility". At one point Gray comments that:
...while sociologists may congratulate 
themselves on their newly attained 
"scientific" status, the fact is that 
as opposed to being truly value-free, 
rather, they have become but professional 
handmaidens of the going value system.
In effect, by refusing to make value 
Judgments themselves, they have tacitly 
accepted the values of others. No longer 
truly intellectuals, they have assumed 
a new role as employees, consultants, or 
technicians serving the present establish­
ment which, on the matter of values, is by 
no means shy.l8
In the view of critical sociologists, then, value-neutral
sociology is not only a myth, but it also serves to conceal
mainstream sociologists' basic commitment to maintaining the
status quo.
The implicit conservatism of value-neutral sociology 
is no more clearly evident than in Talcott Parsons' structural- 
functionalism, certainly the dominant theoretical perspective 
in American sociology during the 1950's and the early i960's. 
The conservatism of Parsons' framework is a principal theme 
in one of the most important and most influential books to 
come out of this critical movement, Alvin Gouldner's The 
Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. A good portion of the
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book is devoted to a discussion of Parsons' personal back­
ground as it relates to the development of his structural- 
functionalist framework. Gouldner takes note of Parsons' re­
latively tranquil life in Cambridge, Massachusetts, isolated 
from the real horrors of the Great Depression, in addition to 
the fact that he had a secure position at Harvard during these 
turbulent times, as two aspects of his personal background 
which, in part, explain both his implicit and explicit defense 
of American capitalism. Although the existence of this link 
between Parsons1 personal background and his contributions to 
sociological theory is really never proven by Gouldner, there 
can be no doubt about the inherent conservatism of the function 
alist perspective itself.
The nature of this conservatism is well-captured by 
Gouldner in attempting to account for the emphasis in func­
tionalism on the adoption of a common morality rather than 
any kind of fundamental socioeconomic change as the key to 
future social stability. What this amounts to, according to 
Gouldner, is a commitment "...to the present society, with 
all its dilemmas, contradictions, tensions, and, indeed, with 
all its immorality....It [functionalism] is committed to 
making things work despite wars, inequities, scarcity, and 
degrading work, rather than trying to find a way out."1^
That which is already established being associated with that
which is functional, anything which challenges the existing
?nsocial order, thus comes to be looked upon as deviant. In 
essence: "Functionalists,...constitute the sociological
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21conservation corps of industrial society." —  and this is 
true in spite of all the claims to value neutrality.
Value neutrality is not only considered the hallmark 
of scientific sociology but it is also considered essential 
to professional sociology, as reflected in the American Soci­
ological Association's Code of Ethics. As a basic component 
of this code, this doctrine of value neutrality again reveals 
its conservative implications. Some sociologists charged that 
the A.S.A. 's move to adopt a code of ethics almost immediately 
following the Project Camelot scandal was a calculated move 
designed to allay the public's fear that sociologists were 
in fact social advocates rather than value-neutral, scientific 
researchers they professed themselves to be. What this amount­
ed to is explained by Gouldner in the following terms: "What 
seems more likely is that it [the adoption of a value-free 
position^] entails something in the way of a tacit bargain: 
in return for a measure of autonomy and social support, 
many social scientists have surrendered their critical im­
pulses . 1,22
In surrendering their critical impulses, value- 
neutral sociologists have clearly allied themselves with the 
established social order, for "...the man who attempts to 
stay 'above or beside' the battle by not taking sides on 
social issues, actually, by the consequence of such 'non­
choice' becomes an ally of the existing power structure —
23and has, thus, taken sides after all."
In attempting to locate the source of this inherent 
conservatism, few critical sociologists have focused on the
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nature of empirical sociology itself; rather, they have, for 
the most part, sought an explanation for this inherent con­
servatism in the personal backgrounds of individual sociolo­
gists. In one form or another, the argument has been that 
mainstream sociologists and their professional association 
have been primarily concerned with their own survival. Thus, 
Gouldner suggests that the conservatism built into Parsons' 
theoretical framework derives from his desire to see a capi­
talist social order preserved, which had provided him with a 
secure existence even during the Depression. In a similar 
vein, the motive behind the American Sociological Association's 
adoption of a code of ethics is argued to be mainstream soci­
ologists' concern with guaranteeing continued public support 
for their research efforts. Significantly, no attempt is made 
to prove these charges; they are usually presented as possible 
explanations and left at that.
Although C. Wright Mills had argued that this conserva­
tive orientation in mainstream sociology is rooted in the very 
nature of empirical sociology (in its bureaucratic ethos), 
this line of argument was largely dropped by later critical 
sociologists. The reason it was dropped, I believe, derives 
from a general reluctance of these critical sociologists to 
discuss philosophical questions of any kind. Clearly, an 
examination of the nature of empirical sociology and its in­
herent value implications would encompass a discussion of 
some basic epistemological and ethical issues. This reluctance, 
which will be noted time and again in the chapters to follow,
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constitutes what I contend is one of the basic shortcomings 
of this critical movement as a whole.
Members of the Frankfurt School, who have commented 
extensively on the epistemological and ethical implications 
of the predominant empirical-positivistic mode of thought in 
contemporary social science, clearly perceived the connection 
between empirical sociology and a conservative value position.
In its emphasis on collecting data on people's attitudes and 
opinions, empirical sociological research can do no more than 
reflect the established order (or, better, reflect the propa­
ganda about the established social order). These attitudes 
and opinions are said to constitute the empirically real; any 
attempt to uncover the true nature or basis of the established 
social order is considered futile. As Max Horkheimer puts it, 
"The so-called facts ascertained by quantitative methods, which 
the positivists are inclined to regard as the only scientific
ones, are often surface phenomenon that obscure rather than
oh
disclose the underlying reality." Thus, the ideological 
conservatism of sociology's empirical methodology is disclosed, 
for insofar as this methodology goes no further than a de­
scriptive analysis of the status quo, it cannot come to tran­
scend that status quo and come to see it as it truly is —  as
25
Just another phase in the historical development of a society. 
Put otherwise, empirical sociology can provide no base for a 
critical analysis of the established social order. So, in 
the view of these members of the Frankfurt School, the absence 
of any kind of critical analysis in mainstream sociology (hence,
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its inherent conservatism) derives primarily from its founda­
tion in empiricism and not from the personal backgrounds of 
individual sociologists.
Among the few instances in which critical sociologists 
do acknowledge that empirical sociology does entail a certain 
value orientation is an argument put forth by Robert W. 
Friedrichs. As does nearly every other critical sociologist, 
Friedrichs exposes the doctrine of value neutrality as a myth, 
arguing that all sociological work has value implications. 
Taking a different tact, however, Friedrichs goes on to argue 
that the specific nature of this value orientation is an out­
growth of mainstream sociology's empirical methodology. In 
stark contrast to the argument that this value orientation is 
basically conservative, Friedrichs asserts that it is in fact 
revolutionary. He maintains that the very discovery of stable 
sequences of behavior (i.e., "social lav/s") in sociological 
research influences the social behavior which these "laws" 
describe (for example, that Marx's discovery of the relation­
ship between labor and capital influenced the bourgeoisie in
the twentieth century to modify their control of the prole- 
26
tariat ). In this vein, Friedrichs comments:
Though the great mass of Western sociologists 
remain completely unaware of the fact, the 
person who enters upon social research is 
committing himself to the dialect of change, 
to frustrating the continuity of the rhythms 
that course through social existence, to 
freeing the future from the past. What he 
has been viewing as a neutral delineation 
of things as they are appears instead to 
involve our implicit commitment to change 
per se. 27
Friedrich's argument rests upon two highly question-
able assumptions: (l) that empirical research can indeed un­
cover basic continuities in social life, and (2) that the 
results of such research have a profound effect on future 
social behavior.
As Sorokin, Mills, and others have argued, a basic 
problem with empirical research is its tendency to consider 
only relatively trivial aspects of society; as such, it can 
give us no insight into basic continuities in social life as 
Friedrichs contends. Even more questionable is the assumption 
that the results of such research have a significant impact 
on subsequent social behavior. If anything, the work of soci-
pQ
ologists has largely been ignored by the general public, 
with a couple of possible exceptions being David Riesman's 
work in social psychology and C. Wright Mills' discussion of 
the power elite.
In short, although Friedrichs does focus on the nature 
of empirical sociology and its connection with a certain value 
orientation, his argument rests on a couple of assumptions 
which, as was pointed out in the previous paragraph, are of 
doubtful validity. Indeed, these assumptions underscore 
Friedrichs' underlying commitment to empirical sociology.
In contrast, we have seen that Adorno, Korkheimer, and Marcuse, 
three prominent members of the Frankfurt School, are prepared 
to reject mainstream sociology's empirical methodology be­
cause they argue that such an approach cannot uncover the 
true nature of modern society.
In general, critical sociologists' treatment of the
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value question In contemporary sociology betrays their un­
wavering commitment to sociology's empiricist foundations and, 
in particular, to Max Weber's view of the place of values in 
sociology. Along with Weber, underlying the criticism of the 
doctrine of value neutrality is the implicit conviction that, 
in an ideal sense, values have no legitimate place in any 
phase of a sociologist's work. However, given the fact that 
sociologists are human beings as well as scientists, their 
work cannot help but reflect to some degree their personal 
beliefs, biases, convictions, etc. (i.e., their values). That 
values, and the wrong kind of values at that, have influenced 
the work of sociologists is thus seen as a matter for which 
sociologists themselves must take personal responsibility.
As one critical sociologist puts it: "...If a sociologist 
practices rhetoric (preaching a biased truth), but identifies 
himself (to self and/or others) as a scientist (the carrier 
of unbiased "truth"), he renders his rhetoric immoral, the 
immoral rhetoric of identity deception.
From this view, then, the problem sociologists con­
front is not one that derives from the philosophical found­
ations of their discipline; rather, it is a problem which 
must be dealt with personally by each sociologist. The only 
way to neutralize to some extent the unavoidable effect of 
values on a sociologist's work is for that sociologist to 
acknowledge them openly —  hence, the basic injunction to all 
sociologists: "let's be honest".
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(3) The Basic Solution to the Problem 
of Values in Sociological Work: 
"Let's Be Honest"
As we have seen, critical sociologists argue that 
value-neutral sociology is a myth, an illusion, which more 
often than not conceals an implicit conservative bias. In 
one way or another, then, values enter into all aspects of 
sociological work. So, rather than falsely deny their exist­
ence, sociologists must somehow deal with the question of 
how these values influence sociological research and theory.
In this regard, critical sociologists have overwhelmingly re­
commended one basic solution to this problem, a solution which 
leaves the fundamental tenets of empirical sociology intact. 
This solution, as I have already indicated, can most aptly 
be characterized by the injunction: "let's be honest".
Enjoining one's fellow sociologists to be honest about 
their values is not unique to the sociological critique of 
American sociology. Earlier statements of this position by 
Robert S. Lynd^and C. Wright Mills capture all of the 
essential aspects of its later use. For example, as Mills 
notes:
There is no way in which any social scientist 
can avoid assuming choices of value and 
implying them in his work as a whole....In­
creasingly, research is used, and social 
scientists are used, for bureaucratic and 
ideological purposes. This being so, as 
individuals and as professionals, students 
of man and society face such questions as: 
whether they are aware of these uses and values 
of their work, whether these may be subject to 
their own control, whether they want to seek 
control of them. How they answer these 
questions, or fail to answer them, and how
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they use or fail to use the answers in their 
work and in their professional lives determine 
their answer to the question: whether in their 
work as social scientists they are (a) morally 
autonomous, (b) subject to the morality of 
other men, or (c) morally adrift. 31
Clearly, for Mills, as for later critical sociologists, moral 
autonomy is preferable to the other two alternatives —  the 
other two alternatives being those which apply to those soci­
ologists who hold on to the myth that their work is value- 
neutral. As both Mills and later critical sociologists argue, 
the work of mainstream sociologists is, in reality, either 
ideologically aligned with or a tool of the established social 
order. To be morally autonomous, on the other hand, requires 
that sociologists take definite positions (whatever they may 
be) on the kinds of questions that Mills poses above.
Although the above passage from Mills contains the 
basic elements to be found in later expressions of the "let's 
be honest" position, I believe these later expressions have 
a significantly different emphasis. Whereas Mills' remarks 
are directed at the sociological profession as a whole, cri­
tical sociologists focus more on the integrity of individual 
sociologists.
Among critical sociologists, Alvin Gouldner has been 
one of the staunchest advocates of the "let's be honest" posi­
tion. In his 1962 essay, "Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value- 
Free Sociology", Gouldner comments on Max Weber's strong op­
position to teachers expressing their political opinions 
(i.e., value preferences) in the classroom:
If sociologists ought not to express their 
personal values in the academic setting,
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how then are students to be safeguarded 
against the unwitting influence of these 
values which shape the sociologist's 
selection of problems, his preferences 
for certain hypotheses or conceptual 
schemes, and his neglect of others.
For these are unavoidable and, in this 
sense, there is and can be no value-free 
sociology. The only choice is between 
an expression of one's values, as open 
and honest as it can be,...and a vain 
ritual of moral neutrality. 32
In these terms, a sociologist has only two options open to
him: either being forthright in declaring what his values or
biases are or being wittingly or unwittingly hypocritical and
cling to the myth of value neutrality.
In the work of Gouldner and other critical sociologists 
these two options, honesty or hypocrisy, are linked with other 
personal characteristics such as courage, passion, and coward­
ice. Those sociologists who are unwilling to acknowledge that 
their work is influenced by value considerations in any way -- 
those who hide behind the myth of value neutrality —  are ac­
cused of being cowards. These are the same sociologists who shy 
away from becoming personally involved in any controversial 
social issue. As one critical sociologist argues, "Although 
greed and sloth may account for a significant number of those 
who choose to remain on what they think is dead center, I am 
personally convinced that cowardice is the most important 
single explanation."
Those sociologists who are willing to reflect upon 
their work and openly acknowledge those values that have 
influenced their work are deemed courageous. As Gouldner 
observes, "The pursuit of awareness,...remains rooted in
- Ill -
the most ancient of virtues. The quality of a social sci­
entist's work remains dependent on the quality of his man­
hood. "34
Not only is courage said to be involved in the very 
pursuit of awareness (or "Reflexive Sociology", as Gouldner 
labels this pursuit), but courage and, indeed, passion, are 
also involved in taking clear positions on controversial 
social issues. It is because of a lack of these qualities 
that Gouldner, for example, criticizes Howard S. Becker's 
attempt to define the proper job of the sociologist in his 
article, "Whose Side Are We On?". Gouldner argues that, 
although he seems to favor having sociologists take up the 
cause of the "underdogs" or underprivileged people in our 
society, Becker does not declare his own sympathies. That is 
to say: "...while Becker invites partisanship he rejects 
passionate or erect partisanship. In the very process of 
opposing the conventional myth of the value-free social 
scientist, Becker thereby creates a new myth, the myth of the 
sentiment-free social scientist. Continuing in this vein, 
Gouldner calls into question Becker's motivation in suggest­
ing that sociologists identify with and become advocates for 
the poor and oppressed. He charges that Becker's concern with 
the plight of the underdogs is really only "...part of a titil- 
lated attraction to the underdog's exotic difference...." 
Moreover, Gouldner maintains that the "real" reason for 
Becker's failure to state his position clearly is due to the 
vested interest he has in guaranteeing continued funding for
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such research, which a strong statement of support for the
underdogs on his part may jeopardize by antagonizing those
37who control such funds. In sum, then, Becker's work is 
viewed as self-serving and lacking a true and passionate com­
mitment to the alleviation of suffering among the poor and 
oppressed; and these shortcomings derive from defects in 
Becker and not from defects in the discipline of sociology 
itself.
The kind of personal criticism Gouldner directs at 
Becker is manifest throughout this critical movement. The 
worth of a sociologist's work is often judged in terms of the 
degree to which it reveals a courageous, passionate commit­
ment to a particular value position —  usually one which is 
critical of the established social order. Hence, in Enter 
Plato much of Gouldner's criticism of Plato's social theory 
focuses on what he perceives as shortcomings in Plato's char­
acter —  that he does not measure up to the emotion-filled, 
full-blooded individual that social thinkers, in Gouldner's 
view, ideally should be. Plato's lack of courage and passion 
are linked to what Gouldner sees as the overriding conservative 
implications of his basic concern with social order. This last 
point applies with equal force to Gouldner's treatment of 
Talcott Parsons in The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. 
Finally, one critical sociologist has even applied this type 
of analysis to graduate students in sociology. They are char­
acterized as "dry, small-gauge humans" because they do not 
use "...concepts imbued with emotion; concepts eliciting
aSSSSssa
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39sustained lines of political activity;..."
The realisation of a more significant sociology, then, 
hinges upon a change in the character of sociologists -- that 
they become courageous, forthright social scientists. As 
Alfred McClung Lee notes, "The future of sociology as a sci­
entific discipline in the service of humanity...rests on the
creative scientists, upon their curiosity, courage, integrity,
40
and concern for the human condition."
In addition to the injunction to declare one's values 
openly, some of these same critical sociologists called for 
the establishment of a new field of inquiry, a sociology of 
values, in which values people hold would become an object 
of study just as people's beliefs, attitudes, and opinions 
have been objects of sociological investigation. In the main, 
this sociology of values parallels Emile Durkheim's "science 
of ethics" which was designed to investigate the changing 
moral foundations of society. Both of these approaches are 
basically empirical and descriptive in nature -- their object, 
like that of all sociological research, being to analyze and 
explain, not to advocate or recommend. Irving Louis Horowitz, 
a principal spokesman for this sociology of values, comments 
in this regard, "...that the future of social science as a 
whole, as well as in its parts, is intimately connected to 
the development of a science of ethical judgment. This is a 
necessary compliment to the sociology of knowledge -- a soci­
ology of ethics that would render information about why men 
value what they value under given life conditions.
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In connecting the sociology of values with the soci­
ology of knowledge, Horowitz is clearly indicating what the 
main purpose of such an investigation will be: it will simply 
be to bring an increased awareness to sociologists of what 
values shape their work and how they shape it. With this, 
we come back again to the basic assumption contained in the 
"let's be honest" position: the recognition that, as human 
beings, we all carry around with us certain value preferences
which will manifest themselves in one way or another in all 
42that we do.
(4) Advocating the Adoption of a Particular 
Value Commitment as an Alternative 
Solution to the Problem of Values 
in Sociology
To overcome the continued adherence to the illusion 
that the work of sociologists is and can be value-neutral, 
critical sociologists have offered essentially two alterna­
tive courses of action. The first alternative is the "let's 
be honest" position which we have just finished discussing.
A second alternative, which we will discuss presently, is 
very simply the advocacy of a certain value commitment as an 
appropriate guide for all sociologists to follow. That is to 
say, on this view, sociologists are urged to embrace a parti­
cular value position rather than continue to seek in vain 
for a way in which one can avoid altogether the contaminating 
effects of values.
If there is one value position that most critical 
sociologists explicitly or implicitly endorse it is the
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democratic principle of individual freedom as it applies both 
to society and to sociology itself. The classic argument for 
the adoption of this value position is presented in The Soci­
ological Imagination. As was noted in the Introduction, Mills 
was concerned with the growing predominance of "masses" (or 
"cheerful robots" in the specific case of white-collar workers) 
in modern society. These are the kind of people who are easily 
manipulated into supporting whatever political-economic system 
happens to be established, even if that system adversely affects 
their own lives.
To counter this trend, Mills advocated the cultivation 
of "publics", or those people who constitute the informed, 
questioning, free citizenry of a truly democratic social order. 
It was by means of the "sociological imagination" that Mills 
hoped to cultivate publics, for this sociological imagination 
would help translate "personal troubles" into "public issues" 
and thereby open people's eyes to the fact that their own in­
dividual problems derive from larger problems in the society 
as a whole. In Mills' own words: "What he [the sociologist^ 
ought to do for society is to combat all those forces which 
are destroying genuine publics and creating a mass society -- 
or put as a positive goal, his aim is to help build and
stregthen self-cultivating publics. Only then might society
4^be reasonable and free."
For Mills, sociologists' involvement in the creation 
and maintenance of a truly democratic social order must begin 
with the sociological profession itself. Classic social
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analysts such as Max Weber, who Mills argues had made the 
values of freedom and reason a central part of their work, 
should be emulated by contemporary sociologists. Moreover, 
sociologists should always be committed to the free and open 
discussion of their work -- the free exchange of ideas being 
crucial to the further development of sociology. For Mills, 
then, increased democracy in the sociological profession is 
seen as a necessary condition for the realization of a more 
significant sociology.
This call for greater freedom in society, as well as 
in sociology, was to become a rallying point for critical 
sociologists during this turbulent period in American history. 
One must remember that during the 1960's the academic commun­
ity in general was being increasingly pressured to take de­
finite positions on controversial social Issues. No one felt 
this pressure more than did these same critical sociologists 
who had rejected the doctrine of value neutrality as a per­
nicious myth. Drawing upon Mills' (and, indeed, Max Weber's) 
observation of the growing influence of the"bureaucratic 
ethos" in society and in sociology, these critical sociologists 
embraced the democratic principle as a counter to bureaucratic 
domination. They did so in much the same terms that Mills 
used in expressing his commitment to the democratic principle.
First of all, there was much discussion of bringing 
greater freedom to the sociological profession itself. In 
the previous chapter, we saw that the principal reaction of 
critical sociologists to the Project Camelot controversy was
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to argue for greater autonomy for sociological researchers --
that they be freed from the real and potential manipulation
exercised by those public and private agencies which fund
sociological research,. This point is forcefully stated by
John H. Kultgen in his provocative article entitled "The
Value of Value Judgments in Sociology":
Sociology should be autonomous, a self- 
governing polity. Only then will it 
succeed in its primary aims and, more 
important, be an enterprise in which 
self-respecting moral agents can partici­
pate .
My reaction to the value-free scientist 
ready to serve any master is disgust. This 
is a moral judgment which I consciously 
make and recommend to sociologists. 44
Just as Mills believed that the realization of a more 
significant sociology ultimately rested upon autonomous, 
creative social scientists willing to investigate large, 
controversial issues —  that is, sociologists who do not al­
low their investigations be dictated by pre-determined, bureau­
cratic methods of research —  so too these critical sociolo­
gists maintain that a significant sociology rested upon the
45degree to which sociologists are truly autonomous. To cite 
one prominent example, Alvin Gouldner's proposal to establish 
"theoretical communes" in which free and rational discourse 
replaces mechanical research techniques as the guiding prin­
ciple of operation is based upon the view that a significant 
sociology is first and foremost an autonomous sociology.
More important, however, in the eyes of these critical 
sociologists is the obligation to contribute to the realiza­
tion of a truly free society -- a society run by self-governing
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publics (to paraphrase Mills' vision of such a society). One 
way in which sociologists can contribute to greater democracy 
is to make the results of their work more accessible to the 
people in general. Sociologists should serve the people, not 
the special interest groups which pay for much of the research 
which sociologists do.
Unfortunately, in the view of most critical sociolo­
gists, the latter has more often than not been the case. This 
is to pose the question which Alfred McClung Lee chooses as 
the title of one of his critiques of contemporary sociology, 
Sociology For Whom?. His answer to that question captures the 
general sentiment of critical sociologists: "The excuse for 
the existence of sociologists is not simply the maintenance 
of academic employment and research funding [as mainstream 
sociologists would see it[] . The chief excuse is the answering
of the question, 'Sociology for whom?' in this manner: Soci-
46ology for the service of humanity." And, as Lee goes on to 
indicate, "In serving humanity, sociologists act principally 
as critics, demystifiers, reporters, and clarifiers...they 
try to report more accurate information about the: changing 
social scene and with it help to clarify ways of under­
standing human relations and of coping with personal and
47social problems."
In addition to acting as educators of the masses, 
adherence to the democratic principle also brings with it a 
commitment to the realization of those social conditions which 
allow greater human freedom. This particular point is brought
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out clearly In Dennis Foss's attempt to spell out a new ori­
entation for the sociological profession. Foss draws upon 
basic tenets of democracy laid down in the United States 
Constitution in defining his new orientation: "Ultimately, 
then, what is proposed is: the optimization of alternatives 
open to every individual compatible with the equal optimization 
of alternatives open to all -- each individual's freedom 
should be continually increased up to the point that it begins
hg
to interfere with the optimization of freedom for others."
Sociologists are thus enjoined to work toward the 
"optimization of alternatives" for everyone in our society.
In a similar vein, and in equally general terms, two sociolo­
gists suggest that the "dignity of man"principle become the 
guide for sociological practice. A man's dignity is defined 
"...in terms of his ability to pursue alternative courses of 
action —  to have available significant choices. The idea of 
alternatives, when defined in terms of significant structural 
choices, emphsizes man's effort to control his own destiny.
We shall leave off our discussion of this commitment 
to the democratic principle here and take it up again in more 
detail in the following chapter where we will consider the 
equally strong and related commitment to the individual. Al­
though I will comment more extensively on their vision of a 
truly free society in the next chapter, it is important to 
note here that none of these critical sociologists gets much 
more specific than the above general statements. The gener­
ality and vagueness of their position, I believe, ultimately
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derives from a weakness in the philosophical basis of their 
overall approach to the value question —  a topic we will 
get to shortly. However, before taking up this shortcoming 
in the sociological critique of American sociology, let us 
look briefly at a few more prominent examples of specific 
value commitments urged by critical sociologists.
In addition to being staunch advocates for the demo­
cratic principle, critical sociologists also express sympathy 
for the plight of the poor and oppressed. Alvin Gouldner, for 
example, urges his fellow sociologists to take a stand against 
the suffering of these people. This position is most clearly 
ennunciated in the context of his stinging attack on Howard 
Becker's reflections on this subject, which was briefly dis­
cussed earlier in this chapter. Gouldner charged that Becker 
himself fails to answer the question posed in the title of 
his article, "Whose Side Are We On?". This failure on Becker's 
part Gouldner takes as evidence of his lack of courage to de­
clare his value position openly and honestly. To avoid being 
accused of the same fault, Gouldner makes clear his own com­
mitment: that sociologists support the "underdogs". "The es­
sential point about the underdog," says Gouldner, "is that 
he suffers, and that suffering is naked and visible. It is 
this that makes and should make a compelling demand on us. 
Gouldner argues, moreover, that this kind of "feelingful
commitment" will open up aspects of society for study which
51have previously been totally neglected. By adopting the 
standpoint of the underdog, one such new area of investigation
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which would be opened up is the critical scrutiny of the 
"power elite" who, in the view of most critical sociologists, 
are directly responsible for the plight of the underdogs.
Another prominent value commitment critical sociolo­
gists have embraced is that of a Marxist vision of a good 
society and of how such a society can be realized. Critical 
sociologists, by and large, subscribe to the notion that 
Marx's work can be divided into two distinct periods: (l) the 
philosophical-humanistic, early Marx (or, the "youthful Karl" 
as Friedrichs prefers to call him) and (2) the later scienti­
fic, economic determlnist Marx. If passages from the early 
Marx are used to support these critical sociologists' basic 
commitment to the free development of all individuals, the 
later Marx is uniformly denounced as an economic determlnist 
who denies the possibility of significant human freedom.
This indicates that the commitment to Marx is really second­
ary to the overriding commitment to human freedom.
There was, nonetheless, a group of critical sociolo­
gists who adhered quite closely to Marx's recommendations 
for social change. These critical sociologists enjoined their 
fellow sociologists to get involved in revolutionary move­
ments —  that they, in a sense, take up the position of the 
vanguard of the proletariat. As J. David Colfax and Jack L. 
Roach, the editors of an anthology entitled Radical Sociology, 
assert: "At the present time,...we would argue that the imme­
diate and primary task of the radical sociologist is to con­
tinue to raise public and professional consciousness through
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radical research and practice as well as to engage in radical
52
organizing on and off campus." The Sociology Liberation 
Movement's attempts to prod the American Sociological Associ­
ation into making a statement condemning United States' in­
volvement in Vietnam represents such an effort to raise public 
and professional consciousness.
On the surface, the various value commitments espoused 
by critical sociologists, from the commitment to democracy to 
advocating the overthrow of capitalism, appear to be expressed 
forthrightly and consistently. Nonetheless, underlying these 
arguments is the view that values are, at base, merely ex­
pressions of personal attitudes, convictions, preferences,
53and the like; as such, they are entirely relative. Indeed, 
built into the argument for greater democracy and freedom in 
society and in sociology is a pluralistic and relativistic 
notion of values.
What at first glance appears to be a clear commitment 
to a particular value position, then, is clouded by the simul­
taneous adherence to the view that one's values are no more 
than expressions of personal preference and so cannot be demon­
strated to be more or less valid than the values of someone 
else. Since there is no way of objectively determining which 
value commitments sociologists should adopt, the most sociolo­
gists can do is be honest about what value commitments they 
adhere to. As C. Wright Mills says in the context of making 
the point that all sociological work has moral implications: 
"The question is whether he [the sociologist] faces this
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condition and makes up his own mind, or whether he conceals 
it from himself and others and drifts m o r a l l y . S i g n i f i ­
cantly, the question is not whether the value position a 
sociologist adopts is valid or right.
The overriding relativism of critical sociologists' 
view of the nature of values not only serves to compromise 
their own value commitments, but I believe it is also large­
ly responsible for the characteristically vague way in which 
these commitments are stated. Such statements rarely go be­
yond high-sounding, impassioned pleas for increased freedom 
or the occasional call to sociologists to become actively in­
volved in movements designed to overthrow the existing cap­
italist social order.
(5) Philosophical Considerations of the Problem 
of Values in Sociology: The Need for an 
Objective Base for Value
The disagreements between mainstream and critical 
sociologists concerning the question of the place of values 
in sociology appear to be deep and strong. The repeated harsh 
denunciations of sociologists who espouse the doctrine of 
value neutrality can be taken as an indication of this. The 
basic arguments presented by each side do seem to express 
clearly opposing positions: mainstream sociologists arguing 
that, as a scientific discipline, sociology must be value- 
free; and the critics charging that value-free sociology is 
a myth, that values inevitably find their way into all aspects 
of sociological work.
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However, for all the fury of this debate and the 
seemingly irreconcilable positions each side defends, I be­
lieve there exist some significant similarities. This is a 
point for which evidence has already been presented in the 
discussion of critical and mainstream sociologists' inter­
pretation of Max Weber's "Science as a Vocation". That sim­
ilarities exist, indicates that perhaps mainstream and cri­
tical sociologists do not differ all that much on this issue, 
which leads one to conclude that the criticism of the doctrine 
of value neutrality does not represent a significant challenge 
to mainstream American sociology.
Most significantly, both sides of this issue hold a 
similar view of the nature of values; namely, that values 
are merely expressions of personal opinion, bias, prejudice, 
and the like. That is to say, values are universally seen as 
subjective, as having their locus within the individual; and 
hence, they are also relative.
Given such a conception of values one can readily 
understand how both positions in this debate can be defended. 
For mainstream sociologists to allow such subjective values 
to enter their work would mean giving up a basic goal of all 
scientific endeavor: achieving objective, reliable results. 
Hence, as defenders of sociology's status as a scientific 
discipline, mainstream sociologists are perfectly justified 
in arguing that sociology must be value-free. On the other 
hand, those who criticize the doctrine of value neutrality do
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so on the basis of the very same subjective conception of the 
nature of values. It is argued that because sociologists are 
human beings as well as social scientists, it is impossible 
to eliminate values entirely from their work because values 
are an inherent part of being human. So, rather than falsely 
espouse value neutrality, these critical sociologists take 
what they believe to be the more truthful, realistic stance 
of advocating a policy of honesty —  that sociologists open­
ly acknowledge their values so that the potential biasing 
effects of these values can be understood and neutralized to 
some extent.
Although the achievement of truly objective results 
is ruled out in the critics' view, objectivity, nonetheless,
remains a principal goal for them, just as it is for main­
stream sociologists. As one sociologist notes:
Objectivity or value freedom do not define a 
science. If they did, not only sociology 
but physics, chemistry, and all the rest 
would fail the test. What defines a science 
is the attempt to be objective, a commitment 
to try to filter out ideology from empirical 
knowledge, even while it is clear that the
attempt ultimately fails and the commitment
is basically in vain. 55
It is precisely this attempt "to filter out ideology from
empirical knowledge" that the "let's be honest" position is
designed for.
In those cases where critical sociologists have gone 
beyond the call for greater self-awareness and advocated the 
adoption of a particular value commitment, these value com­
mitments, in line with the predominant view of the nature of
- 126 -
values, have tended to be subjective and relative. From
Alvin Gouldner's call to oppose human suffering, to Alfred
McClung Lee's "existential humanism", to Dennis Foss's
"optimization of alternatives", each position is presented
as just one of many acceptable value commitments sociologists
can adopt. As any mainstream sociologist would also assert,
Dennis Foss points out that: "...the value of the orientation
[the optimization of alternatives^] is assumptive and not 
57demonstrable." Built into each position is a vagueness and 
a relativism which guarantees that it will never present a 
serious challenge to mainstream sociology and its conservative 
bias.
In short, in spite of all the high-sounding rhetoric —  
advocating greater freedom and fighting against bureaucratic 
domination and human suffering -- these critical sociologists 
have no well-defined view of a better society to oppose to 
the conservative view presented in mainstream sociology that 
they find so inadequate.
To my knowledge, none of these critical sociologists 
makes any serious attempt to address such important questions 
as those posed by Gideon Sjoberg and Ted R. Vaughn in the 
following passage -- questions which go to the heart of what 
is perhaps the most serious shortcoming of this critical 
movement:
In recent years social scientists have sought 
to formulate ethical codes or ethical guidelines 
by which their actions, particularly those in 
the research context, can be evaluated. Despite 
the emergence of, and attempt at, codification 
of these norms in the scientific community,
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almost no attention has been given to such 
fundamental (and corollary) questions as:
What Is the ultimate moral basis of the 
scientist's conduct? What is the ultimate 
standard by which the scientist is to 
justify and evaluate his actions? 53
This is to point to the need for a base or ground both for
judging the value of a sociologist's work and, ultimately, for
judging the adequacy of the conception of the kind of society
toward the realization of which sociologists should be work-
5'
ing (i.e., the appropriate goal orientation of sociologists). 
To suggest the necessity of attempting to resolve this complex 
and difficult issue of what constitutes a sound base for value 
judgment is also clearly to indicate the necessity of address­
ing some long-standing philosophical questions.
Despite the obvious importance of philosophy, many 
critical sociologists have explicitly disavowed any discussion 
of the relevant philosophical issues. One of the most widely- 
cited essays on the value question, Alvin Gouldner's "Anti- 
Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology", begins with 
such a disavowal. Gouldner says, "I do not wish to enter into 
an examination of the logical arguments involved, not because 
I regard them as incontrovertible but because I find them less 
interesting to me as a sociologist. Instead what I will do 
is to view the belief in a value-free sociology in the same
manner that sociologists examine any element in the ideology
fin
of any group." Ultimately, it is this failure to address 
the underlying philosophical issues which is indicative of 
the shallowness of the sociological critique of American soci­
ology as a whole.
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In clear contrast to critical sociologists' disavowal 
of philosophy, critical theorists of the Frankfurt School have 
argued that philosophy must be the basis of any truly critical 
analysis of society or sociology. As was brought out earlier 
in this chapter, some of these critical theorists perceived 
that the explanation for the inherent conservative bias in 
mainstream sociology lay in its philosophical underpinnings 
rather than in the social and psychological backgrounds of 
individual sociologists.
With its methodology, and the theory built upon it, 
rooted in empiricism, critical theorists argue that sociolo­
gists can do no more than reflect the given reality —  there 
is no way that an empirical approach to the study of society 
can disclose anything more than how Individuals, groups, or 
societies perceive themselves. Any judgment on the accuracy 
or propriety of these perceptions is left totally out of ac­
count, for to make such a judgment presupposes insight into 
the true nature of society and such an insight is precisely 
what the empiricist tradition denies we can attain. The point 
Is, as Theodor Adorno asserts: "In tabooing the inquiry into 
the essence of things as an illusion, as a demand that method 
is incapable of fulfilling, one is a priori shielding the es­
sential relationships, those which really determine the nature
6 1of society, from cognitive analysis." In the view of these 
critical theorists, only by means of a dialectical approach 
can one hope to disclose the true nature of the present social 
order, that is, come to see its inherent contradictions and
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the tendencies within it which point in the direction of a 
new social order.
What is at issue here, ultimately, are two different 
views of the nature of knowledge and reality. Sociologists, 
basically following Kant's lead, have maintained that all 
knowledge derives from experience, with our minds imparting 
a certain order to this experience (specifically, by way of 
the categories of the understanding for Kant). On this view, 
then, knowledge is based entirely on the appearance of things, 
on individuals' perception of things; what things are in them­
selves (or, what society is in itself, what is its true nature) 
belong to the realm of the unknowable. To base a study of 
society on such a view of the nature of knowledge and reality 
is to rule out the possibility of knowing society as it real­
ly is and of defining what society could or should be, for 
all one can know is what society appears to be as this is 
usually reflected in the countless studies of the attitudes 
and opinions of individuals.^
For the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School 
the above view of the nature of knowledge and reality can 
encompass no critical dimension, for in rejecting the possi­
bility of ever coming to know the true nature of society there 
can be no ground or basis for criticism. Rather, as Marcuse 
argues so eloquently in "The Concept of Essence", reality 
consists of appearance and essence. The job of the philosopher 
(and, indeed, of the sociologist) is to penetrate appearances 
and get at the essence of things, which means coming to see
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things both as they really are and as they are capable of 
becoming. All genuine thinking requires that one transcend 
the given reality,  ^ the present social order, and look upon 
it not as an absolute (as the functionalists tend to do) but 
as a moment in the historical development of society. A 
given society can only properly be understood as an outgrowth 
of the past and as containing tendencies which point in the 
direction of a new social order in the future.
Ultimately, in the view of these critical theorists,
it is in terms of a conception of the as yet potential, future 
64
utopian social order that criticism of the present is possi­
ble —  that the shortcomings and problems of present-day 
society become visible. This conception constitutes the 
ground or base for the Frankfurt School's critical analysis 
of modern society.
A close reading of the work of Adorno, Horkheimer, 
and Marcuse, three major figures of the Frankfurt School, does 
reveal the broad outlines of a philosophical or critical base. 
Among the three, Marcuse clearly goes the farthest in attempt­
ing to define this base in specific terms. Early on in One- 
Dlmenslonal Man Marcuse describes this base in the following 
terms:
In order to identify and define the possibilities 
of an optimal development, the critical theory 
must abstract from the actual organization and 
utilization of society's resources, and from 
the results of this organization and utili­
zation. Such abstraction which refuses to 
accept the given universe of facts as the 
final context of validation, such "transcending" 
analysis of the facts in the light of their 
arrested and denied possibilities, pertains
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to the very structure of social theory. It 
is opposed to all metaphysics by virtue of 
the rigorously historical character of the 
transcendence. The "possibilities" must be 
within the reach of the respective society; 
they must be definable goals of practice.
By the same token, the abstraction from the 
established institutions must be expressive
of an actual tendency -- that is, their
transformation must be the real need of the 
underlying population. Social theory is 
concerned with the historical alternatives 
which haunt the established society as 
subversive tendencies and forces. 65
What is particularly important to note about the above state­
ment is the emphasis placed on the concrete, factual nature
of the definition of this "optimal development". The good
society is to be defined in terms of actual tendencies in the 
present society, that is, of what society is capable of becom­
ing. For example, one important tendency in modern society 
that Marcuse frequently calls attention to is that of automa­
tion. Automation, he argues, has the potential of liberating 
people from necessary labor so that they may develop to their 
fullest potential as whole persons rather than have to waste 
their energy and talents performing menial tasks. The social 
critic, then, has the task of revealing these inherent tenden­
cies and working to further their realization.
In general terms, I believe one could accurately charac­
terize these critical theorists' view of a truly humane social 
order as consisting of three basic elements: (l) that the 
natural and industrial resources of the society are used toward 
the end of providing the necessities of life for everyone;
(2) that the toil and misery of necessary labor be reduced to 
a minimum; and (3) that genuine freedom is maximized for every-
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one. The real fruit of this humane social order will be the 
"whole person", the person who Is able to develop all of his 
capacities to the fullest.
Although critical sociologists talk a lot about in­
dividual freedom being the integral aspect of a future, better 
society which a more significant sociology is to have a hand 
in bringing about, their view of freedom is primarily a nega­
tive one. On their terms, freedom means essentially freedom 
from bureaucratic domination, freedom from all forms of social 
and sociological domination. Critical theorists do include 
this negative freedom in their conception of genuine freedom. 
After all, it was because of the strongly bureaucratic, man­
ipulative nature of Soviet communism that they came to reject 
it, along with American corporate calitalism, as contrary to 
their vision of a humane social order.
But much more important than negative freedom is 
"positive" freedom, that is, freedom for an individual to de­
velop as a whole person. Such freedom requires the development 
of a social order which provides significant opportunities for 
everyone. Among other things, this would require the establish­
ment of a more just property system. In the context of sociolo­
gy itself, it would require the adoption of a view of reality 
which most critical sociologists express vehement opposition 
to. As Marcuse sees it:
...This real context in which the particular 
subjects obtain their real significance is 
definable only within a theory of society.
To say that this meta context is the 
Society (with a capital "S") is to hypostatize 
the whole over and above the parts. But this
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hypostatization takes place in reality, is_ 
the reality, and the analysis can overcome 
it only by recognizing it and by compre­
hending its scope and its cause. Society 
is indeed the whole which exercises its 
independent power over individuals and this 
Society is no unidentifiable "ghost". It 
has its empirical hard core in the system 
of institutions, which are the established 
and frozen relationships among men. 66
It is statements such as the one above which have 
earned for Marcuse denunciations from some critical sociolo­
gists for being overly pessimistic and anti-individual. None­
theless, we should take note of what this statement implicitly 
suggests: that the resolution of the value question in soci­
ology requires a sound conception of social life and society 
as its basis. This is to make the important point, as I have 
emphasized all along, that what is wrong with contemporary 
American sociology derives primarily from a faulty methodo­
logical and theoretical base.
That a sound basis for value judgment requires a more 
adequate conception of society (i.e., of the facts) than those 
that have been offered in sociology and in the history of 
social thought in general is a principal theme running through 
the work of Elijah Jordan. Critical sociologists (as do main­
stream sociologists) separate the world of fact and the world 
of value, with the world of value having its locus in the bio- 
psychological individual and the world of fact refering to 
that world outside the bio-psychological individual. Jordan 
argues, on the contrary, that: "The relation between fact and 
value is one of constitutional mutuality,..." Value is the 
meaning of a fact. One judges something in terms of the
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larger system of relations in which it stands, that Is, in 
terms of the meaning or implications something has to the 
larger natural and cultural order of things. That larger 
natural and cultural order of things must be properly under­
stood in order to make correct Judgments about how things 
fit in this larger whole, of how they contribute to or de­
tract from this life whole.
Ordinarily, ethical or value questions are thought 
to involve the acts of individuals, the judgment of which is 
based on the perceived beneficial or detrimental effect of 
these acts on other individuals or on the particular individ­
ual involved. There is little in the work of critical soci­
ologists that would suggest any fundamentally different view 
of ethics. Indeed, by maintaining that values are both sub­
jective and relative, they place themselves clearly within 
the framework of an individualistic ethics.
Jordan takes issue with such a view of ethics because 
it is founded upon an inadequate conception of the person or 
individual. Persons, considered as separate and distinct bio- 
psychological entities, are not an appropriate base for ethics; 
they cannot be considered the real actors of modern society. 
Rather, as Jordan points out, the real actors are "instru­
mented or embodied persons"; that is, institutions or orders 
of objects directed toward some human end. It is through In­
stitutions that bio-psychological individuals act to achieve 
ends. A doctor, for example, achieves the end of healing the 
sick through the medical institution which encompasses the
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schools, the laboratory facilities, the drugs, the hospitals, 
etc. that are organized in such a way (or, at least, should 
be) to facilitate the end of healing the sick.
Ultimately, then, to judge things properly one must 
focus on this institutional structure and how it serves to 
enhance or detract from a sound social order. In Jordan's 
words: "...we shall have to redefine the person in terms of 
a corporate structure of interinstitutional relations if our 
ethical theory is to have conformity to the fact that is
necessary to give it validity and to ground its formulas as
, .,68 law.
This redefinition of the person represents nothing 
less than a redefinition of society —  that society Is 
essentially an organized system of institutions. It Is this 
fact which forms the essential basis of value -- the value 
of some aspect of society being the meaning that aspect has 
for the larger whole of which it is a part.
In the second chapter of his Forms of Individuality 
Jordan addresses the question of where sociological thinking 
stands with respect to this redefinition of the person and 
society. He argues that sociological thought Is inadequate 
because its focus on bio-psychological individuals and how 
they are held together in groups by subjective ties fails to 
take into consideration the objective development of the vast 
institutional structure of modern society. Although critical 
sociologists vehemently reject many aspects of contemporary 
American sociology, they tacitly accept the subjective view
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of society described above. Indeed, many critical sociolo­
gists go even further in emphasizing the subjective, as can 
be clearly seen, for example, in Alfred McClung Lee's "exist­
ential humanism". But, again, such an emphasis overlooks the 
fact that the lives of individuals are bound up with a larger 
institutional order, and that it is this larger institutional 
order on which sociologists need to focus.
In Chapter V we will come back to Jordan's conception 
of society and discuss it in greater detail in the context of 
a presentation of some alternative conceptions of society 
offered by critical sociologists. For now, let us just note 
how this all relates to the resolution of the value question 
in sociology.
In contrast to the subjective and relativistic view 
of values, Jordan is arguing that objective, sound judgments 
of value can be made, but they can only be made on the basis 
of a sound understanding of society. Therefore, the ultimate 
resolution of the value question rests upon a thoroughgoing 
reexamination of the most fundamental aspect of sociology's 
theoretical base; namely, the conception of society with 
which it connects. Unfortunately, such a reexamination has 
taken up but a small portion of the voluminous writings of 
critical sociologists.
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CHAPTER IV
THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 
IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIETY
(1) Origin and Nature of the Basic Value 
Commitment of Critical Sociologists
In the last two chapters, what has emerged from our 
analysis of critical sociologists' view of the proper rela­
tionship between sociological research and its sources of 
funding and their view of the proper place of values in soci­
ology is a commitment both to increased autonomy in the prac­
tice of sociology and to increased involvement in the struggle 
to realize a more humane, democratic social order. The values 
of freedom of inquiry, of openness to all methodological and 
theoretical perspectives, of education of the public about 
important social issues are universally acknowledged as 
essential elements of a significant sociology. A significant 
sociology, on this view, is one committed to furthering and 
sustaining a truly democratic social order.
Critical sociologists maintain that mainstream Amer­
ican sociology not only contains an inherent conservative 
political bias, but that it also places too much emphasis on 
the Comtian notion that knowledge of society and the practical 
application of such knowledge is to be left solely in the 
hands of experts, an intellectual elite. Critical sociologists 
see the predominant positivistic methodology and the function­
alist theoretical framework lending support to such an elitist 
view of the practical implications of the study of sociology.
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That is to say, critical sociologists are charging that the 
education of the masses (the electorate in a democratic so­
ciety) has never been a principal concern of mainstream soci­
ologists .
It is precisely in this area of general social edu­
cation that critical sociologists believe sociology could 
have its greatest practical import. In terms reminiscent of 
C. Wright Mills' earlier statement of this position, Irving 
Louis Horowitz comments:
The originating basis and ultimate purpose 
of sociology, as of any scientific discipline, 
is the formation of intelligent publics who 
are in a position to utilize that which they 
have learned and, as a matter of fact, who 
define the learning process precisely as the 
utilization and central sifting of information 
...Hence, the purpose of learning sociology 
is the transformation of unformed and 
uninformed men into decision-making creative 
persons. 1
So, rather than feed information to those in power In govern­
ment, the military, and business, critical sociologists urge 
their colleagues to turn their attention to the underprivileged
masses and help them come to understand their plight and of
2
what can be done to rectify this unjust situation.
In order for sociologists to carry out this task de­
scribed above they must, in the view of critical sociologists, 
first put their own house In order; that Is, the sociological 
profession must be made more democratic. One aspect of this 
call to bring greater democracy to the sociological profession 
has already been discussed at length. In discussing the re­
lationship between sociological research and social policy
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in Chapter II, It was noted that critical sociologists gener­
ally favor giving sociological researchers more autonomy in 
order to check the undue influence of private and public 
funding organizations over the conduct of social research.
More autonomous sociological researchers, it was further 
maintained, would be more likely to engage in more signifi­
cant research; they would not be afraid to tackle research 
topics which involved delving into controversial social issues.
Greater democracy in sociology also means accepting, 
on a more or less equal footing, all of the various methodolo­
gical and theoretical approaches that sociology has to offer. 
V/hatever harsh words these critical sociologists express to­
wards quantitative methods, functionalism, or other popular 
subjects for criticism, they almost invariably agree that 
such methodological and theoretical approaches have a legiti­
mate place in sociology. What critical sociologists protest 
is the attempt to present any particular approach as the only 
legitimate one. As Alfred McClung Lee asserts: "...humanist 
sociologists [i.e., critical sociologists] do not throw out 
the triplet babies -- system, theory, and quantification -- 
with their intellectual bath water. To humanist sociologists, 
system, theory, and quantification are useful tools, but they 
are not a "holy trinity" that should be permitted to dominate
O
sociological research and thinking.'0
According to the above view, the sociological profes­
sion is being urged to adopt a pluralistic approach toward the 
practice of sociology -- sociologists should both accept and
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utilize various methods and theories In Investigating social
phenomena and reporting their findings: "...it is evident
that wisdom as well as common sense, dictates an awareness
that sociology is not a monolithic entity, but a history, a
4
style, and a series of options."
That no one methodological or theoretical approach or 
no one school of thought be allowed to dominate the work of 
sociologists Is a principle which has a direct counterpart in 
the democratic society toward the realization of which this 
democratic sociology aims. The domination of an intellectual 
elite in society is viewed as being just as repugnant and un­
acceptable as the domination of any particular school of 
thought In sociology. The implications of supporting or re­
jecting such elitism are clearly set forth by T.B. Bottomore 
in the following passage:
If the aim of sociology is taken to be the 
discovery of the hidden mechanism of social 
life, which is then communicated in the train­
ing of a small elite of 'social engineers', 
this does entail the production and repro­
duction of a form of domination. But if the 
aim Is seen as the diffusion through society 
of an understanding of how social relation­
ships are established, persist, or can be 
changed -- as a kind of public enlightenment -- 
then Its effects can well be seen as liberating.^
Likewise, Richard Flacks, In criticizing what he sees 
as Alvin Gouldner's preoccupation with reforming sociology 
rather than society, takes a definite anti-elitist stance. 
With C. Wright Mills clearly in mind here, he states that: 
"...the purpose of sociology is above all, to strive to 
improve the capacity of ordinary people to understand social 
reality, to locate themselves historically, and to comprehend
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6the consequences of existing or potential social patterns."
It should come as no surprise to find these critical 
sociologists drawing upon major arguments presented in Mills'
The Sociological Imagination in defending the democratic 
alternative to established sociology and society. As I have 
noted on several previous occasions, Mills' work has had a 
tremendous influence on this critical movement as a whole, 
and that influence is no more evident than with respect to 
this call for greater democracy in sociology and society.
Certainly a major aspect of The Sociological Imagina­
tion is Mills' effort to free sociology (i.e., free the "soci­
ological imagination") from the dominant styles of work; namely, 
"abstracted empiricism" and "grand theory". In Mills' view, 
sociology needs to be freed from the dominance of these de­
fective styles of work so that it can more effectively carry 
out its educational function, thereby enhancing the prospects 
of realizing a truly democratic social order. Logically enough, 
as Howard Press notes in his critical review of Mills' life and 
work, the ideal of Jeffersonian grass-roots democracy greatly 
appealed to Mills. Indeed, if one had to characterize his poli­
tical position it would be that of a"radical democrat".^
The importance of America's democratic heritage for 
later critical sociologists is also clearly in evidence.
Some of their proposals can be traced directly to principles 
laid down some 200 years ago in the founding of our system 
of representative democracy. Among the best examples of this 
is Dennis Foss's "new" orientation for the profession. At
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one point, Foss describes this new orientation in the follow­
ing terms:
Ultimately, then, what is proposed is: the 
optimization of alternatives open to every 
individual compatible with the equal opti­
mization of alternatives open to all —  
each individual's freedom should be con­
tinually increased up to the point that it 
begins to interfere with the optimization 
of freedom of others. 8
Here are presented two basic principles of American democracy:
that individuals be allowed to pursue whatever life-course
they desire and that this freedom be limited only to the ex-
9
tent that it harms or hinders others.
Another "radical democrat", Alfred McClung Lee, also 
draws heavily on this democratic heritage in arguing for his 
"humanist-existential" value orientation. "The rough humanist- 
existential paradigm calls for a man-centered sociology in 
the service of human needs and goals as they are popularly 
defined. Thus, it is democratically oriented by its very 
nature."10 Maximum individual autonomy and popular partici­
pation in the shaping of public policy are the key elements 
of Lee's conception of the democratic alternative. It is 
"people power", ultimately, that Lee presents as the panacea 
for what ails both sociology and society.11
In addition to drawing upon Mills 1 work and the demo­
cratic tradition in America, critical sociologists also connect 
with a major theme in the work of members of the Frankfurt 
School. The critical theorists of the Frankfurt School main­
tain that the development of modern civilization as a whole, 
including both capitalist and communist worlds, is in the
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direction of increasing domination of the individual. There 
is the economic and political domination of the ruling classes 
over the underprivileged masses, and there is also the domi­
nation of certain modes of thought -- modes of thought which 
contain no critical perspective and which often serve as 
rationalizations for the status quo. In the face of this, the 
proper job of the social critic is to oppose this trend, to 
make criticism rather than rationalization of the status quo 
central to one's work. Similarly, critical sociologists see 
this as the proper function of sociology: "In summary terms, 
a responsible sociology has the dual task of developing a
critique of all forms of social oppression and of all forms
12of social science that serve to support such oppression."
Put simply, this view holds that the only responsible soci­
ology is a critical sociology.
In opposing these various forms of domination, criti­
cal sociologists can be seen (and clearly want to be seen) as 
coming to the rescue of the beleaguered, dominated individual.
They oppose mainstream sociology's "oversocialized conception 
1^
of man", in which the individual is lost sight of in the 
overriding concern with studying the larger social order. In 
Alfred McClung Lee's terms, critical sociologists should try 
"to identify and to grasp opportunities for the magnification 
of the Individual's potential In society."1^ Or, as Alvin 
Gouldner states In presenting his view of the proper role of 
the social critic: "The critic affirms the creative potenti­
alities of the Individual, and he opposes these to the con-
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formifcy demands of established institutions, ...
Although critical sociologists' defense of the indi­
vidual, their opposition to social, political, and economic 
domination, and their advocacy of the democratic alternative 
all connect with arguments put forth by members of the Frank­
furt School, there are significant differences which, I believe, 
point to serious shortcomings in the position of critical 
sociologists. Most significantly, this individualistic-demo­
cratic orientation leads to a rejection of any holistic, 
objective conception of society as inherently conservative 
and inadequate. But it is precisely a holistic, objective 
conception of society that members of the Frankfurt School, 
and, indeed, Elijah Jordan maintain is more in line with the 
reality. On this fundamental point, among others, we shall 
see significant differences emerge as we proceed to discuss 
the various facets of these critical sociologists' individual­
istic-democratic orientation in light of the Frankfurt School 
and Jordan's critical observations on the validity of such an 
orientation.
(2) Domination of the Individual in 
Mainstream Sociological Thought
Among the most important premises Anderson and Gibson 
lay down in setting forth their conception of a new, more 
significant sociology in their text, appropriately entitled 
Toward a New Sociology, is the following: "Individuals as 
members of groups define the form and content of society and 
history. As architects of society and history, individuals
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are capable of changing the structure of society and the 
course of history."10 This could serve as a major premise 
of the sociological critique of American sociology as a 
whole.1^ Critical sociologists argue that a fundamental short­
coming in the work of mainstream sociologists is the neglect 
of the individual. From the work of Auguste Comte to that of 
Talcott Parsons, the emphasis has been on how social struc­
ture and social processes shape the individual rather than 
the other way around.
The social determinism of mainstream sociology runs 
contrary to the democratic alternative which critical sociolo­
gists advocate, for their call for increased democracy in the 
practice of sociology and in society presupposes that indi­
viduals, in the words of Robert Lynd, be seen as "the active
l8carriers, perpetuators, and movers of culture..." It is 
through a sound education (i.e., through changing the minds 
of these individuals) that radical social change can be effect­
ed, and this is a task for which the "new sociology" is es­
pecially designed. From Mills' "sociological imagination", 
to Gouldner's "reflexive sociology", to Lee's humanistic soci­
ology, the focus is upon bringing to individuals a greater 
awareness of their plight and of what they can do to improve 
their situation.
Whereas critical sociologists maintain that their 
individualistic orientation is the core of radical, critical, 
humanistic sociology, the social deterministic orientation of 
mainstream sociology is characterised as conservative, con­
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formist, and ultimately, anti-humanistic. Any sociologist 
who deigns to investigate the nature of social order or who 
goes as far as to adopt a holistic perspective is thereby 
accused of committing himself, wittingly or unwittingly, to 
a conservative political position. Alvin Gouldner's treat­
ment of the work of Plato and Parsons is a case in point. In 
comparing their views of society, Gouldner notes, "In both 
views,...men are viewed as lacking reality, or true human­
ness apart from their involvement In or dependence upon God 
or Society. This "God or Society", Gouldner argues, rep­
resents nothing more than the sanctification of the status 
quo; hence the charge that there is a conservative bias built 
into their theories. Finally, Gouldner maintains that the 
overriding concern with order in the work of Plato and Parsons
po
precludes a concern for freedom, happiness, or equality. w 
That all sociological theories which deal with the 
question of social order and which adopt a social (as opposed 
to an individualistic) theoretical perspective must be regard­
ed as inherently conservative is certainly open to question. 
Indeed, the charge that Plato's "God" is actually a glorified 
symbol of the status quo is an Interpretation seriously 
challenged by members of the Frankfurt School, among others.
In their discussion of the relation of the Individual and 
society, members of the Frankfurt School point out that Plato's 
view of this relation —  that individuals achieve the best life 
possible in the context of the larger social order -- Is pre­
mised on the realization of a just, well-ordered society,
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p 1which is not to be equated with the status quo.
In addition to being viewed as conservative, conformist, 
and anti-humanistic, social theories which place society above 
the individual are generally considered part and parcel of 
the economic and political domination of the individual in 
modern society. Domination of the individual In a theoretical 
sense is held to be just as serious as other forms of domina­
tion. In this regard, Robert Friedrichs notes that: "Manip­
ulating symbols of man rather than man himself may indeed be 
a greater actual threat to the traditional image of the human­
ity of man than any steps that have been taken to date to
22"control" him physically." In what sense mainstream sociology 
threatens the "humanity of man" is suggested by Alvin Gouldner: 
"...an objectivistic sociology that seeks to establish natu­
ral laws and which views men as objects in exactly the same 
way as a natural science does, already rests upon a thingified 
conception of man that is inherently antithetical to the goal
of human emancipation."^
The significance of the above observations by two 
prominent critical sociologists lies in the fact that they 
relate directly to another main theme in the work of critical 
theorists of the Frankfurt School. These critical theorists 
are particularly concerned with the domination of certain modes 
of thought which preclude or "eclipse", in Max Horkheimer's 
words, critical modes of thought. The lack of critical think­
ing -- thinking which ultimately derives from some vision of 
a better society -- means the continued dominance of modes of
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thought which are designed to do no more than clarify, cate­
gorize, and explain (i.e., rationalize) the existing social 
order, but never challenge it.
Clearly, a major target for such criticism is posi­
tivism, particularly as this mode of thought is manifested 
in the social sciences. "The entire Frankfurt School tradi­
tion (from Horkheimer to Habermas) has constituted a sustained 
attack on positivism because it implies a subordination and
capitulation to the reality of existing social forms, namely, 
.,24
capitalism. Moreover, as Gouldner likewise points out in 
drawing upon this tradition: "...positivism itself was ground­
ed in a specific ideology and politics: the politics of "what 
is". It is the tacit affirmation that "what is", the status 
quo, is basically sound; that it only needs to be fine tuned 
through the use of new social science and of a "positive"
appreciation of "what is", scientifically formulated by the
25
new sociological priesthood." Evidence of the inherent con­
servatism of the predominant methodological and theoretical 
approaches of mainstream sociology presented in the last two 
chapters could be cited in support of the above argument.
£0, an important segment of the structure of domination 
in modern society is that of thought which stresses adaptation 
to the ways things are. On this view, freedom for the indi­
vidual to achieve a better life is premised on the elimination 
of such modes of thought as positivism, which, at base, can do 
no more than reflect the established social order. On this 
much there is general agreement between critical sociologists
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and critical theorists. Disagreement becomes manifest when 
one looks at their respective views of hew the emancipatory 
potential of society can be realized.
It is important to note that in drawing upon the work 
of members of the Frankfurt School, critical sociologists have, 
by and large, favored the work of the most contemporary figure 
connected with this school, Jurgen Habermas, as opposed to the 
work of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse who could reasonably 
be said to have constituted the core of the school. 'That cri­
tical sociologists would focus on Habermas gives us a fairly 
clear indication of their view as to how radical social change 
is to be effected. Commenting on the two principal views of 
social change among critical theorists, John Sewart says of 
Habermas's view:
The model critically adopted by Habermas 
for the practical realization of critical 
theory is Freudian psychoanalysis. Habermas 
finds within psychoanalysis an emancipatory 
project of therapy....
The goal is to further self-reflection 
and self-knowledge in the patient and ulti­
mately explain and remove unnecessary forms 
of domination. 26
Refering to this later as Habermas's "talking therapy", Sewart
brings out the strong psychological overtones of this view of
radical social change.
Habermas's "talking therapy" ties in directly with
critical sociologists' persistent call for the development of
greater self-awareness and self-reflection among sociologists
generally. This theme is perhaps most clearly exemplified in
27Alvin Gouldner's call for a "reflexive sociology".
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Although both Habermas and Gouldner acknowledge the need for 
more concrete economic and political change, they view the 
lack of self-awareness among social scientists and people gen­
erally as the major obstacle to true human emancipation. As 
Trent Schroyer points out in his reconceptualization of 
critical theory along lines laid down by Habermas: "...the 
scientistic image of science is the fundamental false con­
sciousness of our epoch. If the technocratic ideology is to 
lose its hold on our consciousness, a critical theory must
lay bare the theoretical reifications of this scientistic
28image of science."
On the other hand, John Sewart aptly characterizes
the other prominent view of social change contained in critical
theory as following along more traditional Marxian lines with
its emphasis on changing material conditions. Although there
can be no doubt that the critique of positivism is a focal
point of discussion for the Frankfurt School as a whole, the
vision of the free society which they are striving to realize
points to the existence of a significant difference between
Habermas and other principal members of the Frankfurt School.
Whereas Habermas sees the reform of language as the
29basic prerequisite to emancipation, Marcuse, for example, 
sees change in the material organization of society as es­
sential. With Marcuse's work in mind, John Sewart notes, 
"Critical theory must determine the "concrete roads" leading
its agents of revolutionary praxis to the realization of a
*^0
just society."^ Among these"concrete roads", Marcuse
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focuses particularly on automation and its potential for free­
ing people from necessary labor.31 In addition, Marcuse argues 
that the provision of basic life necessities to all people
must be considered a fundamental prerequisite to the reall-
32
zation of a just and humane social order.
That critical sociologists would tend to favor 
Habermas's views over those of someone such as Marcuse is 
congruent with their commitment to cultivating greater self- 
awareness among sociologists in particular and people in 
general. Critical self-awareness -- the ability to overcome 
dominating and uncritical modes of thought such as exempli­
fied in positivism —  is viewed as the key to human emancipa­
tion. Alvin Gouldner's program for an emancipatory sociology 
is a prominent example of this line of reasoning:
It is the function of the emancipatory social 
sciences to liberate man's reason from any 
force, In or out of himself, symbolic, or not, 
in the psyche and in society, that cripples 
and confuses reason. It is the special 
function of the social sciences continuously 
to dissolve man's opaqueness to himself; to 
help him understand those forces that act 
upon him that he ordinarily finds unintelligi­
ble; and to help him transform these natural 
forces that use him as an object Into ^
humanly controllable forces under his control.
Although there Is some recognition here of the need for larger 
changes in society, the thrust of Gouldner's program (indeed, 
of this critical movement as a whole) is aimed at the psycho­
logical demand for greater self-awareness.
The view of true human emancipation which emerges 
here is primarily a negative one, negative in the sense that 
emancipation Is seen entirely as that condition in which
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individuals are freed from the bonds of all forms of domination. 
It is the self-reliant, self-determined individual, the anti­
thesis of the "cheerful robot", that is the ideal outcome, 
the fruit of an emancipatory sociology. 3ecause Marcuse is 
pessimistic about the possibility of realizing a society of
completely self-determined individuals he is denounced as a
3 4
doomsday theorist by Alfred McClung Lee.
Significantly, this view of the individual and of
emancipation clashes greatly with the basic position of the
Frankfurt School, a position which is likewise committed to
the emancipation of the individual. Rather than defend the
separate and distinct, self-determined individual, these
critical theorists defend the so-called "over-socialized
conception of man". As they point out: "No matter how one-
sidedly sociology, due to its posture within the division of
labor of the sciences, may have overemphasized the primacy
of society over the individual, still thereby it offers a
necessary corrective for the illusion, that it Is due to his
natural disposition, his psychology, and out of himself alone
35that each single human being has become what he is." In 
ether words, "Human life is essentially and not merely 
accidentally social life."^
On the basis of this different view of the relation 
between the individual and society put forth by these critical 
theorists, the conception of how true human emancipation is 
achieved changes considerably from the conception offered by 
critical sociologists. Rather than emphasize negative
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freedom (i.e., the individual's freedom from constraints 
imposed by society), these critical theorists argue that the 
truly free individual and a just social order go hand in 
hand:
The most important consequence to be drawn 
from insights into the interaction of the 
individual and society -- and to be sure, 
just that which positivistic sociology 
avoids —  is that the human being is capa­
ble of realizing himself only within a 
just and humane society. This insight is 
already contained in the Platonic theme, 
that functional social coherence is the 
precondition for the actualization of the 
Idea implanted in every human being. Only 
the just society will permit the human 
being to realize his Idea. 37
Critical theorists are particularly skeptical of the 
notion that a progressive, free society can be constructed on 
the basis of the kind of individualism these critical sociolo 
gists espouse. The free individual, unrestrained by larger 
social forces, in the view of members of the Frankfurt School 
is in fact not only a myth but also part and parcel of the 
ideology of capitalism —  the "rugged individualism" of the 
free market. As Max Horkheimer points out, however, these 
so-called "rugged individuals", even those who rise to the 
top, are subordinate to the demands of the larger economic 
order: "In the era of free enterprise, the so-called era of 
individualism, Individuality was most completely subordinated
og
to self-preserving reason." Moreover, as Horkheimer goes
on to note:
The absolutely isolated individual has 
always been an illusion. The most esteemed 
personal qualities, such as independence, 
will to freedom, sympathy, and sense of
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justice, are social as well as individual 
virtues. The fully developed individual 
is the ccnsumation of a fully developed 
society. The emancipation of the indi­
vidual is not an emancipation from society 
but the deliverance of society from atom­
ization, an atomization that may reach its 
peak in periods of collectivization and mass 
culture. 39
That is to say, no just, humane society is going to result
from the kind of program of increased self-awareness advocated
by critical sociologists. Without addressing the underlying
economic, political, and social injustice of the prevailing
social order, the emancipated individual they speak of will
remain, in the words of members of the Frankfurt School, the
40
"absolute cliche".
Critical sociologists fail to see that the individual 
is bound up with a larger institutional order, which means 
that no program of social change that places the emphasis on 
changing individuals, in the absence of basic institutional 
change, can be effective. There are also considerable 
grounds for challenging critical sociologists' abiding faith 
in democracy as both the means to and the end of a truly just 
society. From C. Wright Mills to Alfred McClung Lee, critical 
sociologists have persistently advocated the dissemination of 
sociological knowledge among the general populace so that 
individuals may participate more fully in a democratic 
decision-making process and thereby become self-determining, 
free individuals living in a social order of their own making. 
Yet aside from the questionable assumption that sociological 
knowledge can indeed enlighten the public in a significant
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way, ~ this optimistic assessment of democracy flounders on 
its disregard for the necessity of institutional change.
Although democracy does address the evils of authori­
tarian rule and does bring the masses into the political 
process, democracy does not encompass, as Elijah Jordan 
perceptively notes: "...suggestions as to the nature or the 
structure of the state, no hint as to how the functioning of 
the institutions of life are to be organized into a corporate­
ly integrated whole, no picture at all of that order which
n42is the ground of all meanings in political or public life.
Put otherwise, critical sociologists' promotion of the demo­
cratic ideal amounts to nothing more than a program to in­
crease social and self-consciousness while leaving intact 
the institutional framework of modern society. In the end, 
the inadequacy of this position derives from their inability 
to see (and even disdain for the notion) that this larger 
institutional order is the fundamental reality. In contrast, 
it is this very insight into the larger order of things, along 
with a recognition of the inadequacy of individualism, that 
Jordan opens his Forms of Individuality:
It seemed strange that the system of practical 
principles whose primary purpose is to exalt 
the individual should nevertheless produce a 
complete submergence of the individual in what 
appears to be sub-human or super-human mecha­
nism; and this contradiction impressed me 
with the idea of the possible transference of 
the will-life from the human individual, 
considered as an instrument and ground of 
values, to the super-human corporate individual 
[i.e., the institution^... ^3
By and large, critical sociologists have been content
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merely to advocate greater democracy, greater individual 
freedom in lieu of any real discussion of what constitutes a 
free and just society. That is to say, for all the effort 
devoted to glorifying the individual and emphasizing the power 
of the free individual to initiate beneficial social change, 
little of any substance is said about the institutions of such 
a society —  the kind of economy, government, or education 
that would make up a just society. These critical sociologists 
appear to be saying that the problem of organizing the complex 
institutional network of modern society in such a way as to 
provide a meaningful, decent existence for all people can be 
solved by merely granting individuals greater personal freedom.
Ultimately, in the view of critical sociologists, it 
is the free and open expression of opinion that emerges as 
both the mechanism and end of social change. "In the end, 
there is probably no more powerful mechanism of social change 
than people's talk." And not just any kind of talk, but for 
Gouldner, it is manly, face-to-face talk. But Just how this, 
or any other kind of talk for that matter, is to result in 
or be considered the end of a free and just society is never 
made clear.
(3) The "Endless Dialectic"
In light of critical sociologists' belief in the 
efficacy of the free and open expression of opinion, John 
Seeley in his article, "The Making and Taking of Problems: 
Toward an Ethical Stance", aptly characterizes the program of
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social change advocated by critical sociologists generally:
As we begin to bring these beginnings 
together we would initiate, I should 
think, an appropriate endless dialectic 
in which the claims and cogencies of long 
and short perspectives, undying general 
principle and proximate practical pro­
posal, present locations, desired future 
states and transition possibilities (all 
in their actual interpenetration) and the 
respective claims of knowing, and doing, 
acting and reflecting, could be brought 
into never-ending collision and cohabi­
tation. (my emphasis) 45
As stated in one way or another by nearly all of the major
figures of this critical movement, the hoped for result of
the sociological critique of American sociology is to initiate
an "endless dialectic".
Although only Seeley makes use of this specific term,
the essential meaning of his recommendation is conveyed by
slightly different terminology by other critical sociologists.
Robert Friedrichs, for example, prefers the term "dialogue"
to dialectic because of the Marxian overtones of the latter
term.^ Among other expressions used are: "an ensuing debate
"continuing dialogue",^  and "creative c o n f u s i o n " T o  these,
Alvin Gouldner alone adds: "reflexive rational social inquiry",'’0
"energizing tension" , ^  and a "contestful friction of minds".^
The use of such terminology indicates that the way
sociologists ought to assist in bringing about a new social
order and the kind of society this is to be involves a process
of conflict, of debate, of talk. And, significantly, this is
to be an endless process of dialogue and debate, for as Alvin
Gouldner recommends: "We want to understand our social world
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and ourselves and others in It, so that we may change it In
ways that enable us to understand It still better, to have
fuller rational discourse in it, so that we may better be
able to change it, and so on £and so on, and so on,..."^ ."53
That the statement of their program of social change
emphasizes discussion and debate helps explain, in part,
critical sociologists’ preoccupation with changing sociology
54
rather than changing society itself. Moreover, the emphasis
on discussion and debate is clearly revealed in the meaning
they attach to the term "dialectic", which, although borrowed
from Marx and Hegel, is used in a much different sense.
The "endless dialectic" that John Seeley talks about,
and that other critical sociologists refer to in various
guises, essentially entails nothing more than continuous
discussion and debate. Contradictions arise and are resolved
all on the level of communication, of talk. Alvin Gouldner
uses such terms to characterize his purpose in writing The
Dialectic of Ideology and Technology:
The study here is part of an effort to lay 
a basis for developing a third form of 
discourse that eludes the pretentiousness, 
false consciousness, and limits of both 
social science and ideology, as we have 
lived them historically. It is a probe 
toward a more transcending form of discourse 
that we might call reflexive rational social 
inquiry, toward a critical theory that 
wonders about itself and about the w o r l d . 55
In contrast, for both Hegel and Marx, the dialectic involved
much more than discussion and debate -- it described a process
of broad historical change.
For Marx, the dialectic is inextricably linked to his
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materialism. Social change is engendered by contradictions 
arising in the economic system. Marx argues that in nine­
teenth-century Surope the contradictions inherent in the 
dominant capitalistic economic system (that, for example, 
the rich were getting richer and the poor poorer) had reached 
a point where revolution was inevitable and capitalism would
56
be overturned and eventually supplanted by communism. £0, 
for Marx, dialectical social change entails a fundamental re­
ordering of the economic structure and not merely a process of 
discussion and debate, as critical sociologists would have it. 
Certainly, capitalist ideology (to which conservative, main­
stream sociology lends support, in the view of critical soci­
ologists) will have to be overturned along with capitalist 
economic structure, but the priority clearly lies with eco­
nomic structure, for as Marx asserts, "The mode of production 
of material life conditions the social, political, and Intel-
C *7
lectual life process in general."-''
Logically enough, critical sociologists reject what 
they see as she economic determinism built into Marx's view 
of dialectical social change. Critical sociologists typically 
distinguish the young, philosophical Marx from the old, 
scientific-deterministic Marx. The latter is criticized for 
being anti-individual, for supporting the notion that the 
"social" takes precedence over the individual, albeit that 
the"social" would involve a fundamental re-crdering of eco­
nomic relations. Alvin Gouldner and Robert Friedrichs, in 
particular, disavow the sc-called later Marx. In the Intro-
duction to The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology Gouldner 
says that he prefers the label "Maoist" to "Marxist" because 
he sees the spirit of the Chinese cultural revolution more 
congruent with his own view of social change. Likewise, 
Friedrichs shies away from the use of the term dialectical 
because he does not want his position too closely associated 
with that of Hegel and Marx.^®
To argue as I have —  that critical sociologists' 
notion of dialectical social change neglects the Marxian 
emphasis on economic structure -- does not mean that we must 
reject their view of social change merely because it runs con 
trary to that of Marx. Indeed, as twentieth-century Marxists, 
particularly members of the Frankfurt School, have maintained 
Marx's theory of social change leaves something to be desired 
especially as regards the nullifying effects of an increasing 
standard of living and the Influence of mass culture in de­
laying the onset of the proletarian revolution which was to 
sweep the capitalist world. Nonetheless, we should not lose 
sight of the valuable and valid point that emerges from a 
comparison of these two distinctive views of the dialectic; 
namely, that critical sociologists fail to address the crucia 
question of how the material structure, the relations among 
institutions, are to be organized and ordered. When we re­
call, as Elijah Jordan points out, that the lives of indi­
viduals are bound up with these institutions, that it is 
through these Institutions that Individuals achieve their 
ends, then we must agree that this Institutional system
cannot be ignored in any proposal that aims at bringing about 
a just and free society.
As I have maintained throughout this chapter with res­
pect to critical sociologists' support for the individual and 
for democracy, nothing concrete is ever proposed concerning 
the make-up of a future, more humane social order. Everything 
is left undetermined, a matter of endless debate and discussion. 
Again, we can see evidence of that blind faith in the efficacy
of merely opening things up --- that somehow by incorporating
free and open discussion in sociology and in society as a 
whole the conservative, anti-individual tendencies in main­
stream sociology and in the established social order will be 
eliminated.
Such a program of social change as critical sociolo­
gists envision presupposes the soundness of sociology’s method­
ological and theoretical base. The only obstacle to signifi­
cant social change on this view lies in sociologists' lack 
of autonomy —  their inability or unwillingness to engage in 
free and open discussion, to participate in the "endless 
dialectic". As I have emphasized all along, however, this is 
to overlook entirely the more basic and important question 
of the adequacy of that methodological and theoretical base. 
Elijah Jordan, in particular, calls into question some of 
the predominant conceptions of society that sociologists have 
adopted and finds them wanting for not having incorporated 
the organized system of institutions which society manifestly 
is.
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There have been some attempts to spell out an alter­
native conception of society as a basis for a more signifi­
cant sociology. This represents perhaps the most significant 
development within the context of the sociological critique 
of American sociology, and yet we will see that these alter­
native conceptions of society fail to go much beyond the 
conception of society upon which mainstream sociology rests.
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CHAPTER V
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS 0? SOCIETY
(l) Introduction
Throughout my analysis of major themes in the soci­
ological critique of American sociology I have continually 
noted the failure of these critical sociologists to address 
basic methodological and theoretical issues. Instead, these 
critics have chosen to focus their attack either upon indi­
vidual sociologists, their professional association, or a 
particular theoretical orientation such as functionalism. 
Critical sociologists have portrayed certain individual 
sociologists as cowardly figures hiding behind the doctrine 
of value-neutrality yet all the while implicitly supporting 
the established social order. Sociologists' professional 
association, the American Sociological Association, has, on 
occasion, been singled out for its conservatism and Its re­
luctance to take definite positions on some of the controversial 
issues of our time. And, finally, sociologists espousing a 
functionalist orientation (or any holistic orientation for 
that matter) have frequently been denounced as arch-conserva­
tives supporting the Increasing social domination of the 
Individual.
Yet, for all this criticism, some of which is ex­
pressed in harsh terms, seldom is there given any indication 
that perhaps the problem with sociology, the reason for its 
conservative bias, lies much deeper than individual sociolo-
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gists, their professional association, or a particular theo­
retical orientation. In each of the preceding chapters it 
has been suggested that the undesirable aspects of mainstream 
American sociology do, in fact, derive from flaws In the 
methodological and theoretical base of sociology.
In the last chapter we saw that some critical soci­
ologists have attempted to spell out a new direction for 
sociology, one 'which is based upon the principles of democracy. 
This attempt was shown to be neither new nor adequate. In 
arguing for a more democratic sociology and a more democratic 
society, emphasis was placed on "opening things up", on 
making room for various methodological and theoretical per­
spectives, on defending the individual against social domi­
nation. This pluralistic, Individualistic emphasis in the 
sociological critique of American sociology not only does 
not represent a significant advance over mainstream sociology 
'out it also has its basis in an inadequate view of the nature 
of society. •
In this chapter on alternative conceptions of society, 
the analysis initiated In the previous chapter will be con­
tinued In that other prominent alternative conceptions of 
society developed by critical sociologists will be discussed. 
That some critical sociologists perceived the need to move 
in this direction is based upon the recognition that a sig­
nificant sociology must derive from a sound understanding of 
the nature of society.
Among the most prominent examples, in addition to
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the democratic alternative discussed in the previous chapter, 
are the following. First, and most pervasive, is a negative 
example; namely, the criticism of functionalism as an inade­
quate theoretical framework. In rejecting functionalism, crit­
ical sociologists indicate the need for developing alterna­
tive, more adequate conceptions of society, conceptions 
which we will find implicit in their criticism. In addition, 
rhree others will be presented and critically analyzed: a 
phenomenological-existential view, a Marxist conception of 
society, and a synthesis of the views of Marx, Weber, and 
Mead.
All of these attempts to spell out an alternative 
conception of society ultimately fail to come up with a 
sound view of the nature of society. Indeed, as I Intend to 
show, critical sociologists' efforts in this direction have 
not gone much beyond mainstream sociology. In contrast, some 
insights of an economist into our modern economic system will 
be presented and it will be suggested that critical sociolo­
gists adopt a similar view in developing an alternative con­
ception of society as the basis for a more significant soci­
ology. In line with this, a more thoroughgoing and valid 
alternative to the predominant view of society held by 
mainstream sociologists will be presented.
What this chapter will suggest, above all else, Is 
that the key to a more significant sociology lies with a 
philosophical reassessment of the theoretical and methodolo­
gical base cf mainstream sociology, a philosophical reassess-
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ment which I have contended is contained in the work of the 
Frankfurt School and in the philosophy of Elijah Jordan. To 
their credit, some critical sociologists did perceive the 
need to move in this direction, as we will see in this chap­
ter; however, they generally failed to come up with any sig­
nificant alternatives. This chapter, then, will set the stage 
for the concluding chapter in which we will review this fail­
ure of critical sociologists to address those basic philo­
sophical issues which lie at the heart of the problems in 
mainstream sociology that they point to.
(2) The Alternative Conception of Society
Implicit in the Criticism of Functionalism
If there is one sociologist and one theoretical per­
spective that has been the principal target for critical 
sociologists, it Is Talcott Parsons and his structural- 
functionalism. In each of the previous chapters Parsons and 
his theoretical perspective have been singled out for cri­
ticism. Indeed, critical sociologists' rejection of so-called 
mainstream sociology can largely be read as a rejection of 
Parsons' functionalism. In this chapter criticism of Parsons 
work will also be discussed, but it will be discussed with 
a view to what clues this criticism gives into alternative 
conceptions of society which are implicit in it.
Among the first, and certainly most influential, 
critical analyses of Parsons' work is that given by C. Wright 
Mills in The Sociological Imagination. Calling Parsons a 
"grand theorist", Mills proceeds to argue that he has devel­
oped a theoretical framework which is at a level of general­
ity and abstractness far removed from the actual 'workings of 
society. Moreover, grand theory can give us no insight into 
the problems which confront the individual and society, for 
as Mills comments:
In The Social System Parsons has not been 
able to get down to the work of social 
science because he is possessed, by the 
idea that the one model of social order 
he has constructed is some kind of univer­
sal model; because, in fact, he has fe- 
tlshlzed his Concepts. What is 'system­
atic ' about this particular grand theory 
is the way it outruns any specific empiri­
cal problem. It is not used to state more 
precisely or more adequately any new 
problem of recognizable significance. It 
has not been developed out of any need to 
fly high for a little while in order to 
see something in the social world more 
clearly, to solve some problem that can 
be stated in terms of the historical real­
ity in which men and institutions have 
their concrete being. Its problem, its 
course, and its solutions are grandly 
theoretical. 1
To get down to earth, for Mills, entails developing 
some understanding of the structural features of society, 
which essentially involve the basic institutions of society. 
Parsons, in contrast, limits his analysis to "the institu-
p
tionalizatlon of values." This kind of criticism points in 
the direction of an entirely different view of society, one 
which sees society as constituted essentially of institutions 
within which individuals have their being.^ This is to argue 
that the problem with Parsons' functionalism derives princi­
pally from its underlying conception of society as something 
held together by common values.
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Although Alvin Gouldner directed his criticism more
at Talcott Parsons himself than at his theoretical framework
he did, on occasion, suggest that an inadequate conception
of society is the key to the problems with Parsons' theoreti
cal framework. In reference to Parsons' analysis of Kills'
The Power Elite, Gouldner notes that Parsons overlooks the
importance of property and wealth as a source of power in 
u
our society. Then, in what I believe has to be considered
one of Gouldner's most insightful criticisms, he argues,
It is clear, ...that, from Parsons' formu­
lation of the social system, elements in 
men's biological constitution and physio­
logical functioning, as well as features of 
their physical and ecological environment, 
are excluded. So too are the historically- 
evolving cultural complexes of material 
objects, including tools and machines, even 
though these are man's own unique and dis­
tinctive creations, the very products and 
the mediating elements of his social inter­
action and communication, and even though 
they also include those instruments of 
transportation which make possible the very 
interchanges among social parts that con­
stitute their interdependence. 5
This would seem to indicate that Gouldner, along with Mills,
believes that a structural, materialist view of society is
more adequate.
Although the passage above certainly suggests that 
Gouldner supports such an alternative conception of society, 
the thrust of his work as a whole has beer, in an entirely 
different direction. As was brought out in the last chapter, 
Gouldner, along with other major figures in the sociological 
critique of American sociology, have sought to restore the 
individual to a central place in sociology and in society.
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They have argued against any holistic perspective; that is, 
any perspective which views society as a system and which 
concerns itself with the problem of social order. Such a 
perspective, it is argued, is necessarily conservative, anti­
individual, and in their view, false.
So, at the same time that Gouldner can make the above 
comments concerning the importance of the material structure 
of society, he also attacks Parsons for having conceived of 
the individual as "an entirely 'social' creature, as an empty, 
hollowed out container that depends entirely upon experience 
in the training by social systems,..."^ Parsons fails to see, 
as Gouldner goes on to point out, that human beings are not 
mere social products -- that "Human beings are as much en­
gaged in using social systems as in being used by them. Men 
are social-system using and social-system-building creatures."^ 
Such criticism points in the direction of an alternative con­
ception of society which places more stress on the individual 
and his ability to change society.
Fart and parcel cf the criticism that functionalism 
omits the individual is the criticism tnat functionalism can­
not account for social change and social conflict. It is be­
cause the individual is downplayed and social order is em­
phasized that the crucial elements of conflict and change 
are left out cf account. Hence, Parsons' functionalism is 
seen as the exemplar of conservative sociological theory -- 
that it is at base a rationalization for the status quo, that 
it is committed to the present society despite the dilemmas,
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contradictions, and tensions within it.
This connection between Parsons' neglect of the indi­
vidual and the conservative bias built into his theoretical 
framework is brought out in his concluding statement of an 
essay appropriately entitled, "The World View of Talcott 
Parsons". The author comments:
In conclusion, I would say that Parsons 
exhibits a consistent tendency to gloss 
over the horrors of industrial society 
with bland phrases, tricks of definition, 
thinly disguised cliches and arrogance; 
and to abolish all individual values 
ether than those which serve the "total 
system". The Parsonian world does not 
provide for any possibility cf a discon­
tinuity between the individual's day-to-
day life inside the system and its effects n 
upon the inner world of his own personality.
Or, as Alfred McClung Lee charges, "Instead of being focused 
on the dynamic relations of individuals and groups to social 
process for the benefit of people, they [the majority of 
sociologists, meaning primarily sociologists with a function­
alist orientation^] are preoccupied with the maintenance of 
'social equilibrium' in its ramifications —  in other words, 
with how to maintain the status quo.""
The crucial elements of the alternative conception of 
society which emerges from this criticism of Parsons' func­
tionalism are the individual and conflict. That is to say,
according to this view, sociologists stand more to gain by
viewing society as consisting of individuals whose relations 
are often filled with tension and conflict. In characterising 
George Herbert Mead's view of society, Alvin Gouldner captures 
the essence of this alternative conception of society: "Mead,
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...rejects an image of the social world as a given, neatly 
arranged static order; both view it instead as a tensionful, 
changing, open-ended, loosely stranded, somewhat indeterminate 
and fluid process.
Among critical sociologists generally this individ­
ualistic, conflict view of society is expressed in a couple 
of different forms. Some critical sociologists turned to a 
phenomenological-existential perspective, while others turn­
ed to the "early" Marx as an alternative to mainstream soci­
ology. We will see that these two alternatives are largely 
congruent with the alternative conception of society that 
emerges from the criticism of Parsons' functionalism.
(3) The Phenomenological-Existential Alternative
In large part, the adoption of a phenomenological- 
existential perspective by some critical sociologists reflects 
a dissatisfaction with mainstream sociology's scientific 
methodology. It is argued that the widely-used survey re­
search techniques, such as the questionnaire and the inter­
view, are superficial; no real attempt is made to understand 
a person's social behavior from the perspective of that 
person. To understand social behavior truly, sc the argu­
ment goes, requires the adoption of an empatnetic or partic­
ipant observation approach.
Jack Douglas, in his collection of critical sociolo­
gical essays entitled The Relevance of Sociology, aptly char­
acterizes the -distinctive nature of this phenomenological-
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existential perspective:
Science as we have known it tends to be 
abstractionist and comparative, to seek 
the general in the particular. Yet man's 
everyday existence is concrete and par­
ticular, this immediate existence full 
of uncertainty and contingency, which 
concerns us most about man. And it is 
this realm of experience which we can 
understand most fully through poetic 
and artistic forms of knowledge.11
Such an approach to studying social behavior is embodied in 
a radically new methodology known as "ethnomethodology", which 
came on scene in the 19o0's. As two practitioners of this 
new method describe it, ethnomethodologists study social 
phenomena by focusing on "...embodied, sensuous, human activ­
ity, in talk and in actions."12
Rather than consider further the specifics of an 
ethnomethodological or phenomenological approach to social 
research, let us turn to the more relevant question of the 
alternative conception of society embodied in the phenomeno­
logical-existential perspective. Of course, arguing that the 
most valid approach to understanding social behavior involves 
adopting the perspective of the individual or group you are 
studying clearly Implies an emphasis upon psychological fac­
tors. As Jack Douglas notes, in pointing out the need for 
personal involvement and participation in social research, 
"...social behavior is meaningful behavior and...any valid 
and worthwhile explanation of social behavior will involve 
social meanings as the fundamental causal variables.m1^
Underlying the phenomenological-existential perspec­
tive, then, is a view of society which emphasizes individual
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self-determination and creativity as opposed to the view
which stresses the structural aspects of society. Alvin
Gouldner sees such a view of society expressed in the work
of Erving Goffman. He calls Coffman's a "radically different
nl4and comprehensive theoretical model,... , which presents
a challenge to the functionalists' focus on the larger social
order. Mors specifically, Gouldner notes, "...Goffman's
image of social life is not of firm, well-bounded social
structures, but rather of a loosely stranded, criss-crossing,
l11swaying catwalk along which men dart precariously." ^
This emphasis upon the individual and upon the perva­
sive feature of conflict is best displayed in the work of 
Alfred McClung Lee. Indeed, we should recall that Lee him­
self labeled his distinctive approach a humanist-existential 
perspective. In Sociology for Whom? Lee indicates his agree­
ment with the sophist Protagoras's maxim: "man is the measure 
of all things". Along these lines, Lee points out that his 
humanist-existential perspective "...is concerned primarily 
with individuals, with human expression and creativity, with 
human society and socializing, and with people's ability to 
persist and tc flourish."1^
Although the charge that mainstream sociology, in 
particular Parsons' functionalism, has a built-in conservative 
bias has merit, turning to an individualistic, conflict per­
spective is no real remedy for this problem. To focus on 
individuals, to attempt to see life from their point of view, 
however accurate one may be, still leaves out of account
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important aspects of society which any sound alternative to 
mainstream sociology must include. Insight into the nature 
of modern society, as we will see Zlijah Jordan argue, be­
gins with the manifest fact that society is an organized 
system of institutions. This, I believe, is the essential 
starting-point for the development of a more significant soci­
ology, not the phenomenological-existential alternative which 
is based on an inadequate view of the nature of society.
Some critical sociologists turned to Marx for an 
alternative theoretical perspective, and in so doing they 
would appear to have been sensitive to the kind of short­
comings of the phenomenological-existential alternative 
brought out above. Yet, interestingly enough, the predomi­
nant position among those who turned to Marx was to focus on 
the so-called "early Marx" who is said to be concerned less 
with socio-economic structure and more with the individual 
and the problem of alienation.
(4) The Marxian Alternative 
to Mainstream Sociology
The promise of developing a radical alternative to 
mainstream sociology out of the Marxian tradition is aptly 
set forth by Richard Flacks. He notes that more fundamental 
than research Into the nature of the power structure "...is 
the task of making a theory -- a theory that will comprehend 
the operation of society in its totality, links the present 
with the past organically, and reveals the necessary contra­
dictions and unravelings of the established social order.
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Such a holistic approach to understanding modern society, I 
believe, represents one of the more significant attempts to 
develop an alternative to mainstream sociology. It certainly 
suggests a radically different approach from those discussed 
previously in this chapter in which the individual was empha­
sized over and above social structure.
A structural Marxist approach is predominant among 
the essays contained In J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach's 
(eds.) volume, Radical Sociology. For example, L. Paul 
Metzger argues for a larger, structural approach to analyzing 
the race problem in contrast to Gunnar Myrdal and others 1
inadequate approach which focuses on beliefs and attitudes.
18Racism is seen as an outgrowth of capitalism. In general,
as Colfax himself asserts: "...there is reason to believe
that a Marxist class-analysis of contemporary society holds
the greatest promise for the transformation of sociological
19and social consciousness over the next decade."
Herman and Julia Schwendinger's major study of the
rise of early American sociology, The Sociologists of the
Chair, derives from a structural Marxist point of view. In
the Introduction to their study they note that in the work
of other "radical" sociologists the commitment to radical,
structural change is usually confined to a last paragraph
or sentence in an article and that this commitment is usually
20stated In extremely vague terms. This, of course, is a 
charge that has been levelled at the sociological critique 
of American sociology throughout this dissertation.
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What I have called a structural Marxist view, however, 
has really been overshadowed by another view of the signifi­
cance of Marx. This is a view which accepts the early Marx
and rejects the later, deterministic-scientific Marx expressed 
21
in Capital. What is objectionable about the later Marx is,
in Robert Friedrichs' analysis, "that Marx's overall position
22took,...a markedly 'systemic' tone." This systemic tone is
reflected most clearly in the famous dictum that men's social
being determines their consciousness, which, as Friedrichs
goes on to argue, is a position which ignores "spontaneity,
23
creativity, and existential risk,..."
It is the young Marx, the Marx of alienation, that is 
the alternative that Alvin Gouldner eventually turns to. He 
sees the later Marx as essentially no different from Parsons 
or Plato and their concern with social order. Ac I have 
pointed cut previously, it seems that all holistic, systemic 
views of society are rejected as inherently conservative -- 
that it is only insofar as one connects with the individual 
that one can develop a radically new view of society based 
on social change rather than social order. This is why the 
young Marx who talked about alienation has more of an attrac­
tion for critical sociologists such as Gouldner.
In the Preface to The Dialectic cf Ideology and 
Technolog?/, Gouldner makes it very clear that he does not 
want to be associated with any Marxist school or Marxist 
community. He prefers the position of "Marxist outlaw'":
"My own standpoint is essentially that of ridge rider: half
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sociologist and half Marxist, and rebel against them both." 
After all, as Gouldner notes, "...the first commandment of 
the dialectic is contradiction, negation, critique.  ^Ulti­
mately, the alternative that critics such as Friedrichs and 
Gouldner turn to never goes beyond the injunction to be con­
stantly negative and critical, especially towards any social 
practice or sociological concept which demeans the individual. 
This alternative is as vague and ill-defined as the position 
of Marxist outlaw described above.
(5) The Marx-Weber-Mead Alternative
Rather than reject the structural perspective of the 
"later" Marx, some critical sociologists have sought to com­
bine it with certain social psychological insights in an 
attempt to develop an alternative conception of society which 
could serve as the basis for a more significant sociology.
The clearest example of such a synthesis is to be found in 
Irving Zeitlin's Rethinking Sociology. Zeitlin argues that 
a synthesis of the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber, George 
Herbert Mead, and Sigmund Freud will result in a more valid 
conception of society.
The contributions of Marx and Weber to this synthesis
are clearly set forth in the following passage:
The advantage of what I have called the 
Marx-Weber model is that it keeps at the 
center of our attention the three most 
strategic institutional spheres of the 
present epoch: the economic, the political, 
and the military/-. For there can be no 
doubt that today and in the foreseeable 
future the most fateful question facing
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mankind is: Who controls the; means of
production, the means of political ad- ,
ministration, and the means of violence?*-®
In addition to the obvious relation of this passage to C. 
Wright Mills' argument in The Power Elite, it clearly under­
lines the importance of the structural aspects of society.
But such a view, to Zeitlin's way of thinking, is
missing something: it is missing a theory to account for the
interpersonal interaction that goes on within that structure. 
"Because the Marx-Weber model is predominantly structural, 
...it does not answer our need for a social psychology.
A social psychology is needed to balance off the social de­
terministic overtones of Marx's views in particular (again, 
as exemplified in the dictum that social being determines 
social consciousness) .
In Zeitlin's view, a more adequate conception of 
society must give the Individual a larger part to play than 
is the case in various structural views. This Is precisely 
what he finds attractive about Mead's symbolic interaction- 
ism:
The relation of the individual to his world 
is an active process. It is only within this 
processual relation that things become what 
they are. In man this dialectical relation 
gives rise to reflection, which is also a 
form of action in which the individual con­
verses with others and himself and therefore 
evokes in himself the same response (meaning) 
he does in others.2c
The argument that Marx's structural perspective must 
be supplemented by or Integrated with a social psychological 
perspective also finds its expression in a couple of textbook
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written in the spirit of this critical movement. For example, 
William Chambliss and Thcmas Ryther note that: "Marx's ver­
sion of conflict theory remains largely at the level of insti­
tutional analysis. However, as far as we can see, it contains 
no principles inconsistent with the idea that social struc­
ture is a special kind of reality constructed out of shared 
20
meanings." ^
Borrowing some terminology from Charles Horton Cooley, 
Charles Anderson and Jeffrey Royle C-ibson, in their text.
Toward a New Sociology, assert that: "Individuals and society 
are essentially 'twin-born 1 . . . . As does Zeitlin, they 
discuss at length the relevance of Marx's work, yet they 
argue in the end that Marx's analysis must be supplemented 
by Mead's social psychological insights.
Above all else, I believe these critical sociologists 
are concerned with not losing sight of the individual in their 
alternative conception of society. This explains these attempts 
to synthesise two markedly different views of the nature of 
society.
(6) The Structuralist Alternative
In contrast to these attempts to integrate Mead's social 
psychology with Marx's structural perspective, some critical 
sociologists have chosen to adhere to a strictly structuralist 
point of view. They have not perceived any need to alter 
Marx's argument in any fundamental way. In their view, Marx's 
structural perspective is the most valid alternative to
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mainstream sociology, as David Horowitz, for example, brings 
out in the following passage from his introduction to a col­
lection of essays in radical sociology:
...the basic orientation of academic 
sociologists is micro-social in character: 
academic sociologists are chiefly concerned 
with individuals, groups, and institutions 
as they are influenced by or integrated into 
the prevailing social order. A typical mod­
ern 'dictionary' of sociology, for example, 
defines 'social system' as 'a social group 
or set of interacting persons conceived of 
as distinct from the particular persons who 
compose it... 1
In contrast, radical sociology begins 
with a perspective in which the social sys­
tem is the distinctive pattern of economic, 
political, and cultural relationships ac­
cording to which a group organizes the 
production and distribution of goods and 
services necessary to sustain itself, and 
by which it insures the maintenance of its 
basic structures.31
This structuralist view, of course, is by no means 
only connected with Marx. G. Wright Mills' notion of "big 
range" sociology, which Irving Louis Horowitz comments on in 
his introduction to The New Sociology, involves a larger view 
of society than the predominant group and interpersonal Inter 
action focus of mainstream sociology. This larger view of 
society is reflected in Mills' Interest in comparative, cross
national research -- an area on which he had begun working
-3 0
jusr prior to his death.'"
Morris Janowitz's analysis of sociological research 
on arms control provides a good example of the kind of "big 
range" sociology that Mills had In mind. As Janowitz points 
out, the important task in arms control research "...is to 
inject into sociology -- from the study of small groups to
the analysis of international organizations -- a theoretical 
reconceptualization that sees the world as a social unit and 
is concerned with the basic transformation of the role of 
force within and between nation states."33
I would maintain that those critical sociologists who 
saw the need for an alternative conception of society which 
emphasized social structure present the only significant 
alternative to mainstream sociology. We have seen that the 
other alternative conceptions discussed in this chapter, even 
those inspired by Marx, are all individualistic at base. They 
all derive from the belief in the power of an individual to 
determine the course of his own life and that of society as 
well.
There are grounds for arguing that insofar as critical
sociologists focus on the individual they are not really
offering anything substantially different from the mainstream
sociology they are seeking to separate themselves from. Both
views are equally subjective. It is in this context that the
following observation by a Soviet sociologist concerning
Parsons' theory of society is entirely appropriate:
In his solution to the problem of social laws, 
Parsons proves, as a matter of fact, to be an 
even greater "individualist" than the upholders 
of traditional Individualism. In his concept 
of "normative order", social law is wholly 
subjectlvized: it is directly identified with 
individual positions and tendencies and is 
transformed into a projection of the personal 
will of one person upon the personal will of 
another. "The theory of social action" proves 
upon examination to be merely a reformulation 
of a traditional Ideological doctrine (the 
theory of society as a"mechanical sum of 
atoms").3^
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Indeed, the contention that sociology, at base, presupposes 
a conception of society as a mechanical sum of individuals 
held together by subjective ties is a principal contention of 
Elijah Jordan, on which he elaborates in his critical analysl 
of sociology contained in the second chapter of his Forms of 
Individuality.
Sc, although critical sociologists stress the poten­
tial radical political implications of their brand of indi­
vidualism, they essentially do not get beyond the subjective 
view of society contained in mainstream sociology. That they 
wculd draw upon social thinkers such as Mead and upon demo­
cratic and existential schools of thought in constructing 
their alternatives clearly indicates their commitment to a 
fundamentally subjective and individualistic view of society 
a view of society which I will argue, as does Jordan, is in­
adequate .
(7) An Alternative to the Conceptions of 
Society Held by Both Critical and 
Mainstream Sociologists
As has been previously noted, critical sociologists 
are, for the most part, reluctant to reject any aspect of 
mainstream sociology. They argue that all theoretical and 
methodological perspectives (even the most flawed, such as 
functionalism) have a legitimate place in sociology along­
side the alternative conception of society these critical 
sociologists offer. Their alternative, in the last analysis, 
can only be considered one among several legitimate sociolo-
gical perspectives.
Contrary to this pluralistic attitude of critical 
sociologists, there are grounds for rejecting an individual­
istic and subjective view of society, whether such a view be 
held by a critical or mainstream sociologist. Critical soci­
ologists' rejection of any larger, systemic conception of 
society as inherently conservative and anti-individual is 
mistaken; it derives from a lack of insight into the nature 
of modern society. I believe a true understanding of society, 
which can be the only basis for a more significant sociology, 
begins with the recognition that institutions are the basic 
elements of society and not bio-psychological individuals.
To understand the bases of social order as well as the
potential for social change (something critical sociologists
are particularly interested in), we must focus on institutions.
In analyzing the economy, for example, some economists have
become increasingly aware of how the growth of corporations
on a national and a multinational level has fundamentally
changed our economic system. In light of this fact, David
Bazelon, in his insightful book, The Paper Economy, argues
that all the old economic assumptions and arguments must be
rejected in favor of ones congruent with this tremendous
•j c
corporate development. Conventional economic thinking has 
for too long ignored this corporate development.
In essence, Bazelon is arguing that the individual 
entrepreneur talked about in Adam Smith's time no longer 
exists as such. Corporations are the entrepreneurs of our
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modern economic system -- they are the economic actors of
modern society. Or, as Bazelon notes, "A 'new man' has en-
'3n
tered unto the historical stage,...'
Bazelon's analysis applies with equal force to the 
nature of modern society as a whole. Elijah Jordan argues 
throughout his major works that a basic problem with ethical, 
legal, political, and economic thought is that it is largely 
rooted in an individualistic and subjective perspective which 
is fundamentally out of line with the reality of modern soci­
ety. A more significant philosophy and, indeed, a more sig­
nificant sociology, must begin with the recognition that 
society is basically an organized system of institutions.
The bases of social order as well as the key to social change 
are to be found in this institutional order.
These institutions (or corporations, as Jordan also 
refers to organized bodies of objects directed toward a human 
end) are the real actors in society. This is not to say that 
individuals in the abstract (relation-severing) sense in 
which critical and mainstream sociologists speak of them are 
of no significance, as long as we acknowledge that these 
individuals are bound up witn a larger natural and cultural 
order of objects. By considering the individual apart from 
these relations to the natural and cultural world, critical 
sociologists take all that which is human away from the in- 
dividual. It is only as the individual connects-1'with in­
stitutions that he can develop as a human being. It Is by 
working through institutions that human ends are achieved --
from rearing a child, to building a better transportation 
system, to bringing about a better society.
In Jordan's terms: "Corporations or institutions have, 
therefore, a status in human relations that is unique and 
peculiar to themselves. They are personal agents objectified; 
that is, they are rationally ordered systems of purposes 
realized in physical objects and constituted as organic struc­
tures. They are, then, in the legal and political sense,
„38
persons.
The "individual" (that separate and distinct bio- 
psychological entity) which critical sociologists go to such 
great lengths to defend is, in terms of Jordan's argument, 
a myth. A critical, radical, or more significant sociology 
cannot be based upon the defense of a myth. A sound critique 
of sociology must begin with an examination of the underlying 
conception of society which it presupposes. Although some 
critical sociologists, to their credit, did perceive the sig­
nificance of criticizing this theoretical base, they largely 
failed to come up with a sound alternative. Such a sound alter­
native, I maintain, is contained in Jordan's view that society 
is fundamentally an organized system of institutions. And if 
these critical sociologists are serious about making their 
discpiine relevant to the constant effort to improve the lives 
of people, they must focus on that institutional order, the 
true basis for human life.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
As has been emphasized throughout this dissertation, 
the most serious shortcoming of the sociological critique of 
American sociology derives from the lack of attention paid to 
basic philosophical issues which underlie the problems in 
mainstream sociology to which critical sociologists point.
This failure to address basic philosophical issues has been 
interpreted as a failure to address the question of the ade­
quacy of mainstream .30c.i0.l03y' s methodological and theoretical 
base- Although critical sociologists, at times, called into 
“j’.uistion some aspects cf this base, the alternative methods 
and theories for which they argued were found to be not all 
that different from those contained in mainstream sociology.
In general, there persisted an overriding commitment to prevail­
ing modes of social research which focus primarily on gather­
ing information about individuals1 beliefs and attitudes and 
to a view of society as a sum of individuals held together 
by subjective, psychological ties. Evidence was presented to 
suggest that this is not a sound basis for sociology, but 
such evidence largely came from sources outside this critical 
movement in American sociology -- it came from the work of 
members of the Frankfort School and from the philosophy of 
Elijah Jordan.
Critical sociologists have not only failed to perceive 
the connection between deficiencies in mainstream sociology 
and an inadequate methodological and theoretical base, but
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also, in developing some notion of a more significant soci­
ology they have largely overlooked the Importance of re­
defining this base. Their recommendations for developing a 
mere significant sociology have.generally revolved around the 
notion of merely "opening things up"; that is, make room for 
various methodological and theoretical perspectives. Although 
such a recommendation does address the problem of having one 
particular method or theory dominate the practice of sociolo­
gy, it does nothing to correct whatever inadequacies may lie 
in these various methods and theories themselves.
In discussing the work of three principal forerunners 
of this critical movement in Chapter I, we did get an initial 
glimpse of what has been meant all along by the charge that 
later critical sociologists failed to discuss the question 
of the adequacy of sociology's methodological and theoretical 
base. Although weaknesses in each of their arguments were 
pointed out, the criticism of sociology contained in the work 
of Robert Lynd, Pitirim Sorokin, and C. Wright Mills was 
argued to be more profound than anything offered by later 
critical sociologists.
Robert Lynd, for example, suggested that a major de­
ficiency of the social sciences was its inadequate theoretical 
orientation which, he maintained, largely excluded important 
psychological insights. Moreover, in addressing the value 
question in sociology, Lynd did perceive the need to try to 
spell out an objective base for making value judgments -- 
specifically, for determining what is and what is not worthy
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of social scientists' attention. His answer, although certain­
ly open to criticism for being vague, is a far cry from the 
predominant relativistic position of critical sociologists in 
the 6C's and 7 0 's —  a position which I argued on several oc­
casions essentially amounts to no position.
Methodological deficiencies in contemporary American 
sociology were highlighted in Pitirim Sorokin's Fads and 
Foibles in Modern Sociology. Sorokin attempted to expose the 
inappropriate use of concepts and formulas from the physical 
sciences and mathematics in sociology. He also raised ques­
tions about the use of survey methods in sociological re­
search, pointing cut that such methods represented artificial 
(and hence, inaccurate) ways of gathering information about 
social behavior. In his view, a more significant sociology 
could be realized by adopting a better means of learning about 
society and social behavior. This, I argued, was an important 
insight, even though I found fault with the alternative means 
of learning about society and social behavior that Sorokin 
presented.
Although C. Wright Mills can certainly be considered 
the "father" of the sociological critique of American soci- 
ology, I maintained that his criticism of sociology went be­
yond that of later critics. It went beyond this later criti­
cism in that Mills clearly suggested that the realization of 
a more significant and more relevant sociology involved a 
revision of prevailing method and theory in American sociology. 
Mills rejected what he called "abstracted empiricism" not 
just because it was the predominant style of research but
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because it had serious inherent flaws. For one, this style 
of research merely focused on the psychological reactions of 
individuals in a questionnaire or interview situation. As sueh 
it could not uncover anything of significance about the larger 
social structure or its history. Such a style of research had 
to be rejected, Mills argued, in favor of the "sociological 
imagination". Thus, we see here the recognition that the path 
to a more significant sociology involves a revision of its 
methodological base.
Implicit in the "sociological imagination" is also 
the recognition that sociological theory likewise needed to 
be revised; it needed to be revised to take into account the 
crucial element of social structure —  that Institutions (and 
ultimately, the nation-state) be the basic units of investi­
gation. As we saw in Chapter V, some later critical sociolo­
gists also suggested that the theoretical orientation of 
mainstream sociology be revised; however, the alternatives 
they presented tended to stress the importance of the in­
dividual and not institutions. Indeed, these later critical 
sociologists by and large rejected any holistic, structural 
view of society as inherently conservative and inadequate.
To the contrary, I have argued that in order to develop a 
more significant sociology we need to focus on social struc­
ture as Mills urged. It Is precisely on this point that the 
work of Elijah Jordan, as I argued In the last three chapters, 
provides some insights from which sociologists can learn in 
attempting to develop a more significant sociology.
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When we begin to discuss specific issues raised by 
critical sociologists in the 60's and 7 0 's in Chapter II, the 
question of the adequacy of mainstream sociology's methodolo­
gical and theoretical base fades into the background. Criti­
cal sociologists raised the issue of what they saw as an in­
appropriate relationship which had developed between sociolo­
gical researchers and their sources of funding, as typified 
most clearly by the debate over Project Camelot. The basic 
position that critical sociologists adopted was to argue that 
sociologists should strive to preserve their autonomy, that 
is, not to let any outside influences dictate the conduct of 
social research. Not to take away from the importance of 
arguing such a position, it was pointed out that to focus on 
autonomy leaves unattended the question of the adequacy of 
prevailing research methods themselves. There appeared to 
exist an abiding faith in even the most narrowly-conceived 
sociological research, to the extent that some critics, such 
as Martin Nicolaus, believed that the information obtained 
through such research was of strategic importance to groups 
seeking power or wanting oo remain in control of things in 
our society.
In criticism of this position put forth by critical 
sociologists, I suggested that sociological research has 
hardly contributed such significant knowledge. As we sow,
0. Wright Mills and Pitirim Sorokin questioned the very 
possibility of getting other than relatively trivial infor­
mation from the prevailing modes of empirical research in
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sociology, primarily having in mind survey techniques which 
focus on attitudes and opinions. Such knowledge was character 
ized by Sorokin as mere "hearsay stuff". Members of the Frank 
furt School likewise found prevailing research techniques in 
sociology to be a very limited tool. Again with the focus on 
survey techniques. Theodor Adorno points out in his essay, 
"Sociology and Empirical Research", that empirical social 
research suffers from two defects: (l) it cannot uncover in­
formation relevant to the larger, structural aspects of
society, and (2) it merely reflects prevailing attitudes and 
opinions. As Adorno comments:
In general, the objectivity of empirical
social research is one of method, not of
subject-matter. Through statistical pro­
cessing, information on a greater or lesser 
number of individuals is turned into state­
ments which, following the laws of probability, 
are generalizable and independent of individual 
variations. But the resultant mean values, 
objectively valid though they be, nevertheless 
remain for the most part objective statements 
about individual subjects; in fact, about how 
these subjects see themselves in reality.
Society in its objectivity, the aggregate of 
all the relationships, institutions and forces, 
within whose context men act, is something 
vrhich the empirical methods of questionnaire 
and interview, with all their possible com­
binations and variations, have ignored or at 
least regarded as purely accidental....
[Moreover'] By taking more or less standard­
ized surveys of numbers of individuals and 
processing the results into statistics, they 
tend to enshrine already widespread -- and as 
such pre-formed -- attitudes as the founda­
tion for their perspective on the subject of 
their investigations.1
In addition to pointing out some serious shortcomings in
empirical social research, the above statement also provides
the basis for the charge that the conservatism of mainstream
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sociology is. in part, rooted in an approach to studying 
society which merely reflects (through the filter of indivi­
dual attitudes and opinions) the established social order.
So, the prevailing mode of empirical research in sociology 
cannot provide the basis for criticism of the existing social 
order, much less provide knowledge of significant aspects of 
society; and it cannot do this not because of who controls 
this research but because these empirical research techni­
ques are themselves very limited tools by which to study society.
When some critical sociologists did question the 
adequacy of the predominant survey research techniques, they 
presented an alternative (usually some variant of participant 
observation) which, I argued, failed to overcome some of the 
problems in survey methods they highlighted. In short, I 
pointed out, as have other critics, that there is no real way 
to be sure that the findings of a participant observer are 
any more objective or accurate than those of a survey research­
er. Moreover, the principal focus of such an approach is 
likewise on individual beliefs, attitudes, motives, and the 
like, the only difference being that Individuals and groups 
are studied in their natural settings and not with artificial 
devices such as a questionnaire. There was still the neglect 
of larger historical and structural aspects of society. So, 
in their one attempt to address the crucial question of the 
adequacy of mainstream sociology's methodological base, 
critical sociologists failed to come up with anything signi­
ficant, In contrast, I suggested that the criticism offered
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by Mills and members of the Frankfurt School is more signi­
ficant .
In Chapter III critical sociologists' analysis of the 
value question was discussed and here the disavowal of any 
philosophical issues became even more explicit. On a couple 
of occasions critical sociologists, such as Alvin Gouldner, 
were cited as stating an express disinterest in logical or 
ethical questions. Critical sociologists were almost univer­
sally content with what I called the "let's be honest" posi­
tion; that is, it is sufficient for sociologists merely to 
declare their value position, whatever it may be. Some criti­
cal sociologists did perceive certain value positions as better 
than others (such as working for the elimination of human suf­
fering or working for the greater freedom for the individual), 
but because they viewed values as both subjective and relative 
they really lacked any basis for defending any particular 
value position.
In short, I argued that this "let's be honest" position 
and its underlying subjective and relativistic view of value 
was a bankrupt position. It failed to provide either a re­
solution of the value question or a basis for a new and more 
significant sociology. In contrast, I presented the views of 
a couple members of the Frankfurt School and Elijah Jordan, 
which represented what I consider significant attempts to 
define an objective view of value.
Among the members of the Frankfurt School, Max 
Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse were perhaps the most insistent
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about the deficiencies of relativism. They also suggested an 
objective base for determining what a just society lsj that 
is they tried to spell out the conditions necessary for the 
realisation of a just, 'humane social order. As was noted, 
among these conditions was the satisfaction of the needs of 
physical survival for all human beings and the elimination 
of necessary labor through automation as a step in the direc­
tion of freeing individuals to develop as total persons. Sig­
nificantly, these critical theorists were under no illusion 
that by- merely"opening things up" or by merely declaring 
one's values, as critical sociologists urged, anything posi­
tive toward the realization of a more significant sociology 
or a more just society was going to be achieved. Although I 
do not claim to have proved that the argument of Horkheimer 
and Marcuse is more valid, I do believe it is worthy of con­
sideration by sociologists and it does seem to offer one 
possible resolution of the value question in sociology, 
whereas the predominant position among critical sociologists 
provides no basis for defining a more significant direction 
for sociology or society.
In light of the same reservation as that expressed 
above, I presented the views of Elijah Jordan on the question 
of value. As was noted, Jordan does not subscribe to the 
prevailing view that fact and value can be considered separate­
ly. Indeed, as Jordan points out, value is the meaning of fact 
in a larger system of relations. The value of the United States' 
decision to intervene in Vietnam, for example, is the meaning
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of that fact in the context of a larger system of relations. 
That fact can be analyzed in terms of its meaning for U.S. 
foreign policy, its meaning for the people of the United 
States or Vietnam, or, most significantly, its meaning for 
the world as a whole. The ultimate determination of the value 
of that fact, whether it was good or bad policy, rests upon 
the question of how it fits in the world as a whole. Obviously, 
the determination cf value on this basis is a very complex 
matter, but what Jordan proposes is, in a sense, no different 
from the judgment an agricultural specialist makes with res­
pect to the value of a particular soil -- how that soil fits 
in the larger agricultural system. We have no quarrel with 
the agricultural specialist making an objective determination 
of what is good soil and what is bad soil for various purposes; 
and, significantly, I believe we would all agree that this is 
not a judgment that can properly be based on mere subjective 
opinion .
To define specifically what Jordan's objective base 
for value is would take us far beyond the purposes of this 
dissertation, but I believe enough of Jordan's position and 
the position of Horkheimer and Marcuse have been presented 
to warrant serious consideration by sociologists interested 
in developing a more significant, relevant sociology. Critical 
sociologists, by subscribing to the prevailing subjective 
view of value, leave us with a plethora of value options and 
no basis for determining which among these value options 
should guide the work of sociologists in their capacity as
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social scientists and social reformers. 3y shifting the focus 
of the value question from individuals (and their subjective 
beliefs and attitudes) to the world (and the objective rela­
tions which exist there) Jordan provides some basis for deter­
mining what a significant sociology is and toward what kind 
of society should sociologists be working.
In Chapters IV and V more of Jordan's objective base 
is revealed by way of presenting his conception of society: 
that society is essentially an organized system of institutions. 
Jordan argues that institutions (or "corporate persons") are 
the basic units of society and, significantly, the real actors 
in society. They are the real actors in the sense that it is 
by way of them that we achieve human ends, from relatively 
simple acts (such as making breakfast) to more complex acts 
(such as designing a school system). All of these acts are 
bound up with institutions, with the myriad of objects and 
their organization and distribution which are necessary to 
carry them out. Moreover, Jordan maintains that human relations 
are mediated by these institutions: that a teacher enters the 
lives of students by way of education, by way of the system 
of objects which has been developed to carry out the act of 
education -- the libraries, the books, the classrooms, etc..
A farmer enters all of our lives by way of an agricultural 
and marketing system, even though we may never have face-to- 
face contact with that farmer or with the people involved in 
marketing what the farmer produces. This is not to deny the 
existence or significance of human relations such as love,
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friendship, and the like, but even these "psychological" re­
lations involve objects (eg., that a friendship is sustained 
through the use of a telephone system, postal system, or by 
having access to some means of transportation, or that a 
mother's love for her child counts for little when lack of 
access to adequate food supplies causes permanent brain 
damage or death). Jordan is arguing that these objective re­
lations are fundamental, they are the backbone of society, 
not the subjective, psychological relations among individuals 
(which ignore the individual's relation to this natural and 
cultural world of objects) that critical and mainstream soci­
ologists alike emphasize. Hence, on Jordan's view, any sound 
value position, any program for the realization of a just 
society, must be concerned with this world of objects, with 
the proper organization and integration of these institutions, 
and not merely with granting greater individual freedom, as 
many critical sociologists maintained.
Critical sociologists' proposal to expand individual 
freedom, particularly freedom of expression, in both society 
and sociology, is taken up in Chapter IV. The position they 
arrive at is aptly characterized by one critical sociologist 
as an "endless dialectic": that a better society and a better
sociology would involve the constant clash of ideas, of dis­
cussion and dialogue. Not to deny the importance of having a 
free exchange of ideas, I nonetheless argued that such a 
position resolves little with respect to the nature of this 
more just, humane society toward which critical sociologists
say they are working. It was in this context that I cited the 
following comment by Jordan on the nature of democracy: he
argued that democracy does not encompass any "...suggestions 
as to the nature or structure of the state, no hint as to how 
the functioning of the institutions of life are to be organized 
into a corporately integrated whole, no picture at all of that 
order which is the ground of all meanings in political or 
public life."^
Members of the Frankfurt School, who were also con­
cerned with "freeing" the individual from various forms of 
domination, likewise do not subscribe to the simplistic 
position of critical sociologists. These critical theorists, 
as does Jordan, bring to our attention the fact that the 
individual is bound up with a larger social order, and th'fc 
any program of significant social change must begin with the 
recognition of this fact. Indeed, the Marxian notion of the 
dialectic itself is based upon changing material conditions, 
which is far removed from the kind of "endless dialectic" 
that critical sociologists see as the salvation of society.
Finally, in Chapter V we come to one of the more 
significant developments of this whole critical movement. In 
this chapter alternative conceptions of society developed by 
critical sociologists are discussed. What is significant here 
is that there is an implicit recognition that what is wrong 
with mainstream sociology lies in its theoretical base, that 
is, the conception of society with which it operates. None­
theless, it was pointed out that the principal alternatives
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offered by critical sociologists focused on the individual 
and subjective relations among individuals,, which I suggested 
were not all that different from mainstream sociology. A more 
significant alternative, I argued, lies along the lines of 
the objective, institutional conception of society presented 
by Jordan and, in somewhat different forms, by a few critical 
sociologists and members of the Frankfurt School. Although no 
proof of the greater validity of Jordan's position was offered 
as such, I believe his views on the nature of modern society, 
as they are described at the end of Chapter V, are significant 
and appear to have a firmer basis in fact than do the views 
of critical sociologists which largely ignore the existence 
of an objective order of things.
In sum, I believe this dissertation has shown that 
the sociological critique of American sociology has offered 
little more than superficial criticism of mainstream sociology 
and much less in terms of developing a more significant soci­
ology. On the other hand, I believe the promise of the soci­
ological critique of American sociology (i.e., if it is to 
contribute to the realisation of a more significant sociology 
and a just society) lies in the direction of the criticism of 
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